


AN ANONYMOUS FOURTEENTH-CENTURY  
TREATISE ON "INSOLUBLES":  
TEXT AND STUDY

by

Paul Vincent Spade

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment  
of Requirements for the Degree of  
Licentiate of Mediaeval Studies in  
the Pontifical Institute of  
Mediaeval Studies, Toronto

1969



Errata

- p. #22, line 21, word 4. Read pars
- p. #24, line 8, word 2. Read conclusions
- p. #40, line 21, word 1. For stipulated read stipulates
- p. 12, par. 21, line 1, word 3. For qrguitur read arguitur
- p. 45, par. 83, line 8, word 2. For convertibile  
read convertibilis
- p. 55, par. 102, line 7, word 5. For sifficiunt  
read sufficiunt
- p. 59, par. 110, line 23, word 4. For penna read pennam
- p. 92, par. 185, line 19, word 3. For convertibilis  
read convertibile
- p. 106, par. 226, line 2, word 2. For minor read minori
- p. 112, par. 237, line 7, word 11. For parta read parte
- p. 113, par. 239, line 13, word 6. For dicjunctiva  
read disjunctiva
- p. 122, par. 254, line 7, word 4. For prolata read prolatae
- p. 137, text c, line 8, word 1. For solve read solvi
- p. 138, text e, line 12, word 1. For significatio  
read significato
- p. 140, under FL, line 2, word 1. For Problemegeschichten  
read Problemegeschichten
- p. 141, under SL, line 6, word 2. For stoppint read stopping
- p. 141, under SL, line 9, word 2. For incunabuls  
read incunabula
- p. 142, n. 6, line 2, word 3. For work read word
- p. 142, n. 6, line 9, word 1. For talis read talia
- p. 144, n. 14, line 3, word 4. For Mediaeval read Medieval
- p. 148, n. 66, point 3, line 2, word 5. For Propositio  
read Praedicato
- p. 149, n. 73, 1st full par., line 9, after word 8  
(falsa). Add ....Sexta conclusio: Omnis propositio  
significans se esse veram et se esse falsam est falsa.
- p. 152, n. 12, line 3, word 5. Read eatenus
- p. 152, n. 12, line 17, word 6. For instantis read instantia
- p. 154, n. 35, point 4, line 1, word 2. For importnat  
read important
- p. 156, n. 67, word 5. For descriptiones read descriptions
- p. 158, n. 88, line 15, word 6. For least read best
- p. 162, n. 45, 3rd par., line 7, word 8. For 46r read 47r
- p. 164, n. 6, line 7, after word 5 (propter). Add  
finem. Et similiter formae non sunt, nisi propter
- p. 166, n. 24, word 5. For: aliqualliter read aliqualliter
- p. 168, n. 65, line 11, word 4. For praedicatum  
read praedicatur

- p. 168, n. 66, line 5, word 2. For esse read inesse
- p. 169, n. 74, line 7, word 3. For fir read fit
- p. 171, n. 99, line 4, word 4. For and read an
- p. 171, n. 99, 2nd par., line 8, last word. For work  
read word
- p. 172, n. 7, word 3. For quod read intentiones
- p. 175, n. 53, text a, line 14, after word 1 (intentionum).  
Add seu
- p. 183, n. 62, line 3, after the Bekker number (1027b17-22,).  
Add Junt., v. 8,
- p. 184, n. 80, word 2. For Tertia read Tertio
- p. 185, n. 89, word 3. For ipse read ipsa
- p. 186, n. 17, the Bekker number. For 1024b16-1025a12  
read 1024b16-1025a13
- p. 188, n. 49, word 3. For arrarante read apparante
- p. 189, n. 67, line 1, the Bekker number. For 16af.  
read 16a4f.
- p. 191, n. 98, line 1, word 6. For tc. read tx.
- p. 193, n. 28, line 1, word 9. For 'est' read 'est
- p. 194, n. 53, line 4, word 8. For dubiecti read subiecti
- p. 196, n. 95, line 2, word 2. For principle read principal
- p. 209, n. 44, line 2, word 2. For ratio read oratio
- p. 209, n. 44, line 2, word 5. For monis read omnis
- p. 229, s.v. variatio. For 208 read 209
- p. 229, s.v. molitum. For molitum read volitum
- p. 231, entry 4, line 5, word 1. For Merietti read Marietti



# Table of Contents

<u>STUDY.</u>	pp. #1-#55
Introduction	#1-#5
The Purpose of This Study.	#1-#2
The Nature and Importance of the Semantic Antinomies	#2-#5
The Treatise, Its Date and Its Author	#5-#8
The Form of the Treatise	#8-#9
The Subject-Matter of the Treatise.	#9-#12
The Consideration of Previous Opinions	#12-#30
The First Previous Opinion, Based on John Dumbleton	#12-#16
The Second Previous Opinion	#16-#20
The Third Previous Opinion, That of William of Ockham.	#20-#24
The Fourth Previous Opinion	#25-#28
Other Opinions	#28-#30
Thomas Bradwardine	#28-#29
An Anonymous Opinion	#30
The Principles of the Author's Solution	#30-#39
Three Divisions.	#30-#33
Five Suppositions	#33-#35
Two Descriptions	#35-#36
Five Conclusions	#36-#39
Application of the Principles to Individual Cases	#39-#44
An Evaluation of the Author's Work	#45-#51
Philosophical	#45-#49
Historical.	#49-#51
The Manuscript	#52-#54
The Edition	#54-#55

<u>TEXT</u> . . . . .	1-124
<u>APPENDICES</u> . . . . .	126-138
A. Four Texts on <u>Insolubilia</u> from John Dumbleton's <u>Summa logicae et philosophiae</u> <u>naturalis</u> . . . . .	126-128
B. Two Texts of Ockham on <u>Insolubilia</u> and Self-Reference . . . . .	129-134
C. Five Texts from Thomas Bradwardine's <u>Insolubilia</u> . . . . .	135-138
<u>List of Abbreviations of Works Frequently</u> <u>Cited</u> . . . . .	140-141
<u>Notes</u>	
<u>to the Study</u> . . . . .	142-163
<u>to the Text</u> . . . . .	164-210
<u>to the Appendices</u> . . . . .	211-212
<u>Indices</u>	
<u>Index of Authors and Works Cited in the</u> <u>Text</u> . . . . .	213-216
<u>Index of Propositions Discussed in the</u> <u>Text</u> . . . . .	217-220
<u>Index of Terms</u> . . . . .	221-229
<u>Bibliography</u> . . . . .	230-238

STUDY

## Introduction

### A.) The purpose of this study

The study of self-referential semantic antinomies is an enterprise of considerable interest to modern thinkers. The literature on the subject is immense.<sup>1</sup> By and large, recent attempts to resolve the antinomies have proceeded by appeal either to the theory of types<sup>2</sup> or to the distinction between object-language and meta-language.<sup>3</sup> Yet the problem is scarcely to be considered settled.<sup>4</sup>

For this reason, an inquiry into the mediaeval discussions of the semantic antinomies seems to be of more than merely historical interest. Fresh light may perhaps be thrown on the modern versions of the problem by examining mediaeval logicians' presentations of it and suggested solutions to it. Unfortunately, little work has been done in this field, largely because of the unavailability of the mediaeval texts.<sup>5</sup>

The purpose of this present study is to contribute something toward the amelioration of this state of affairs. A hitherto unedited mediaeval treatise on semantic antinomies--"insolubilia",<sup>6</sup> as they were

called--will be edited and studied, its doctrine examined and evaluated, and its use of and relation to other mediaeval writers on the problem investigated, insofar as the present state of research makes this possible.

B.) The Nature and Importance of the  
Semantic Antinomies

Perhaps the most "classical" form of semantic antinomy is the so-called Liar Paradox, in which a speaker utters the following sentence only: 'I am lying'. The antinomy breaks out as follows: The speaker's statement is either true or false. If it is true, then it follows that, just as he says, he is in fact lying. Accordingly, what he says is not true, but rather false. On the other hand, if his statement is false, then, contrary to his own assertion, he is not lying, but rather uttering a true statement. Thus, his statement is true if it is false, and false if it is true. Is the speaker a liar or is he not? This dilemma constitutes the antinomy.

Such an antinomy is not a mere contradiction. A contradiction can be accommodated by simply denying it--



by asserting that it is false. An antinomy, on the contrary, gives rise to a contradiction regardless whether it is true or false. The distinguishing feature of an antinomy is precisely this, that there seems to be no way of avoiding a contradiction, once the antinomical statement is given.

The paradox can be presented in other forms as well. One version which avoids any reference to a speaker is simply the following: 'This sentence is false'. In fact, a great variety of subtle and often amusing variations on this paradoxical theme have been developed.<sup>7</sup>

Such paradoxes are of very considerable importance. Van Heijenoort writes, "Since the last years of the nineteenth century the paradoxes have exerted a profound influence on the development of logic. For a while their effect on logic and the foundations of mathematics seemed devastating."<sup>8</sup>

The importance of the semantic antinomies lies in the fact that they seem to be cases in which a contradiction is produced simply by the straightforward application of logical rules of inference--rules that are said to be logically valid precisely because their

application would never give rise to a contradiction. The antinomies strike at the very heart of human reasoning. It is the whole enterprise of rationality that is at stake. Quine writes, "...it is they that bring on the crises in thought. An antinomy produces a self-contradiction by accepted ways of reasoning. It establishes that some tacit and trusted pattern of reasoning must be made explicit and henceforward be avoided or revised."<sup>9</sup> Again, "An antinomy, however, packs a surprise that can be accommodated by nothing less than a repudiation of part of our conceptual heritage."<sup>10</sup>

Although, in both the Middle Ages and more modern times, the problem of the antinomies arose in the context of formal logic,<sup>11</sup> its solution inevitably leads one beyond purely formal considerations to the investigation of the semantic relation of words to reality. Hence the term 'semantic antinomies'. This fact was first pointed out by F.P. Ramsey.<sup>12</sup> Ramsey distinguished two groups of paradoxes. The first group "consists of contradictions which, were no provision made against them, would occur in a logical or mathematical system itself. They involve only logical

or mathematical terms such as class and number, and show that there must be something wrong with our logic or mathematics."

Paradoxes of the second sort, however, such as the Liar Paradox and other semantic antinomies,

are not purely logical, and cannot be stated in logical terms alone; for they all contain some reference to thought, language, or symbolism, which are not formal but empirical terms. So they may be due not to faulty logic or mathematics, but to faulty ideas concerning thought and language. If so, they would not be relevant to mathematics or to logic, if by 'logic' we mean a symbolic system, though of course they would be relevant to logic in the sense of the analysis of thought.<sup>13</sup>

Accordingly, the mediaeval treatise edited below considers, in addition to matters of formal logic, questions of semantics and even of psychology--questions about the meanings of terms, about the formation of mental propositions, and about the relation of language to thought.

#### The Treatise, Its Date and Its Author

The treatise seems to have been originally part of a larger work dealing with the parva logicalia,<sup>14</sup> or perhaps even with the whole of logic. Several references in the text indicate that the original work comprised

more than the treatise on insolubilia. In paragraph 85, for instance, there is a reference to a description of the term 'significare'. No such description occurs in the treatise. In paragraphs 19 and 41, there are references to the descriptions of a univocal term and of the term 'subordinare', respectively. In both cases the description is said to be "alibi declarata". Yet, they are not to be found anywhere in the Insolubilia.

More explicitly, paragraph 104 speaks of "ea quae prius dicuntur in materia suppositionum". Again, in the last paragraph, paragraph 258, the author promises to consider certain pseudo-insolubles "non hic, sed convenienter in obligationibus". Treatises on supposition and obligationes were regularly included in the parva logicalia, along with treatises on insolubles.<sup>15</sup>

The work seems to have been intended especially for beginners, for "juvenes" who presumably had not had much experience in the more abstruse aspects of logical argumentation. At the end of paragraph 162, for example, the author remarks that, when he is discussing insolubles in greater detail later in the treatise, he will, for the sake of the "juvenes", treat of insolubles of the more difficult "exclusive" sort somewhat more briefly.<sup>16</sup>

The treatise was written sometime after 1335, perhaps by a Franciscan, and probably at Oxford. The terminus post quem for the work is established by the author's use of John Dumbleton's Summa logicae et philosophiae naturalis in discussing the first of the four previous opinions considered in the treatise. Dumbleton's work in turn makes use of William Heytesbury's Regulae solvendi sophismata, written in 1335.<sup>17</sup> The present treatise was thus written sometime after that date.

No terminus ante quem can be certainly assigned to the treatise, although one might suspect that it was written sometime during the second quarter of the century. Another treatise on insolubilia in the same codex, that of Roger Nottingham, is dated 1343 in the manuscript.<sup>18</sup>

Every identifiable work in the codex is by an author affiliated with Oxford University: Thomas Bradwardine, Roger Nottingham, Walter Chatton (?), Adam Wodeham, Richard of Campsall and Richard Killington.<sup>19</sup> Of these, Nottingham, Chatton and Wodeham were Franciscans.<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, in paragraph 243, the author of the present treatise explains the fallacia consequentis by an example which begins: "Frater studiosus communiter est in choro,



et similiter communiter est in studio." Although all this is scarcely incontrovertible evidence, it certainly suggests that the author himself was perhaps an Oxford Franciscan.

### The Form of the Treatise

In brief, the form of the treatise is as follows. After a short consideration of the nature of an insoluble,<sup>21</sup> the author considers four solutions held by previous writers.<sup>22</sup> Taking up each solution in turn, he first states the principles and argumentation on which it is based, and then rejects it on the basis of several counter-arguments.

After each of these opinions has been considered and rejected, the author turns to a positive presentation of the principles of his own solution. He states and argues for three "divisions" (i.e., dichotomies),<sup>23</sup> five suppositions,<sup>24</sup> two descriptions<sup>25</sup> and five conclusions.<sup>26</sup> The last two conclusions concern the question whether a part can stand for the whole of which it is a part. This question was argued at length in discussing the four previous opinions, and the author feels that he must

defend his own conclusions on the matter a little more fully. Accordingly, there follows a series of objections to the author's fourth and fifth conclusions,<sup>27</sup> together with his replies.<sup>28</sup>

When the principles of the author's solution have thus been established, he proceeds to resolve the problem of insolubilia by applying the principles to individual illustrative cases. Simple categorical insolubles are discussed and analyzed, first those which are true,<sup>29</sup> then those which are falsa.<sup>30</sup> Composite insolubles are then considered, first disjunctive insolubles,<sup>31</sup> then conjunctive ones,<sup>32</sup> exclusive ones,<sup>33</sup> and finally exceptive ones.<sup>34</sup> The treatise ends with a promise to consider certain pseudo-insolubles in a separate treatise on obligationes.<sup>35</sup>

#### The Subject-Matter of the Treatise

For the anonymous author, insolubles are "sophismata ex quibus non realiter, sed apparenter, sequitur utraque pars contradictionis, propter quam apparentiam talia sophismata 'insolubilia' dicuntur, id est, de difficili solubilia."<sup>36</sup> Two points in this description deserve attention: first, insolubles are said to be in fact

solvable--albeit only with difficulty; second, the source of this difficulty is said to lie in certain inferences that are only apparently valid.

That insolubles are really "de difficili solubilia" is carefully pointed out by other writers as well. The anonymous author of the Insolubilia contained in Bibliothèque Nationale, MS lat. 16617, writes, for example<sup>37</sup>:

Circa tractatum de insolubilibus primo sciendum quod hoc nomen 'insolubile' dicitur tripliciter: uno scilicet modo, quod nullo modo potest solvi; alio modo, quod bene potest solvi quantum est de se, propter tamen aliquod impedimentum numquam solvitur<sup>38</sup>; tertio modo, quod propter sui difficultatem difficile solvitur. Ad similitudinem primi dicitur vox invisibilis; ad similitudinem secundi dicitur lapis absconditus in terra invisibilis; ad similitudinem tertii dicitur sol invisibilis. Ultimo autem modo intendimus nunc de insolubili.<sup>39</sup>

Again, Albert of Saxony's Insolubilia begins<sup>40</sup>: "Insolubilia dicuntur non quia nullo modo possint solvi, sed quia solveere est difficile". Yet again, Ockham writes<sup>41</sup>: "Circa insolubilia est sciendum quod non ideo dicuntur sophismata aliqua insolubilia, quia nullo modo possunt solvi, sed quia cum difficultate solvuntur". And again he writes<sup>42</sup>: "Illud argumentum dicitur insolubile, quia de difficili solvitur".<sup>43</sup>

Nor is the author alone in holding that the difficulty in insoluble propositions arises from certain sophistical

inferences that are only apparently valid. Ockham maintains<sup>44</sup>: "Unde sciendum quod insolubilia sophismata sunt, quando, per consequentias apparentes quae videntur regulari per regulas necessarias, ex propositione aliqua contingente infertur sua opposita, quae ideo dicuntur insolubilia, quia difficile est tales consequentias impedire".<sup>45</sup>

For the author, the apparent validity of such inferences is based in turn on the apparent supposition of certain terms in the insoluble proposition. At least one term in the proposition must seem to stand for a "complexum"--i.e., a proposition--while in reality it does not.<sup>46</sup> In the author's view, this is a necessary condition for an insoluble. For, if Sortes says only "Deus est" and Plato says "Homo est asinus", while some third party says "Solus Sortes dicit verum", this last proposition is not an insoluble at all, for the term 'verum' in it does not merely seem to stand for a proposition, but in fact stands for one, namely, Sortes' statement 'Deus est'.<sup>47</sup> Such cases the author promises to discuss in his treatise on obligationes.<sup>48</sup>

In a word, then, the author thinks of an insoluble as a sophism which gives rise to a contradiction, and



which is difficult to solve because of certain seemingly valid arguments which are really fallacious, and which are based on the fact that at least one term in the sophistical proposition seems to stand for a proposition, while in reality it does not. It is not hard to see that a solution to the problem of insolubilia is already contained in germ in the author's way of describing them.

### The Consideration of Previous Opinions

#### A.) The First Previous Opinion, Based on John Dumbleton

The first of the four opinions considered by the author<sup>49</sup> is based on John Dumbleton's Summa logicae et philosophiae naturalis.<sup>50</sup> It solves the problem by simply denying that it could ever arise. It denies that the "casus" of an insoluble is possible. The casus of an insoluble is, as it were, the situation "by which a proposition is made insoluble".<sup>51</sup> Thus, according to this opinion, no proposition is insoluble in its own right. The author agrees with the first opinion on this point.<sup>52</sup> For instance, the proposition 'Sortes dicit falsum', taken by itself, does not constitute



an insoluble. It would be an insoluble only under certain circumstances which would constitute the casus of the insoluble. If, for example, Sortes says "Homo est asinus", while Plato, referring to Sortes' statement, says "Sortes dicit falsum", there is no insoluble--indeed, Plato's statement is a true one, and there is no paradox at all. If, on the other hand, it is Sortes himself who utters the statement 'Sortes dicit falsum', and if, further, he utters no other proposition, and if there is but one Sortes, and if, finally, Sortes' utterance means what it means in common parlance,<sup>53</sup> then--according to the author<sup>54</sup>--Sortes' utterance is a genuine insoluble.

The first opinion denies that such a case could ever arise by which a proposition would be made an insoluble. This opinion is based principally on two "conclusions". The first conclusion--the third in Dumbleton's treatment of the matter--is: "Nulla propositio per intentionem simplicem in anima, sed per complexum, comprehenditur".<sup>55</sup> The second--the fourth in Dumbleton's presentation--is the following: "Cujuslibet propositionis significantis pro complexo subjectum vel praedicatum est propositio, et alteri vel utrique propositio" in anima "correspondet".<sup>56</sup>

Thus, for example, in the proposition '"Homo est asinus" dicitur a Sorte', the subject would itself be a proposition, while in the proposition 'Falsum dicitur a Sorte', the subject would not itself be a proposition. In the latter case, however, the speaker must have some proposition in mind, to which he is referring by the word 'falsum'.

On the basis of these principles, the author outlines the argument behind the first opinion's denial that the casus of an insoluble is possible.<sup>57</sup> The statement of the argument, as it stands in the treatise, is rather terse. The following presentation, therefore, involves some degree of extrapolation from the text.

As a paradigm example, the following casus is chosen, namely that the proposition 'Falsum est' be the only proposition. This casus is then shown to be impossible. For the term 'falsum' in the proposition 'Falsum est' in some way stands for a complexum.<sup>58</sup> Thus, according to the second conclusion (Dumbleton's fourth), either this term itself is a proposition, or else some mental proposition must correspond to it. But the term 'falsum' is not itself a proposition. Therefore, some mental proposition corresponds to it.

But this is a second proposition, other than the original proposition 'Falsum est'. Thus the casus which posited that 'Falsum est' be the only proposition is impossible, since there are at least two propositions involved.<sup>59</sup> Dumbleton presents an analogous argument.<sup>60</sup>

There is some resemblance between this opinion and the fourth in Paul of Venice's list of fifteen solutions<sup>61</sup>: "Quarta opinio ponit quod nullus potest dicere se dicere falsum, nec intellegere se intellegere falsum, nec aliqua propositio potest esse ex qua insolubile posset generari". The resemblance may be only superficial. In Paul of Venice's description of the opinion, it is the proposition that cannot be, not the casus. Paul takes this to mean, quite literally, that no one can utter the words 'Ego dico falsum',<sup>62</sup> which is of course false. This might, however, be a distortion of the opinion. At any rate, no definite connection between the first opinion in the anonymous treatise and the fourth in Paul of Venice's list can at present be firmly established.

The expedient of solving certain insolubles by denying that their casus are possible was apparently not an unfamiliar one in the milieu in which the anonymous treatise was written. For in Roger Nottingham's

Insolubilia,<sup>63</sup> written at Oxford probably about the same time as the anonymous work edited below,<sup>64</sup> the same technique is used in certain cases. For instance<sup>65</sup>:

Similis est hic: Sit quod omnis dicens falsum sit aeger, et solum talis, et omnis dicens verum sit sanus, et solum talis, et dicat Socrates praecisive se esse aegrum, et dicat Plato praecise ipse non est sanus; pro istis et consimilibus patet quod partes casus sunt impossibiles et quod casus ponit unam impossibilem consequentiam.

Paragraphs 6 to 23 of the anonymous treatise contain the author's refutation of the first opinion. He presents five arguments, all of which are directed, in one way or another, against the opinion's fourth conclusion. These refutations of the first opinion--as, indeed, of the others--will not be considered in detail, since they contribute little to an understanding of the author's own view or of that which he is refuting.<sup>66</sup>

#### B.) The Second Previous Opinion

The second of the four opinions considered by the author<sup>67</sup> grants the casus of insolubles,<sup>68</sup> and concludes that every insoluble is false.<sup>69</sup> This opinion is based primarily on two suppositions and one conclusion.<sup>70</sup>

The suppositions are these: first, that a part can stand for the whole of which it is a part; second, that every



proposition signifies as of now (ut nunc), or simply, whatever follows from it.<sup>71</sup> The conclusion states that every proposition the extreme of which stands for a single item signifies or denotes an affirmation or negation for that item. Thus, when Sortes says the following proposition only: 'Sortes dicit falsum', it follows that the proposition signifies both that it is true and that it is false. For, since the extreme 'falsum' can stand for the whole of which it is part, and since the casus posits that there is nothing else for which it can stand, therefore it in fact stands for the whole of which it is a part, from which it follows that the proposition is false. Thus, by the second supposition, the proposition signifies that it is false. But if it is false, then, since it signifies that it is false, it follows that it is not as it signifies. That is, it is not false, from which it follows that it is true. Thus, again by the second supposition, the proposition signifies that it is true. Thus, the proposition signifies both that it is true and that it is false. Accordingly, since it signifies a contradiction, the proposition must be false.<sup>72</sup>

This position is similar to that of Albert of Saxony. The author was not thinking of Albert, however,



for the latter's suppositiones and conclusiones do not include those listed in the statement of this second opinion.<sup>73</sup>

On the basis of this opinion, the author says, some have held that insoluble propositions signify "first and principally" that they are false, but secondarily, and as a consequent, that they are true. In the first way, they signify what is the case, in the second way what is not the case.<sup>74</sup>

This derivative form of the second opinion may be that of a certain Robert Fland (i.e., of Flanders?), whose Insolubilia seems to have been preserved in a single manuscript in the Bibliothèque publique de la ville in Bruges.<sup>75</sup> The incipit is: "Insolubile est propositio signans primo et principaliter sicut est, et ex consequenti aliter quam est."<sup>76</sup> Until the work can be examined more carefully, there is no way to be certain that Robert Fland based his reasoning on a variation of the second opinion considered in the present treatise. Yet, the close correspondence of terminology would indicate at least some connection between Fland and the position described here by the author.

Buridan mentions what is perhaps this same position.  
He says<sup>77</sup>:

Thus, it is otherwise said, nearer the truth, that every proposition virtually implies another proposition, so that of the subject standing for it, there is affirmed this predicate "true." I say it implies virtually just as an antecedent implies that which follows from it. Thus, any proposition is not true, if in this consequent affirmation, the subject and predicate do not stand for the same....For it does not suffice for a proposition to be true that it is as it signifies according to formal significations. Rather, it is required that it is as is signified by the consequent which was virtually implied.

The author first argues against this variation on the second opinion,<sup>78</sup> and then turns to a consideration of the opinion in itself.<sup>79</sup> Others, he says, have sufficiently refuted the second supposition and the first conclusion of the opinion, and therefore he will consider primarily the first supposition, that a part can stand for the whole of which it is a part.<sup>80</sup> The opinion rests on this principle "sicut totali fundamento",<sup>81</sup> so that, if this be refuted, the position loses all plausibility whatever.<sup>82</sup>

The author approaches the matter as follows: a part can stand for its whole neither in a proposition in the soul nor in a spoken or written proposition outside the soul; therefore, in no proposition at all can a part

stand for its whole.<sup>83</sup> He then argues for the first part of the antecedent separately,<sup>84</sup> then the second part.<sup>85</sup> Finally, he concludes with a brief consideration of the opinion's second supposition, that a proposition signifies whatever follows from it.<sup>86</sup>

C.) The Third Previous Opinion, That  
of William of Ockham

The third of the opinions considered by the author<sup>87</sup> is that of William of Ockham. According to this opinion, some insolubles are true and some false.<sup>88</sup> The position is based on two principles: first, that a part cannot stand for the whole of which it is part; second, that, when Sortes says, for instance, 'Sortes dicit falsum', this means that Sortes some false proposition other than 'Sortes dicit falsum'.<sup>89</sup>

This, in fact, is exactly what Ockham maintains. If, he says, Sortes utters only this: 'Sortes dicit falsum', that proposition is false. It asserts that Sortes utters some false proposition other than 'Sortes dicit falsum'; but the casus posits that Sortes does not utter any such other proposition. Contrariwise, if Sortes utters only: 'Sortes non dicit verum', that

proposition is true, for indeed Sortes does not utter any true proposition other than 'Sortes non dicit verum'.<sup>90</sup>

There are two other reasons for affirming that the author was certainly thinking of Ockham. The first is a confusion about just what is the third opinion's final verdict on insolubles. Although he had already stated that the third opinion held that some insolubles are true and some false,<sup>91</sup> the author nevertheless says "Tertio, incidentaliter, dicit quod propositio dicta a Sorte nec est vera nec falsa".<sup>92</sup> Since the casus posits that the only proposition uttered by Sortes is the insoluble proposition 'Sortes dicit falsum', it must be the insoluble itself that is here said to be neither true nor false.

In replying to this "incidental" remark of the third opinion, the author observes that it is based solely on the following consideration: "sicut concedendum quod Sortes non dicit verum neque falsum aliud ab isto quod dicit, sic concedendum est quod propositio dicta a Sorte nec est vera nec falsa."<sup>93</sup> This clearly comes from the following remark of Ockham<sup>94</sup>: "...quando Sortes incipit sic loqui: 'Sortes dicit falsum', et quaeratur an Sortes dicit verum aut falsum, dicendum est

quod nec dicit verum nec falsum, sicut concedendum est quod nec dicit aliud verum nec aliud falsum ab isto."

If this remark is to be taken as the author seems to think, it would mean that Ockham was not consistent with himself. Yet, Ockham's remark means simply that, since there is no other proposition spoken by Sortes, no other proposition spoken by Sortes can be true or false. When read in its full context,<sup>95</sup> it is clear that Ockham does not mean--the author of the present treatise notwithstanding--that the proposition which is spoken by Sortes, i.e. 'Sortes dicit falsum', is neither true nor false.

The most conclusive reason, however, for affirming that the author certainly had Ockham in mind is a reference made while arguing against the principle that a part cannot stand for the whole of which it is a part. He says that such a principle would contradict what the author of the third opinion had already said "in materia obligationum, ubi dicit quod in ista propositione 'Omnis propositio est vera' subjectum significat totam illam propositionem cujus est pars".<sup>96</sup> In the first chapter on obligationes in his Summa logicae, Ockham in fact says just this.<sup>97</sup>



The author remarks that this opinion assumes without proof that which stands in need of proof in logic most of all, namely, that a part cannot stand for the whole of which it is a part.<sup>98</sup> Secondly, he says, although this opinion<sup>99</sup> is true, it nevertheless is opposed to the principles of its own author, and therefore he will argue against the opinion solely "ex principiis suis".<sup>1</sup> In fact, however, only the arguments in paragraphs 48-50, 52, 55 and 60 are formed explicitly "ex principiis suis".

The arguments against the third opinion proceed as follows: first, three arguments are given to prove that a part can signify the whole of which it is a part<sup>2</sup>; four arguments are then presented to prove that, if a part signifies the whole of which it is a part, then it can likewise stand for that same whole.<sup>3</sup> Six arguments are set out against the opinion's second principle.<sup>4</sup> Finally, a single argument is presented against the "incidental" remark mentioned above,<sup>5</sup> but a fuller consideration of the matter is put off to the discussion of the fourth opinion.<sup>6</sup>

It is difficult to know just what to make of the author's arguments against the third opinion. In refuting

the second opinion, he argued that a part cannot stand for the whole of which it is a part. This, indeed, is his own view.<sup>7</sup> Yet, here, in discussing the third opinion, he argues that a part can stand for its whole. What is one to make of these arguments?

The author never answers them. In his later presentation of arguments against his own fourth and fifth conclusions, together with their replies,<sup>8</sup> none of the arguments against the third opinion is included. The author tells us that the arguments are to be taken "ex principiis suis", but, as was just observed, not all of them are in fact based on peculiarly Ockhamist principles. Moreover, it is not clear that the author means to reject any of Ockham's principles on which the arguments might be based.

Thus, there is an embarrassing residue, as it were, in the treatise. Certain arguments have been brought forward which conflict openly with the author's principles. No attempt has been made to answer them. Perhaps the author simply overlooked the arguments, forgot, as it were, that they had been raised. In any case, they do not obscure the main outlines of the author's own position.

## D.) The Fourth Previous Opinion

The fourth and last opinion considered by the author<sup>9</sup> holds that an insoluble is neither true nor false.<sup>10</sup> It is based on two definitions, two suppositions and three conclusions.<sup>11</sup> The definitions are these: first, a true sign is a sign signifying precisely as things are; second, a false sign is a sign signifying as things are not. The two suppositions are as follows: first, the truth of that which is signified is the cause of the truth of the sign; second, the falsity of that which is signified is the cause of the falsity of the sign.<sup>12</sup> The three conclusions are these: first, the truth of a sign presupposes the truth of that which is signified, as a true cause prior even to the thing itself which is signified; second, the falsity of a sign naturally presupposes as its cause the contradictory and the "prima falsitas" of that which it signifies. The third conclusion states the opinion's verdict about insolubles: That which is signified by the proposition 'Omne verum est', or any similar proposition, is neither true nor false.<sup>13</sup>

This last conclusion is proved as follows<sup>14</sup>: the proposition 'Omne verum est' is neither true nor false.

For, if it were true, then its truth would presuppose the truth of that which it signifies, from the first conclusion; but the proposition itself is one of the things which it signifies; therefore, the truth of the proposition would presuppose the truth of the proposition. This is impossible, for in no order whatever can a thing presuppose itself. Thus, the proposition is not true.

Similarly, the proposition cannot be false. For if it were false, that which it signifies would have first to be false, from the second conclusion; but, as above, the proposition itself is one of the things which it signifies; thus, the proposition would have to be false before it could be false. This is clearly impossible. Accordingly, the proposition cannot be false.

Thus, the proposition 'Omne verum est' is neither true nor false. Similar arguments would apply in the case of other insoluble propositions, and indeed of any proposition which signifies itself.

The author of this opinion is unknown. Perhaps it corresponds to the sixth in Paul of Venice's list of fifteen solutions<sup>15</sup>: "Sexta opinio ponit quod insolubile nec est verum nec falsum, sed medium indifferens ad utrumque." This is not certain, for although the fourth

opinion holds that insolubles are neither true nor false, the author says nothing about its holding for a "third value", an intermediate ground between the two.

Although the author of the fourth opinion remains unidentified, it is nevertheless known that his position was based on two definitions, four suppositions and twenty-four conclusions.<sup>16</sup> His treatise could probably be identified on this basis. The schematic presentation of the opinion by the author of the present treatise is presumably but a distillation of the original.

In arguing against this opinion, the author proceeds as follows: first, several arguments are given directly against the opinion's third conclusion.<sup>17</sup> These constitute, as it were, a defense of the Law of Excluded Middle. Second, the author argues that the opinion destroys itself.<sup>18</sup> Third, he argues against the implicit premiss of the opinion, that a part can stand for its whole.<sup>19</sup> In this respect, the fourth opinion agrees with the second.<sup>20</sup>

The author then turns to an individual consideration of the opinion's definitions and conclusions. He argues against the first definition, that of a true sign, that it does not take into account propositions about the past or future, or about the possible.<sup>21</sup> The second



definition, that of a false sign, is not a good one, because it is applicable to certain true signs as well.<sup>22</sup> The first conclusion is rejected because it does not take into account true propositions about the merely possible,<sup>23</sup> nor is it consistent with the fact that there is an infinitude of merely possible true propositions.<sup>24</sup> Again, it ignores the case of true negative propositions.<sup>25</sup> The second conclusion is likewise rejected, because the false is not a positive reality, nor could a false significatum which exists only in the mind ground the falsehood of a proposition.<sup>26</sup> Finally, the second part of the second conclusion is rejected because one of a pair of contradictories does not necessarily presuppose the other.<sup>27</sup>

#### E.) Other Opinions

##### 1.) Thomas Bradwardine

Elsewhere in the treatise, the author refers to at least two other previous opinions, although he does not discuss them in full. After stating his fifth supposition, for instance, namely that every insoluble has its origin from some casus or supposition which is ordered to such an insoluble,<sup>28</sup> the author remarks<sup>29</sup> that it follows from this

quod male dividitur insolubile, quando dicitur  
quod aliquod insolubile oritur ex actu nostro  
et aliquod ex proprietate vocis....Nec ratio  
ducta pro illa opinione aliquid cogit, cum  
dicitur quod ideo oritur tale insolubile  
'Sortes dicit falsum' ex actu nostro, quia,  
si illae propositiones essent amotae ab actu  
nostro, non essent insolubiles.

He also says that, according to this opinion, every  
insoluble is false.<sup>30</sup>

These references are to the Insolubilia of Thomas  
Bradwardine, written between 1321 and 1324.<sup>31</sup> Compare  
the above text with the following passage<sup>32</sup>:

Divisiones autem sunt duae, quarum prima... talis  
est: Omne insolubile aut oritur ex actu nostro,  
aut ex proprietate vocis. Actus autem nostri  
sunt duplices, scilicet, dicere, intellegere, et  
similia. Ideo talia insolubilia: 'Sortes dicit  
falsum', 'Sortes intellegit falsum' dicuntur oriri  
ex actu nostro. Et hujus causa est quod, si illae  
propositiones essent remotae<sup>33</sup> ab actu nostro,  
non sunt<sup>34</sup> insolubilia. Sed, posito actu nostro,  
fiunt insolubilia. Vocis autem proprietates sunt  
subici et vocari, esse verum et esse falsum, et  
similia.<sup>35</sup>

Bradwardine argues further that propositions signifying  
that they are not true, or that they are false, are in fact  
false.<sup>36</sup>

Again, the author uses Bradwardine extensively in  
discussing his own fourth and fifth conclusions. At  
least five of the arguments which he raises against these  
conclusions are taken from Bradwardine's treatise.<sup>37</sup>

## 11.) An anonymous opinion

Still another writer's opinion seems to lie behind the author's third conclusion<sup>38</sup>: "Quidquid aliqua propositio vel ejus extremum denotat significare, ipsum necesse est quod actualiter significat." This conclusion is presumably directed against some who would distinguish between what a proposition denotes and what it signifies. For, in a later context, he says: "Nec valet fictio ponentium quod propositio dicta a Sorte denotat Sortem dicere aliquam aliam, cum, eo quod aliqua propositio aliquid denotat, ipsum significat. Et dicit tertia conclusio sic."<sup>39</sup> It is not known whom the author had in mind here.<sup>40</sup>

The Principles of the Author's Solution

## A.) Three Divisions

After stating and arguing against the four previous opinions in the first part of his treatise, the author sets out the principles of his own solution. He first posits three "divisions" (i.e., dichotomies). They are, first<sup>41</sup>: Every instance of supposition in a proposition is either material or significative. "Significative" supposition is the same as "personal" or

"formal" supposition.<sup>42</sup> Moody summarizes the distinction between this and material supposition<sup>43</sup>:

When a word was used significatively, to stand for things such as it was instituted to be a sign of, it was said to be used in personal supposition, or in formal supposition. When used autonymously, as a name for itself or for the kind of language-sign of which it is an instance, it was said to be used in material supposition.

To support this division, the author appeals to what was previously said "in materia suppositionum".<sup>44</sup> The dichotomy is important. For a third type of supposition was commonly accepted by mediaeval logicians, namely simple supposition. In the fourteenth century, this was taken to mean the supposition of a term for a mental sign or concept.<sup>45</sup> The author excludes this type of supposition by his first division.

The second division is simply an application of the Law of Excluded Middle<sup>46</sup>: Every simple categorical proposition is either true or false. This had already been defended in arguing against the fourth opinion.<sup>47</sup>

The third and last division is this<sup>48</sup>: Every insoluble is either categorical or hypothetical. This division is but an application of the more general principle, commonly held by mediaeval logicians, that every proposition

is either categorical or hypothetical. Ockham makes the distinction as follows<sup>49</sup>:

...propositionum alia est categorica, alia hypothetica. Propositio categorica est illa, quae habet subiectum et praedicatum et copulam et non includit plures propositiones tales. Propositio hypothetica est illa, quae ex pluribus categoricis est composita.

The author seems to use the terms 'simplex' and 'categorica' interchangeably when referring to insolubles, as likewise the terms 'composita' and 'hypothetica'. For in stating the two descriptions which are principles of his solution, he makes a dichotomy between "insolubile simplex categoricum" and "insolubile hypotheticum".<sup>50</sup> Again, after discussing true and false categorical insolubles, the author says, "Superest igitur, post insolubilia simplicia, de compositis aliquid disserere,..."<sup>51</sup>

Yet, among composite insolubles, the author includes exclusive and exceptive propositions.<sup>52</sup> These were not usually included among hypotheticals. Boethius,<sup>53</sup> Abelard,<sup>54</sup> and Peter of Spain,<sup>55</sup> for instance, give three kinds of hypotheticals, corresponding roughly to modern disjunctions, conjunctions and strict implications. Ockham held for five<sup>56</sup>: "copulativam, disjunctivam, conditionalem, causalem et temporalem." Paul of Venice mentions no



fewer than fourteen kinds of hypotheticals that had been distinguished by his day.<sup>57</sup>

In none of these authors are exclusive and exceptive propositions included among hypotheticals. Instead, such propositions were usually treated in discussions of syncategoremata<sup>58</sup> or of "exponible" propositions.<sup>59</sup> Ockham, for example, considers them to be exponibles, and says that, while they are in fact categorical, they are equivalent to hypotheticals.<sup>60</sup>

#### B.) Five Suppositions

After the divisions, the author lays down five suppositions. The first four deal with truth and falsehood in propositions. First, any simple, categorical, affirmative assertoric<sup>61</sup> proposition about the present is true if it primarily signifies precisely as things are.<sup>62</sup> Second, if any such proposition does not primarily signify precisely as things are, it is false. This follows from the first supposition and the second division.<sup>63</sup>

Third, if a simple, categorical, negative assertoric proposition about the present primarily signifies as things are, then it is false, and signifies something

not to be which, as a matter of fact, is.<sup>64</sup> Thus, fourth, if such a proposition primarily signifies as things are not, then it is true.<sup>65</sup>

These four suppositions present a peculiar notion of truth and falsehood. A proposition is not necessarily true if it signifies as things are, or false if it signifies as things are not. That is so only if the proposition is affirmative. For negative propositions, at least for those which are simple, categorical, assertoric and about the present, just the opposite holds. Contrast this position with the more common mediaeval view: "Propositio vera est oratio significans tantum sicut est....Propositio falsa est oratio significans aliter quam est."<sup>66</sup> Or again: "Propositio vera est quae, qualitercumque significat, ita est, et cum hoc possibile est eam esse....Propositio falsa est quae, non qualitercumque significat, ita necesse est et potest esse."<sup>67</sup>

The author's reasoning seems to be approximately as follows<sup>68</sup>: A simple, etc., affirmative proposition signifies a thing (or things) to be, either absolutely or in a certain way (aliquaqualiter). If, therefore, it signifies the thing to be according as it is in fact,

the proposition is true; otherwise, it is false. By contrast, a simple, etc., negative proposition signifies a thing (or things) not to be, either absolutely or in a certain way. If, therefore, it signifies the thing not to be just as it in fact is not, the proposition is true; if, on the other hand, it signifies the thing not to be as it is, then clearly it is false. For instance, the proposition 'Grass is not red' is true, because it signifies grass not to be (rem non esse) as it is not (sicut res non est). The proposition 'Grass is not green' is false, because it signifies grass not to be (rem non esse) as it is (sicut est).

The fifth supposition is that every insoluble takes its origin from a casus or supposition which is ordered to such an insoluble.<sup>69</sup> That is, it is the casus or supposition which renders an otherwise harmless proposition an insoluble.<sup>70</sup>

### C.) Two Descriptions

After the five suppositions, the author lays down two descriptions. First, a simple, categorical insoluble is one in which one or both extremes merely seem to stand for or to signify<sup>71</sup> precisely a complexum or complexa--i.e.,

propositions.<sup>72</sup> Second, a hypothetical insoluble is one in which some part merely seems to stand for or to signify precisely a complexum.<sup>73</sup> Once again, the notion that terms in an insoluble proposition seem to stand for something for which they do not in fact stand anticipates the author's solution.<sup>74</sup>

#### D.) Five Conclusions

After positing his divisions, suppositions and descriptions, the author argues to five conclusions. These are the most important of his principles. The first is a twofold conclusion<sup>75</sup>: Every mental species of a spoken or written term naturally and in a precise way makes known (est ostensiva) both itself and its own agent cause.<sup>76</sup> Second<sup>77</sup>: No extreme of a proposition outside the soul can signify a thing by imposition, except what is naturally and a priori signified by an extreme of some mental proposition. Third<sup>78</sup>: Whatever a proposition or its extreme denotes, that it must signify.<sup>79</sup>

The fourth and fifth conclusions are closely related. Fourth<sup>80</sup>: No extreme of a proposition in the mind can stand for the whole proposition itself. A

number of arguments support this conclusion.<sup>81</sup> Finally, the fifth and last conclusion, and the last of the author's principles<sup>82</sup>: If in no proposition in the mind can a part stand for its whole, then neither can a part stand for its whole in any proposition outside the mind.

These divisions, suppositions, descriptions and conclusions are "principles" of the author's solution only in a certain sense. They set out the author's basic position from which follows his solution to insolubles. They are not all, however, explicitly used in the argumentation which follows. The first division, for instance, is never referred to again, although it is hinted at, for example, in paragraph 245. Nor is the third division ever explicitly used, although it provides for the author's treatment of simple insolubles first, and then composite ones separately.

The two descriptions are used only once, and then only to rule certain cases out of consideration.<sup>83</sup> The third conclusion likewise is used but once, for the sole purpose of forestalling a specific objection.<sup>84</sup> The third, fourth and fifth suppositions are stated, but never again referred to or used in any fashion.



Thus, although each of the principles is useful insofar as it reveals one aspect of the author's thought, his treatment of insolubles could, strictly speaking, have done without some of them.

Furthermore, although the author's five conclusions are indeed conclusions of arguments, they are not in general conclusions of arguments based on principles which the author had previously laid down. Only the last conclusion is argued on such a basis. The others are argued from quite different principles. They have, in fact, no more claim to be singled out as "conclusions" than have certain of the suppositions which are also conclusions of arguments.<sup>85</sup>

After arguing for the last two conclusions, the author observes that they are more open to debate than are the rest.<sup>86</sup> He therefore sets out several arguments that might be raised against these conclusions,<sup>87</sup> and then replies to them one by one,<sup>88</sup> in order the more firmly to establish his point. Several of these arguments are taken directly from Thomas Bradwardine's Insolubilia.<sup>89</sup>

It is clearly of the greatest concern to the author to establish that a part cannot stand for its whole.

More than any other feature of his position, this point he argues again and again. He devotes several arguments to it in arguing against the second opinion.<sup>90</sup> He argues it again in discussing the fourth opinion. He proves the point with yet a third set of arguments in presenting his fourth and fifth conclusions. Not content with this, he now takes up the issue once again, in a lengthy consideration and reply to a series of objections. It is only after this overwhelming mass of argumentation that the author considers the matter safely established. Only with the last two conclusions thus firmly substantiated does he proceed to the resolution of the problem of insolubles.

#### Application of the Principles to Individual Cases

The author now turns to a consideration of individual cases, solving them by an application of the principles just established.<sup>91</sup> At this point, his style changes abruptly. Whereas hitherto he has maintained a style that might be described as "expository", he now adopts a more dialectical approach, as though he were engaged

in actual dispute with a particular opponent. The paragraphs are frequently much shorter, in some cases consisting solely of an assent to or dissent from an argument just stated.<sup>92</sup> The author maintains this style throughout the section on true simple insolubles.<sup>93</sup> He takes up his former style again with false simple insolubles, and maintains it to the end of the treatise.

The dialectic of the discussion of true simple insolubles proceeds in seven stages,<sup>94</sup> the argument beginning anew with each stage. The main outlines of the author's solution gradually emerge from this dialectic, and are filled in as the discussion proceeds to false simple insolubles and composite insolubles.<sup>95</sup> His position is this<sup>96</sup>:

In any insoluble proposition, there is at least one term which appears to stand for a proposition.<sup>97</sup> Such a term cannot, of course, stand for the whole insoluble proposition of which it is a part, for this would violate the fourth and fifth conclusions.<sup>98</sup> Nor can such a term stand for any other proposition, because the casus stipulated that there be no other appropriate<sup>99</sup> proposition.<sup>1</sup> The casus eliminates the only possibility that such a term has that it stand for a proposition. Thus, it is

ultimately the casus that is responsible for making the proposition an insoluble.<sup>2</sup>

Since the term which seems to stand for a proposition cannot in fact so stand, it must instead stand for whatever it stood for before it was given any imposition.<sup>3</sup> The casus implicitly excludes any imposition for the term.<sup>4</sup>

Thus, in the insoluble proposition, the term stands for whatever it stands for by nature. That is, it represents only itself to the intellect.<sup>5</sup> In other words, it stands materially.<sup>6</sup>

The ultimate solution to insolubles, therefore, is the observation that the terms in the insoluble which seem to stand significatively, in personal supposition for a proposition, in fact stand materially, because the casus implicitly demands this.

With this basis, it is easy to evaluate any given insoluble. The classical instance 'Sortes dicit falsum'--where there is but a single Sortes, who utters this proposition and no other<sup>7</sup>--is easily seen to be true. For the term 'falsum' in that proposition does not, contrary to appearances, stand for any proposition, neither for itself (by the fourth and fifth conclusions) nor for any other (by the casus).<sup>8</sup> It stands solely for

the term itself.<sup>9</sup> Thus, the proposition 'Sortes dicit falsum' means simply "Sortes dicit: 'falsum'"--i.e., that Sortes utters the word 'falsum'.<sup>10</sup> Thus, the insoluble is clearly true, for, since Sortes utters the whole proposition 'Sortes dicit falsum', he must utter the term 'falsum', which is its part.<sup>11</sup>

It follows that the proposition 'Sortes dicit falsum', when uttered by Sortes under the above conditions, is not convertible with the equiform proposition 'Sortes dicit falsum' uttered by Plato. The latter is false, because Sortes utters one and only one proposition, and that proposition is true. The two propositions are not convertible, because the term 'falsum' in Plato's proposition stands for Sortes' proposition, but no term in Sortes' proposition stands for that proposition or for any other. The terms in the two propositions do not stand for the same things. Thus are refuted objections based on the seeming convertibility of an insoluble proposition and an equiform, but not insoluble, one.<sup>12</sup>

Similar to the insoluble 'Sortes dicit falsum' are the following insolubles: 'Sortes scribit falsum' 'Sortes audit falsum' 'Sortes intellegit falsum' 'Propositio est' 'Verum est' 'Falsum est', etc.,<sup>13</sup> each with its appropriate



casus. All of these are true, and each is solved as was 'Sortes dicit falsum'.<sup>14</sup>

While some insolubles are true, there are nevertheless some which are false. In this respect, the author's solution agrees with the third opinion, that of William of Ockham.<sup>15</sup>

Consider, for instance, the following proposition: 'Hoc est falsum'. Let this proposition be the only proposition, and let it be uttered by Sortes. Then it is clear that neither the 'hoc' nor the 'falsum' in that proposition stands for the whole proposition of which it is part. Nor do they stand for any other proposition, for there is no other proposition, by the casus. Thus, each stands in material supposition, and the proposition 'Hoc est falsum' means simply "'Hoc' est 'falsum'"--i.e., that the word 'hoc' is identical with the word 'falsum'. This is obviously false.<sup>16</sup>

Composite, or hypothetical, insolubles are to be treated in the same way. If the only disjunctive proposition which I utter is the following: 'Deus non est vel disjunctiva prolata a me est falsa', then it is false. For the terms 'disjunctiva' and 'falsa' must in that case stand in material supposition, and the second part

of the disjunction means "Iste terminus 'disjunctiva' est 'falsa'",<sup>17</sup> which is clearly false. But, if the second part of the disjunction is false, so too is the first part, and thus the disjunction as a whole is false.

Similarly, if a unique Sortes utters only the following conjunctive proposition: 'Tu es homo et aliqua conjunctiva prolata a Sorte est falsa', the proposition is false, for analogous reasons.<sup>18</sup>

The exclusive insoluble 'Tantum Sortes dicit falsum' is true, if Sortes says this and only this.<sup>19</sup> For it means "Solus Sortes dicit talem vocem 'falsum'", which is true.<sup>20</sup> Likewise, the exceptive proposition 'Nullus praeter Sortem dicit verum' is true under analogous circumstances.<sup>21</sup>

After the very brief consideration of exceptive insolubles, the author brings his treatise to a quick conclusion with a promise to consider certain pseudo-insolubles in a further treatise on obligationes.<sup>22</sup> He has examined in great detail certain previous solutions to insolubles, he has argued at considerable length that a part cannot stand for its whole, he has presented the principles of his own position, and he has, finally, applied these principles to several illustrative cases.

An Evaluation of the Author's Work

## A.) Philosophical

How ought one to evaluate the anonymous author's work? Of what historical or philosophical value is it? It is only fair to say that, philosophically, the work is rather mediocre. The author gives every indication that he was not a mature or first-rate logician. First, his handling of the terminology of mediaeval logic is rather unorthodox. As has been observed, he tends, for instance, to use the terms 'significare' and 'supponere' as nearly interchangeable.<sup>23</sup> Again, his apparent inclusion of exclusive and exceptive propositions among hypotheticals is certainly unusual, if not unique.<sup>24</sup>

More important, however, is his logical technique. While some of his argumentation is extremely clever and insightful, other passages are surprisingly bad--even puerile. The two forms of the "inductive" argument for the Law of Excluded Middle, for example, are totally inadequate.<sup>25</sup> Again, the fact that the author has left several arguments unanswered from his discussion of the third opinion<sup>26</sup> points to a certain carelessness of technique.

Furthermore, although the general thrust of the author's solution is clear enough, he does not seem to have thought through very carefully the individual cases which he uses as examples. For instance, in the case of the insoluble proposition 'Sortes dicit falsum', is it sufficient to posit only that Sortes utter this and no other proposition? The author's solution is predicated on the notion that the casus excludes the possibility that there be any other proposition for which the term 'falsum' in the insoluble can stand. But the casus, as the author states it,<sup>27</sup> is not sufficient to exclude this. On the contrary, it excludes only the possibility that there be any other proposition uttered by Sortes for which the term 'falsum' could stand. As it is, the casus does not exclude the possibility that, for instance, Plato utter the false proposition 'Homo est asinus'. In such a circumstance, the term 'falsum' in Sortes' utterance would indeed have a proposition for which it could stand, namely Plato's utterance. And, since Sortes does not in fact utter that false proposition, 'Homo est asinus', the insoluble would be false, and no paradox would arise. Yet, the casus, as the author has it, would be fulfilled.

Again, in the case of the insoluble proposition 'Hoc est falsum', the author posits as its casus only that Sortes utter that proposition and that only, that it be the only proposition, and that it be symbolized by 'a'.<sup>28</sup> Then, he argues, "si aliquod extremum in a aliquid ex impositione significaret, isto casu posito, illud esset propositio."<sup>29</sup> Since this is impossible, the terms must have no imposition, but stand in material supposition. Yet, there seems to be no reason for the assumption that the term 'hoc' must either stand materially or else stand for a proposition.

In short, the author appears not to have fully thought through his examples.

On the other hand, the author's position says too much. He argues<sup>30</sup> that, because there is no other proposition than that of which the term 'falsum' is a part, therefore the term cannot stand for any other such proposition. This is but an application of the more general principle that the author attributes to William of Ockham, namely that a term standing with respect to a verb in the present tense "tantum supponit pro his quae sunt".<sup>31</sup> The author uses this principle as the very basis for his solution to insolubilia. Yet,

this same principle, when applied without restriction to other propositions, leads to most undesirable results.

Consider, for example, the following propositions: 'Antichristus est' 'Dies crastina est' 'Adam est'.<sup>32</sup> In each of the three cases, the verb is in the present tense. Yet there is nothing now existing for which the subject term can stand. For Antichrist and tomorrow are still to come, and Adam is dead.

Thus, arguing as does the author in the case of insolubles, each of the subject terms must stand in material supposition. But then each of the propositions is true, for, by virtue of the fact that the whole proposition exists, its subject term exists.<sup>33</sup> The propositions, then, simply assert the existence of their subject terms.

Indeed, applying the author's argumentation with full rigor, it would follow that no proposition of the form 'a est' would be false. Every such proposition would be true. For either the subject term 'a' stands in personal supposition, in which case it stands for something which exists, which is what the proposition asserts, or else the subject term 'a' stands in material supposition, in which case the proposition asserts simply



that its subject term exists. In either case, the proposition is true.

It would follow, on this account, that the denial of any proposition of the form 'a est' would be false. In short, following the author's argumentation to its ultimate conclusion, it would be impossible truly to deny the existence of anything whatever.

This, of course, is going further than the author himself would wish to go. Indeed, he explicitly asserts that the proposition 'Antichristus est' is false.<sup>34</sup> This only means, however, that the author had not worked out all the implications of his own position.

#### B.) Historical

Historically, the anonymous treatise is of somewhat greater value. It does not seem to have been highly influential. The author's position does not, for instance, appear among the fifteen solutions catalogued by Paul of Venice at the end of the fifteenth century.<sup>35</sup> For this very reason, however, the treatise is of interest, in that it makes known yet a sixteenth solution.

Again, if one turns to Paul of Venice's chapter on ampliation,<sup>36</sup> one finds him saying<sup>37</sup>:

Dicto de suppositionibus in generali, restat nunc de eisdem specialius pertractare, et hoc quantum pertinet ad diversitatem suppositionis quae fit respectu diversorum temporum. Ideo, antequam ad alia procedam, pono istam conclusionem, quod terminus communis vel discretus supponens per se respectu verbi de praesenti solum supponit pro his quae sunt, vel pro illo quod est.

This is precisely the principle on which the anonymous author implicitly bases his solution to insolubles. Yet, while the author uses the principle without fanfare, and apparently unaware of its difficulties, Paul of Venice devotes almost two full folios to arguing the point and to meeting objections against it, making use of just such examples as 'Antichristus est'.<sup>38</sup> The present treatise is a witness to the state of Paul's question in the second quarter of the fourteenth century.<sup>39</sup>

There are other points of historical interest in the treatise. The author's use of Ockham, Bradwardine and Dumbleton reveals something of the milieu in which he was working. These were presumably authors who were being discussed in his circle. Perhaps as important, however, is the author's silence about the positions of Heytesbury<sup>40</sup> and Swyneshed,<sup>41</sup> both of which were circulating by the time of the anonymous treatise,<sup>42</sup> and both of which came to be well-known solutions to the problem of insolubles.<sup>43</sup>

Again, the Insolubilia of Robert Fland is perhaps cited almost verbatim in the anonymous treatise.<sup>44</sup> If this is so, it would suggest that Fland, almost totally unknown to present-day scholarship, was to some degree known and used at Oxford in the second quarter of the fourteenth century.

Furthermore, the author's great concern to establish firmly that a part cannot stand for its whole suggests that this issue was a heated one in the intellectual atmosphere in which the treatise was written.

Thus, the present treatise provides a glimpse of a certain stage in the development of the mediaeval consideration of the problem of self-referential semantic antinomies. Some idea of the state of the question in the author's day can be gathered from his text. In addition, the treatise presents a solution--albeit not an altogether satisfactory one--that is quite different both from the solutions usually proposed today and from the approaches more commonly taken by mediaeval authors.

### The Manuscript

The treatise has been preserved in a single known manuscript: British Museum, Harley 3243, ff. 47ra-56rb5. The description of the codex in the catalogue to the Harleian collection reads<sup>45</sup>:

Rogeri Notingham, Adami Wodham, & Ricardi Camassale, Quaestiones variae philosophicae & theologicae. Ad fol. 56 scriptum est 'Expliciunt insolubilia'.

In addition to works ascribed in the manuscript to these three authors, the codex includes several other items, some of which have been identified. Professor E.A. Synan has published a brief description of the manuscript, together with a detailed account of its contents.<sup>46</sup>

The codex clearly was produced in a fourteenth-century Oxford milieu. Each of the five hands appearing in the manuscript is fourteenth-century and English. Moreover, every author that has been identified is connected with the fourteenth-century University of Oxford.<sup>47</sup>

The Insolubilia is the fourth item in the manuscript. It is written in a clear hand that appears nowhere else in the codex. The writing is in two columns, fifty-one to fifty-six lines to the column. The treatise ends on

f. 56rb5. The remainder of f. 56rb and all of f. 56v are blank.

Throughout the treatise--as indeed elsewhere in the manuscript--blank spaces have been left for the capitals at the beginning of important divisions of the text. These capitals were never supplied. Normally in the treatise, such a blank space results in two indented lines of text. At the beginning, however, three lines are indented, perhaps indicating that a larger capital was intended for the incipit.

The scribe has usually written rather carefully. There are occasional omissions and repetitions, but these seldom put the sense in doubt. In a few places, the text is badly muddled. The marginalia are mostly to indicate divisions of the text and articulations of the argument. Only a few are corrections, the most significant being on f. 50rb (paragraph 85), where a passage of thirty-four words is inserted in the margin.

In a great many cases, the scribe seems to have corrected his own work as he was writing. A glance at the notes to almost any paragraph of the text will reveal false starts, omissions, misplaced words or phrases, or bad abbreviations, etc., which seem to have

been corrected at the time of writing. The errors have been crossed out (expunctuation is not frequently used), and the correct text written immediately after it, on the line of writing--not inserted between the lines or in the margin, as if by a later corrector.

The manuscript has been examined in microfilm copy only.

### The Edition

The orthography of this edition has been made to conform to Lewis and Short, A Latin Dictionary. In a few cases, curious manuscript spellings, mostly of proper names, are mentioned in the notes. Cases have not been noted in which the scribe has omitted a horizontal stroke or other sign of abbreviation, or where he has added an extraneous one, except where this raises some doubt about the correct reading. The abbreviations 'So2' 'So4', etc., have been expanded to 'Sortes', rather than to 'Socrates'.<sup>48</sup>

In the interest of clarity, words in material supposition are enclosed in single quotation marks (double quotation marks for material supposition within



material supposition). This practise conforms to the modern convention for expressions which are mentioned but not used. There is no corresponding indication in the manuscript, except that the expression 'hoc nomen' or 'haec propositio', or a similar one, often appears before the word or words in question.

References are given according to the "List of Abbreviations of Works Frequently Cited".<sup>49</sup> All other references are given in full in the notes.

The division into paragraphs is mine.

TEXT

<Incipiunt Insolubilia><sup>1</sup>

1.) <sup>2</sup><D><sup>3</sup> insolubilibus tractaturus eorum causam duxi finalem primitus intuendam, ut juxta naturam et dispositionem finis ordinentur ea quae sunt ad finem, cum finis, secundum Aristotelem, 2<sup>o</sup> Physicorum, textu commenti 29,<sup>4</sup> sit<sup>5</sup> causa propter quam causata omnia ab aliis causis concausantur, et etiam ad quam omnes aliae causae ordinantur, 2<sup>o</sup> Physicorum, commento 31.<sup>6</sup> Finis autem hujus scientiae est scire solveere sophismata ex quibus non realiter, sed apparenter, sequitur utraque pars contradictionis,<sup>7</sup> propter quam apparentiam talia sophismata "insolubilia" dicuntur, id est, de difficili solubilia.

2.) Propter igitur hunc finem, primo recitabo opiniones non omnes, sed quattuor tantum, quarum quaelibet a pluribus approbatur. Secundo, improbatis illis opinionibus, ponam positionem aliam. Et tertio, disputando contra eam, obiciam, et statim erit finis illius materiae.

3.) <sup>8</sup>Quattuor enim sunt opiniones extremales magis ab invicem discrepantes, quarum prima ponit quod casus quo propositio redditur insolubilis est impossibilis, et ideo nullo modo admittendus. Secunda contradicit primae et concedit casum. Poniť quasi ulterius pro fundamento quod quaelibet propositio insolubilis significat se esse veram<sup>9</sup> et se esse falsam. Cui contradicit tertia opinio ponens quod nulla propositio insolubilis significat se esse veram vel falsam. Dicit enim, proposito<sup>10</sup> quod Sortes incipiat sic loqui: "Sortes dicit falsum", illa non significat Sortem dicere falsam<sup>11</sup> illam, sed aliam ab illa. Cujus contradictum ponit quarta opinio, cujus fundamentum est quod quaelibet propositio insolubilis antecedenter<sup>12</sup> significat se esse veram et falsam.<sup>13</sup>

4.) <sup>14</sup>Prima opinio casum insolubilium simpliciter negat,<sup>15</sup> et ideo non habet ad insolubilia respondere. <sup>16</sup>Secunda omne insolubile dicit esse falsum. <sup>17</sup>Sed tertia aliquod insolubile concedit esse verum et aliquod falsum. <sup>18</sup>Quarta autem opinio ponit pro<sup>19</sup> regula quod nullum insolubile est verum vel falsum.

5.) Prima autem opinio, quae ponit quod quilibet casus insolubilium est impossibilis, et ideo nullo modo

admittendus, principaliter stat in duabus conclusionibus, quarum prima est talis, et est tertia in ordine<sup>20</sup>: "Nulla propositio per intentionem simplicem in anima, sed per complexum, comprehenditur." Secunda est talis, quae est quarta in ordine<sup>21</sup>: "Cujuslibet propositionis significantis pro complexo subjectum vel praedicatum est propositio, et alteri vel utrique<sup>22</sup> <propositio> in anima correspondet."<sup>23</sup> Ex quibus negatur talis casus, quod sit unica propositio quae sit haec: 'Falsum est', quia, cum haec propositio 'Falsum est' sit talis cujus extremum significat aliqualiter<sup>24</sup> pro complexo, subjectum vel praedicatum illius propositionis est propositio, per tertiam ad quartam conclusionem<sup>25</sup>; et ipsamet est alia propositio; igitur, ad minus sunt ibi duae propositiones.<sup>26</sup>

6.) <sup>27</sup>Contra istam opinionem arguendum multipliciter. Primo sic: Sit a aliqua propositio vera contingenter, ut talis: 'Homo est albus'. Et sit b ista: 'Hoc est falsum', denotando per subjectum b<sup>28</sup> a. Tunc quaero utrum a sit suppositum illius termini 'falsum' vel aliud complexum ab a. Non a probo: Nihil est suppositum illius termini 'falsum', nisi propter significationem falsam; a non habet significationem falsam; igitur, a non est suppositum illius termini 'falsum'. Consequentia

patet, et maior est sua, arguendo contra tertiam opinionem,<sup>29</sup>  
 ubi assumit, posito quod sit unica propositio talis:  
 'falsum <est>', quae sit falsa, quae vocetur<sup>30</sup> "a",  
 quod a non est suppositum illius termini 'falsum',<sup>31</sup>  
 nisi propter significationem falsam. Igitur, secundum  
 eum, prius naturaliter oportet propositionem esse falsam,  
 qua(m) sit suppositum illius termini 'falsum', quod est  
 maior probanda. Et minor illius argumenti paret casum.  
 Igitur, secundum eum, a non est suppositum illius termini  
 'falsum'.

7.) Confirmatur per eum: Prius naturaliter disponitur  
 suppositum termini vel intentionis, ut significetur per ea,  
 quam terminus vel intentio illud<sup>32</sup> significat, ut prius  
 naturaliter est Sortes albus, (47rb) quam Sortes significatur  
 per istum terminum 'album'. Sic prius naturaliter  
 significat propositio aliter quam est, quam sit suppositum  
 illius termini 'falsum'. Haec enim est sua suppositio,  
 arguendo contra quartam opinionem<sup>33</sup>; igitur, illam negare  
 non potest. Ex qua sequitur syllogistice quod a non<sup>34</sup>  
 est suppositum illius termini 'falsum', cum a sit  
 propositio vera.

8.) Sit igitur, secundum ejus quartam conclusionem,<sup>35</sup>  
a propositio quae est suppositum illius termini 'falsum' in



b<sup>36</sup> propositione. Et arguo sic: Quaelibet propositio est impossibilis in qua affirmatur unum contradictorium, vel convertibile cum uno contradictorium, de reliquo; in propositione correspondente b propositioni in anima est talis affirmatio; igitur, propositio correspondens b propositioni in anima est impossibilis. Minor illius argumenti patet. Nam in illa propositione correspondente b propositioni in anima affirmatur propositio non significans sicut est de propositione<sup>37</sup> significante sicut est, quia affirmatur c<sup>38</sup> propositio falsa de a propositione vera. Ex quo ulterius poterit formaliter concludi quod propositioni verae extra animam propositio impossibilis in anima correspondet, ut, posito quod maneat tam a quam b, quousque a sit falsa, tunc b erit vera, et propositio in anima correspondens erit impossibilis.<sup>39</sup>

9.) <sup>40</sup>Item, secundo, sit a ista propositio: "Rex sedet" est propositio vera', et b ista: "Rex sedet" est propositio falsa'. Et arguo sic: a et b praecise eidem propositioni in anima subordinantur; igitur, a et b et convertuntur. Consequentia patet. Et antecedens probo ex principiis istius opinantis. Nam praedicato in a correspondet propositio nulla alia, nisi ista 'Rex

sedet', et eadem correspondet praedicato in b; et subjecta sunt eadem et copulae; igitur, in anima aut est tantum una propositio aut duae propositiones convertibiles, quod<sup>41</sup> aequae valet pro argumento.<sup>42</sup>

10.) Quod autem nulla alia propositio in anima, quam ista 'Rex sedet', correspondet praedicato illius propositionis in voce '"Rex sedet" est propositio vera' arguitur sic: Quaecumque alia sibi correspondens in anima, illa esset impossibilis<sup>43</sup>; constat et illa a sibi subordinata est propositio possibilis; igitur, propositio possibilis propositioni impossibili esset subordinata.<sup>44</sup> Ex quo ulterius sequitur haec conclusio, quod duae propositiones essent convertibiles quarum una est possibilis et alia impossibilis, quod non capit intellectus. Conclusio sequitur per hoc medium generaliter verum, quod propositio in anima et propositio extra animam sibi praecise subordinata convertuntur.<sup>45</sup>

11.) Eodem modo arguitur quod nulla alia propositio correspondet praedicato illius propositionis '"Rex sedet" est propositio falsa', quin ista 'Rex sedet'. Quia, si alia, sit illa b. Tunc sic: b aut stat<sup>46</sup> pro se ipsa aut pro alia. Si pro se ipsa, et affirmatur de ista 'Rex

sedet'; igitur, quod non est ista 'Rex sedet', nec<sup>47</sup> potest esse ista 'Rex sedet', affirmatur de ista 'Rex sedet'. Si significat istam 'Rex sedet', igitur, cum in b sit actus componendi vel dividendi, actus ille, cum aliis partibus ejusdem b, affirmatur[re]<sup>48</sup> de ista 'Rex sedet', quod verum esse non potest.<sup>49</sup>

12.) <sup>50</sup>Item, tertio, sit a ista propositio 'Hoc est falsum', denotando per subjectum istam 'Tu es homo'. Tunc aut praedicato in a correspondet ista propositio 'Tu es <homo>' aut alia. Si ista, igitur istae duae propositiones convertentur in anima: '"Tu<sup>51</sup> es homo" est "Tu<sup>52</sup> es homo"' et 'Hoc est falsum', denotando per subjectum istam propositionem 'Tu es homo'; sed haec est vera in anima: '"Tu es homo" est<sup>53</sup> "Tu<sup>54</sup> es homo"' ; igitur, sua convertibilis est vera in anima, quae est ista 'Hoc est falsum'; et a est propositio falsa, ut patet; igitur, propositioni falsae propositio vera correspondet. Praedicato in a et solum talis in anima correspondet.<sup>55</sup>

13.) <sup>56</sup>Si igitur dicatur quod non solum illa propositio quae correspondet subjecto in a, sed illa, cum aliquo alio, correspondet praedicato in a, sit igitur illud quod non est illa propositio, nec pars illius propositionis, quod

cum illa propositione correspondet praedicato in a, b.  
 Et quaero de b, utrum b sit intentio simplex vel composita  
 (47va) vel aliquis modus significandi sequens intentionem  
 simplicem vel compositam. Si b sit intentio simplex, et  
 per illam comprehenditur complexum; igitur, per intentionem  
 simplicem complexum intenditur, quod est contra primam  
 conclusionem.

14.) Item, si b sit intentio simplex, igitur sibi  
 aliquid correspondet pro supposito. Quaero igitur aut  
 ipsum subjectum est sibi<sup>57</sup> suppositum aut aliud. Si  
 subjectum, et subjectum est propositio, per quartam<sup>58</sup>  
 conclusionem; igitur, ut prius, per intentionem simplicem  
 propositio comprehenditur.

15.) Si autem aliquid aliud sit suppositum illius  
 intentionis simplicis, arguitur sic: Sit illud suppositum  
c. Tunc sic: c, cum ista propositione quae est subjectum,  
 affirmatur de propositione quae est subjectum; sic non  
 est, nec esse potest; igitur, quod non est, nec esse  
 potest, subjectum affirmatur de subjecto.

16.) Item, sequitur si b sit intentio composita  
 distincta ab ista propositione in anima 'Tu es homo'.

17.) Item, si b sit modus significandi qui ulterius correspondet praedicto in a propositione, quam propositio correspondens subjecto, arguitur sic: Ille modus significandi non sequitur intentionem simplicem vel compositam distinctam ab ista propositione in anima 'Tu es homo', et a partibus illius propositionis, quia ubi non est intentio distincta non est modus sequens talem intentionem; igitur, si b sit modus significandi, b sequitur istam propositionem in anima. Quo dato, arguitur sic: Quam naturaliter ista propositio in anima significat quidquid significat, tam naturaliter significat qualitercumque significat. Et loquor de 'qualitercumque' prout distribuit modos significandi sequentes naturaliter ipsum complexum significare. Sed tam naturaliter significat ista propositio 'Tu<sup>59</sup> es homo' in anima quidquid significat, quod non potest manere illa propositio quin significet quidquid significat; igitur, tam naturaliter significat qualitercumque significat, quod non potest manere illa propositio quin significet qualitercumque significat; igitur, sicut b sequitur propositionem a parte praedicati, ita a parte subjecti sequetur. Prima consequentia patet cum minore, cujus major sic arguitur: Quilibet talis modus significandi

est passio vel proprietas naturaliter concomitans ipsum significare; igitur, quam naturaliter habet propositio ipsum significare, tam naturaliter habet quemlibet modum significandi.

18.) <sup>60</sup>Quarto principaliter arguitur contra quartam conclusionem in se, quae dicit quod subjecto cujuslibet propositionis talis in voce est propositio in anima correspondens.<sup>61</sup> <sup>62</sup>Unde erit generaliter quod cuilibet tali termino 'propositio', 'verum vel falsum', 'contingens', et hujusmodi, propositio in anima correspondet. <sup>63</sup>Contra hoc arguo primo sic: Concipiat Sortes sic in anima sua: 'Haec est propositio', denotando per subjectum hanc 'Deus est' vel hanc 'Homo est asinus', quae propositio sit a. Et arguo sic: In a est praedicatio directa; igitur, in a praedicatum non est propositio. Probo consequentiam: quia, si in a praedicatum est propositio, aut eadem propositio quae demonstratur per hoc demonstrativum 'haec' aut alia. Si eadem, igitur ibi est praedicatio identica<sup>64</sup> et non directa.<sup>65</sup> Consequentia paret Aristotelem, primo Posteriorum, capitulo de statu principiorum.<sup>66</sup> Si autem detur quod sit alia propositio quae praedicatur in a, quam propositio quae est subjectum, tunc, cum affirmatur esse subjectum, illa affirmatio non est vera. Consequentia



arguitur ex hoc, quia, cum propositio est extremum propositionis, non significative supponit. Probata igitur consequentia. Probo antecedens: Sit a iste terminus 'homo', et b iste terminus compositus 'iste homo', c iste terminus 'propositio', et<sup>67</sup> d iste terminus compositus 'ista propositio'. Et arguo sic: Sicut se habet a ad b, sic se habet c ad d; sed sic se habet a ad b, quod est praedicabilis de  $\langle b \rangle$  praedicatione directa; igitur, sic se habet c ad d, quod c est praedicabilis de d praedicatione directa.

19.) Item, iste terminus 'propositio' de aliquibus sibi inferioribus praedicatur univoce; igitur, iste terminus 'propositio' subordinatur uni intentioni simplici in anima de illis pluribus univoce a priori praedicabili[s]; sed non est praedicabilis univoce de aliquibus, nisi quae potest intellectui repraesentare; igitur, intentio simplex potest intellectui propositionem repraesentare. Prima consequentia patet juxta descriptionem termini univoci alibi declaratam<sup>68</sup>; et secunda patet de se; igitur, etc.

20.) Tertio ad idem sic: Haec passio disjuncta<sup>69</sup> 'verum vel falsum' est demonstrabilis<sup>70</sup> de propositione in anima; igitur, huic termino 'propositio' extra

intentio communis et simplex (47vb) in anima correspondet. Probo consequentiam: Nihil potest esse subjectum<sup>71</sup> conclusionis<sup>72</sup> demonstrativae, nisi quod potest esse<sup>73</sup> terminus communis potens plura significare; igitur, cum 'propositio' potest esse subjectum conclusionis demonstrativae, sequitur conclusio intenta, cujus antecedens paret Aristotelem, 2<sup>o</sup> Posteriorum, capitulo 2<sup>o</sup>,<sup>74</sup> ubi tradit in lectione<sup>75</sup> quomodo passio disjuncta<sup>76</sup> poterit demonstrari<sup>77</sup> de subjecto suo proprio, de quo neutra pars per se est demonstrabilis.

21.) <sup>78</sup>Quinto principaliter arguitur contra hoc, quod dicit quod subjecto talis propositionis 'Falsum est' propositio in anima correspondet. Ponit enim in hoc quod maxime indiget probatione. Nam cum omnibus suis principiis stat oppositum illius dicti. Stant enim simul quod, cujuslibet propositionis cujus extremum aliququaliter supponit pro complexo, quod ejus extremum sit propositio, vel quod ejus extremo correspondat propositio, et tamen quod extremum illius propositionis 'Falsum est' non est propositio, nec sibi correspondat propositio, cum stet quod iste terminus 'falsum' in illa propositione non supponeret<sup>79</sup> pro complexo.

22.) Confirmatur ratio: Sit a iste terminus 'falsum', et b ejus species propria et naturalis existens in anima. Et arguitur sic: Si ipsa anima praecise affirmaret esse de illo quod naturaliter repraesentat sibi b, tali propositioni in anima talis extra animam 'Falsum est' esset subordinata; sed tunc in tali extra animam 'Falsum est' subjectum non supponeret pro complexo; <sup>80</sup> igitur, si anima affirmaret esse de illo quod naturaliter repraesentat sibi b, in tali extra 'Falsum est' sibi subordinata subjectum non supponeret pro complexo. Ista consequentia est bona, et totum antecedens possibile; igitur, consequens. [anima] Major arguitur ex hoc, quod, si talis esset extra animam 'Falsum est', esset alicui propositioni in anima subordinata, et nullae alii <quam> illi cujus b est subjectum; igitur, etc. Et <sup>81</sup> minor: quia subjectum in ista propositione 'Falsum est' non supponit pro aliquo, nisi pro quo supponit subjectum propositionis in anima; sed b, <sup>82</sup> quod est subjectum propositionis in anima, pro se supponit pro isto termino 'falsum'; igitur, 'falsum' in ista propositio<ne> <sup>83</sup> 'Falsum est' praecise pro eodem supponit; igitur, possibile est quod aliqua talis sit extra animam, cujus nullum extremum pro aliquo complexo supponit.

23.) Ad idem sic: Quam possibile est quod aliqua vox vel aliquod scriptum causat speciem in anima nihil distinctum ab ipso causante actualiter significantem, tam possibile est de qualibet voce et quolibet scripto; possibile est igitur quod iste terminus 'falsum' causet speciem in anima Sortis quae<sup>84</sup> Sorti solum istam vocem 'falsum' significet; et sicut Sortes intellegit, sic potest componere in anima; absolute igitur possibile est ut talis propositio 'Falsum est' sit in anima Sortis, cujus subjectum praecise significat Sorti talem vocem 'falsum', a qua fuit causata, sic quod nulla alia sit in anima Sortis, nec extra animam. Ex quo formaliter sequitur quod casus iste est absolute possibilis, qui ponit quod sit unica propositio talis: 'Falsum est'.

24.) <sup>85</sup>~~S~~ecunda opinio ponit quod quaelibet propositio insolubilis significat se esse veram et significat se esse falsam. Ista opinio principaliter consistit in duabus suppositionibus et una conclusione, quarum suppositionum <sup>86</sup>una est quod pars potest supponere pro toto cujus est. <sup>87</sup>Alia est: Quaelibet propositio significat ut nunc vel simpliciter quidquid sequitur ad eam. <sup>88</sup>Conclusio autem est ista: Quaelibet propositio cujus extremum unicum habet suppositum significat sive

denotat affirmationem vel negationem pro illo supposito. Ex quibus conceditur casus insolubilium, et dicitur quodlibet insolubile esse falsum, eo quod significat se esse verum et significat se esse falsum.<sup>89</sup>

25.) Quod arguitur <ex> istis principiis sic:

<sup>90</sup>Ponatur quod Sortes dicat istam et nullam aliam: 'Sortes dicit falsum', quae sit b.<sup>91</sup> <sup>92</sup>Tunc ista consequentia est bona: 'Sortes dicit falsum; igitur, a est falsum'. Consequentia tenet per secundam suppositionem, quia, per casum, praedicatum illius propositionis 'Sortes dicit falsum' non supponit (48ra) pro alia propositione a b.<sup>93</sup> Et ideo, cum, per primam suppositionem, potest pars supponere pro toto cuius est pars, tunc a in proposito solum unicum habet suppositum, scilicet, totam propositionem cuius est pars; unde, per primam conclusionem, a significat affirmative vel negative pro illo supposito. Tunc sic: b esse falsum sequitur ad a; igitur, b significat se esse falsum. Consequentia paret secundam suppositionem. Et, per consequens, b significat se non<sup>94</sup> esse verum, cum se non esse verum et se esse falsum [et se esse falsum] convertuntur. Ex quibus duobus arguitur sic: a est falsum, et b significat se non esse verum; igitur, non

est ita, quod b non est verum. Et ultra: Igitur,  
est ita, quod b est verum. Et ultra: Et<sup>95</sup> esse verum  
et esse falsum sequuntur.<sup>96</sup>

26.) Dicunt igitur quidam quod quodlibet  
insolubile significat primo et principaliter sicut  
est, quia significat primo et principaliter se esse  
falsum, et sic est. Secundario tamen, et non  
principaliter, aliter quam est, quia significat<sup>97</sup>  
secundario et ex consequenti se esse verum, et sic  
non est. Quare istud dictum solum est sophisticum.<sup>98</sup>

27.) Ideo contra ipsum sophistice<sup>99</sup> arguitur sic:  
Sit a ista propositio: 'b significat primo et principaliter  
aliter quam est'. Et demonstro per subjectum totam  
propositionem cujus b est subjectum. Tunc quaero utrum  
a significat primo et principaliter sicut est aut non.  
Si sic, et a significat primo et principaliter aliter  
quam est; igitur, cum a sit propositio insolubilis,  
aliqua propositio insolubilis significat primo et  
principaliter aliter quam est; igitur, non quodlibet  
insolubile significat, etc.<sup>1</sup> Si autem detur quod a  
non significat primo et principaliter sicut est, igitur,  
per dictum eorum, a significat primo et principaliter

aliter quam est; et a sic [sic] significat; igitur, a significat primo et principaliter sicut est, quod est oppositum dati.

28.) <sup>2</sup>Contra istam opinionem autem in se arguitur brevius, eo quod ab [q] aliis sufficienter improbatur [quo] quoad secundam suppositionem et primam conclusionem. Ideo arguitur principaliter contra ejus primam suppositionem, quae est quod pars potest supponere pro toto cujus est pars. Nam, illo improbato, constat quod deductiones quas fecit nullum<sup>3</sup> omnino habent colorem.<sup>4</sup> Non enim valet haec consequentia: 'Sortes dicit falsum; igitur, a est falsum', nisi pars supponeret pro toto cujus est pars. Alioquin enim consequens totaliter impertinens esset antecedenti.

29.) Item, ex hoc, quod ista propositio 'Sortes dicit falsum' habet se ipsum pro supposito extremi, concluditur apparenter quod propositio dicta a Sorte significat se esse<sup>5</sup> veram et falsam. Quae deductio illi principio renititur, sicut totali funda<men>to. Quod fundamentum destructum sive negatum, quod ista positio concluderet, non haberet.



30.) Ideo contra istud principium arguitur primo sic: In nulla propositione in anima potest pars supponere pro toto cujus est pars, nec in aliqua propositione extra animam; igitur, in nulla propositione potest pars supponere pro toto cujus est pars. Consequentia patet ex sufficienti divisione. Et assertum pro prima parte arguitur sic: quia, si in aliqua propositione in anima potest pars supponere pro toto cujus est pars, sit in ista propositione 'Falsum est'. Et arguo sic: In ista propositione subjectum supponit pro tota propositione cujus est subjectum; igitur, quam primo anima habet illud subjectum tam primo intellegit totum. Et sequitur formaliter: Intellegit totam illam propositionem; igitur, intellegit actum animae qui erit in illa propositione, qui actus sit a. Tunc arguo sic: Anima [quam] priusquam producit a, non plus de se determinatur ad producendum a quam ad producendum alium actum ejusdem[us] speciei cum a, ut per subjectum determinatur plus ad a quam ad (48rb) illum actum ejusdem speciei cum a; igitur, si subjectum pro illo priori repraesentet ipsi animae a, pro eodem priori repraesentet ipsi animae omnem actum qui potest esse ejusdem speciei cum a. Consequentia patet, cum non ex

se nec ex natura animae nec ex aliqua alia circumstantia determinatur plus ad repraesentandum a quam alium actum ejusdem speciei. Sed infiniti possunt esse actus ejusdem speciei cum a; igitur, infinitos actus repraesentat, si repraesentat a.

31.) <sup>6</sup>Sed forte hic diceret aliquis quod subjectum repraesentat intellectui totam illam propositionem cujus est pars, sed non repraesentat quamlibet partem illius propositionis, et ideo non sequitur quod infertur. Sed hoc non exacuat argumentum. Nam idem arguitur de propositione. Nam in omni propositione in anima prius [tam] est subjectum quam anima, intellecto illo subjecto, habeat actum compositionis vel divisionis; sed quam primo est ibi subjectum, tam primo repraesentat intellectui totam propositionem cujus, in posteriori natura, erit pars, cum naturaliter et non ad placitum significat; igitur, prius natura repraesentat illam propositionem quam illa propositio sit. Paret consequentia cum antecedente. Ex quo sequitur idem <sup>7</sup>inconveniens quod prius, quia non plus determinatur subjectum ad repraesentandum ipsi animae propositionem quae erit quam propositionem ejusdem speciei quae poterit fore; igitur, si illa quae erit repraesentet, infinitas repraesentat.

32.) <sup>8</sup>Secundo sic: Sicut se habet intellectus totius propositionis ad totam propositionem,<sup>9</sup> sic intellectus<sup>10</sup> partis ad partem; sed se habet intellectus totius propositionis ad totam propositionem, quod sic est intellectus totius, quod intellectus partis esse non potest, non plus quam totum pars esse possit, cum intellectus totius propositionis resultet ex intellectionibus partium, sicut totum quantitativum resultat ex quantitate partium suarum; igitur, sic se habet intellectus partis ad partem, quod sic est intellectus partis, quod intellectus totius esse non poterit.

33.) <sup>11</sup>Tertio sic: Si ista propositio 'Homo est asinus' esset in anima Platonis, et ista 'Falsum est' esset in anima Sortis, tunc in ista in anima Sortis pars non supponeret pro toto cuius est pars; sed non magis nunc supponit pro toto cuius est pars, quam si ista propositio 'Homo est asinus' esset in anima Platonis; igitur, nunc<sup>12</sup> pars pro toto non supponit. Consequentia patet, et major est omnium illorum qui ponunt partem posse supponere pro toto cuius est pars, eo quod tunc haberet pars propositionem pro qua posset supponere distinctam ab illa propositione cuius est pars. Et minorem arguo sic: Iste terminus 'falsum' in anima

naturaliter significat; igitur, quidquid est quod jam potest significare jam significat. Patet consequentia cum antecedente. Igitur, si non potest significare totam propositionem cujus est pars, alia propositione posita, dempta<sup>13</sup> illa, non significabit. <sup>14</sup>Confirmatur breviter sic: Qualiter [cum] iste terminus 'falsum',<sup>15</sup> in anima significat, posita propositione in anima Platonis, taliter omnino significabit, dempta propositione, eo quod, secundum Aristotelem in Praedicamentis, capitulo de substantia,<sup>16</sup> termini non mutant suas significationes propter mutationes rerum; sed, posita propositione in anima Platonis, taliter significat, quod non faciet animam reflecti supra propositionem cujus est pars; igitur, illa dempta, taliter significabit, quod non faciet animam reflecti supra propositionem cujus est pars; igitur, nec pro illa supponet.

34.) <sup>17</sup>Quarto sic: Si in tali propositione 'Falsum est' pars supponit pro toto, quaero aut intellectus elicit actum virtute notitiae habitae per subjectum ad habendum notitiam quam habet, aut<sup>18</sup> ad habendum aliam. Primum non potest dari (48va) propter repugnantiam terminorum mutationis. Si autem detur secundum, igitur, posito illo actu, habebit aliam notitiam; sed nullam

aliam, ut suppono, nisi notitiam illius propositionis 'Falsum est'; igitur, notitia illius propositionis 'Falsum est' est alia a notitia subjecti; et, per consequens, subjectum non repraesentat intellectui totam illam propositionem cuius est [est] pars.

35.) <sup>19</sup>Quinto sic: Secundum Aristotelem, 3<sup>o</sup> De anima, capitulo 3<sup>o</sup>, natura nihil agit<sup>20</sup> frustra<sup>21</sup>; igitur, si subjectum repraesentat intellectui totam propositionem cuius est pars, una cum illo subjecto non adderet natura propositionem<sup>22</sup> ad idem repraesentandum. Consequentia patet. Antecedens arguitur: Nam quam primo intellegitur subjectum, aut intellegitur tota propositio aut non. Si non, igitur non supponit pro tota illa propositione. Si quam primo intellegitur subjectum intellegitur illa propositio, igitur frustra ponitur postea illa propositio propter notitiam aliquam habendam; nec propter aliam causam aliquam illa propositio ponitur, cum omnis propositio ponitur propter notitiam habendam; igitur, ista simpliciter frustra ponitur.

36.) <sup>23</sup>Confirmatur ratio: Quidquid ista propositio significat, pars ejus significat, et e contrario. Et hoc simul et semel in eadem anima. Igitur, cum non

ponatur aliquod signum in ipsa anima, nisi propter ipsum repraesentare sive significare, necessario alterum superfluit, quod natura non permittit.

37.) Item, si pars posset supponere pro toto cujus est,<sup>24</sup> contradictorium pro contradictorio supponere potest. Consequentia generaliter conceditur. Ex quo arguitur contradictio sic: Sit a ista propositio: 'Quodlibet istorum est verum', tantum denotando per hoc 'istorum' contradictorium illius a et istam 'Deus est', quae praecise significet juxta compositionem <termin>orum.<sup>25</sup> Et quaero utrum a sit verum vel falsum. Si verum, et contradictorium a est, igitur contradictorium a est falsum; igitur, non<sup>26</sup> quodlibet illorum est verum. Patet consequentia.

38.)<sup>27</sup> Item sic: Sit b contradictorium a. Et arguo sic: b est falsum; et b est aliquod illorum; igitur, non quodlibet<sup>28</sup> illorum est verum.

39.) Si a sit falsum, tunc sic: a est falsum; igitur, b est verum; et ista 'Deus est' est verum; igitur, quodlibet illorum est verum. Consequentia est bona; verum est antecedens; igitur, verum est consequens; et consequens est a; igitur, a verum.

40.) <sup>29</sup>Sexto, ad ultimum: Secundum Aristotelem, primo Elenchorum, capitulo 14<sup>o</sup>, <sup>30</sup>propter nugationem vitandam, hoc nomen 'duplum' <sup>31</sup>per se positum significat duplum <sup>32</sup>dimidii. Si <sup>33</sup>tamen additur 'dimidii' ad 'duplum', totum significat duplum dimidii, et nulla ejus pars; igitur, secundum Aristotelis principia, propter consimilem nugationem vitandam, tota ista propositio 'Falsum est' significat falsum esse et nulla ejus pars.

41.) <sup>34</sup>Item, quod in nulla propositione extra animam pars supponat pro toto cujus est pars solum facio unicam formam. Arguitur sic: In nulla propositione in anima pars potest supponere pro toto cujus est pars; igitur, in nulla propositione extra animam pars pro toto supponere potest. Probo consequentiam: Sicut tota propositio extra animam subordinatur propositioni in anima, sic subjectum in propositione extra animam subjecto propositionis in anima, et praedicatum praedicato. Patet ex descriptione istius termini 'subordinare' alibi declarata. <sup>35</sup>Igitur, nihil aliud potest subjectum in propositione extra animam significare quam illud quod a priori significat subjectum propositionis in anima cui est subordinata. Et sic patet consequentia. Antecedens concluditur ex praemissis.



42.) <sup>36</sup>Item, contra secundam suppositionem aequae breviter sic: Non quaelibet propositio simpliciter impossibilis simpliciter significat quodlibet; ex qualibet propositione simpliciter impossibili simpliciter sequitur quidlibet<sup>37</sup>; igitur, non quaelibet propositio significat simpliciter quidquid simpliciter sequitur ad eam. Major arguitur: quia nec ex natura nec ex impositione talis propositio significat quidlibet. Et minor conceditur generaliter apud eos.

43.) Item, si quaelibet propositio (48vb) significat quidquid sequitur ad eam, significat eo modo quo significat propositio quae sequitur ad eam, quia sicut significare ad significare, sic modus significandi propositionis sequentis ad modum significandi propositionis ex qua sequitur; sed propositio sequens, ratione modi significandi, est hypothetica, cum ex qualibet propositione, quantumcumque simpliciter<sup>38</sup> categorica, sequatur hypothetica, quia ipsamet et alia sibi convertibilis vel superior; igitur, propositio ex qua<sup>39</sup> sequitur esset hypothetica. Probatur consequentia: Modus suus significandi est hypotheticus; igitur, propositio hypothetica.<sup>40</sup>

44.) Item, data suppositione, quaelibet propositio, quantumcumque impossibilis, significaret sicut necesse est

esse. Consequens absurdum. Et consequentia patet, eo quod, juxta regulas eorum, propositio simpliciter necessaria sequitur ad quodlibet.<sup>41</sup> Et tantum contra secundam opinionem.

45.) <sup>42</sup> Tertio opinio ponit<sup>43</sup> pro fundamento duo. Primum: quod pars non potest supponere pro toto cujus est pars. Secundum: quod, posito casu communi, quod Sortes tantum dicat istam propositionem 'Sortes dicit falsum', dicit quod illa<sup>44</sup> propositio significat Sortem dicere aliam propositionem quam illam quam dicit. Tertio, incidentaliter, dicit quod propositio dicta a Sorte nec est vera nec falsa.<sup>45</sup>

46.) Ista opinio mirabilis mihi non videtur. Primo, quia ponit sine aliqua probatione illud quod maxime in logica<sup>46</sup> indiget probatione, scilicet, quod pars non potest supponere pro toto cujus est pars. Secundo, videtur, quamvis ista opinio sit vera, tamen obviat propriis principiis. Unde solum ex principiis suis arguam.

47.) <sup>47</sup> Contra eum arguitur igitur primo, probando duas conclusiones, quarum <sup>48</sup> prima est quod pars significat totum cujus est pars. Secunda: Si pars

significat totum cuius est pars, pro toto cuius est pars supponere potest.

48.) <sup>49</sup>Prima istarum probatur sic: Quilibet terminus communis omnia sibi inferiora significat; iste terminus 'propositio' est terminus communis; igitur, iste terminus communis omnia inferiora significat. Patet consequentia in tertio modo primae figurae,<sup>50</sup> et minor de se. Major autem est principium apud eum.<sup>51</sup> Sed propositio prolata a Sorte, cum sit una singularis propositio, est aliqua propositio significabilis per istum terminum communem 'propositio'; igitur, in ista propositione 'Propositio est' subjectum significat totam illam propositionem.

49.) <sup>52</sup>Secundo sic: Ad hoc, quod aliquis terminus significat aliquam rem vel aliquas res ex impositione, non requiritur praecognitio illius vel illarum, nisi tantum confusa et universalis, secundum eum<sup>53</sup>; sed talem de omni propositione habet intellectus<sup>54</sup> per conceptum propositionis secundum quid propositio est<sup>55</sup>; igitur, habita illa cognitione, potest intellectus imponere istum terminum 'propositio' ad significandum omnem propositionem [et ad omnem propositionem significandum]<sup>56</sup>; igitur, cum

a sit propositio virtute illius impositionis, significat iste terminus 'propositio' a; et illius propositionis iste terminus 'propositio' est pars; igitur, pars potest significare totum cuius est pars.<sup>57</sup> Et ad vitandum omnem cavillationem, pono quod iste terminus 'propositio' positus in illa propositione sit omnis talis terminus. Patet major primae consequentiae: Nam aliter iste terminus 'homo' unica impositione non significaret omnem hominem, cum nullus unico conceptu intellegit omnem hominem, nisi prout omnis homo convenit in eadem natura in specie.

50.) Item, quod pars significat totum cuius est pars negari non potest ab eo, eo quod est conclusio sua in materia obligationum,<sup>58 59</sup> ubi dicit quod in ista propositione 'Omnis propositio est vera' subjectum<sup>60</sup> significat totam illam propositionem cuius est pars.

51.) <sup>61</sup>Habito igitur quod pars significat totum, probatur secunda conclusio, quae est ista: quod, si pars significat totum cuius est pars, pro toto cuius est pars supponere potest. Arguitur haec consequentia primo sic: Quodlibet significatum termini de quolibet potest intellectus affirmare vel negare; propositio cuius iste terminus 'propositio' est pars est aliquod significatum

illius termini 'propositio'; igitur, hoc significatum potest<sup>62</sup> intellectus de isto termino 'propositio', quae est pars, affirmare vel negare; (49ra) et sive sic sive sic, sequitur quod pars potest supponere pro <toto> cujus est pars; igitur, eo ipso quod 'propositio' significat totum cujus est pars, pro toto cujus est pars supponere potest.

52.) <sup>63</sup>Secundo sic: Secundum principia illius opinantis, <sup>64</sup>terminus communis respectu verbi de praesenti supponit pro quolibet suo significato quod est; igitur, secundum eum, cum propositio quae est cujus iste terminus 'propositio' est pars sit aliquod significatum illius termini communis 'propositio', in ista propositione 'Omnis propositio est <vera>' in qua subjectum supponit respectu verbi de praesenti, pro ea actualiter supponit; unde, secundum prima principia, haec consequentia est bona: 'Omnis propositio est vera; haec est propositio; igitur, haec propositio est vera', denotando per subjectum minoris ipsam propositionem; quae consequentia non valeret, nisi in minori pars supponeret pro toto cujus est pars; igitur, eo ipso quod pars significat totum cujus est, et totum est, et pars est, pro eo respectu verbi de praesenti supponere potest.

53.) <sup>65</sup>Tertio sic: Sint a b duae tales propositiones: 'Propositio est', 'Propositio est'. Et sit una in anima Sortis et alia in anima Platonis. Et sint istae propositiones omnes propositiones. Et arguo sic: Subjectum a supponit pro b, et subjectum b supponit pro a, juxta istam opinionem; sed major reflexio actuum supra se est, sive circulatio in causis essentialiter ordinatis, quod a supponit pro b, et e contrario, quam quod pars supponit pro toto cujus est pars; igitur, eo ipso quod concedit quod subjectum a supponit pro b, et e contrario, quod partem posse supponere pro toto concedere habet.

54.) <sup>66</sup>Quarto sic: Sit a ista propositio 'Propositio est', ut prius, et b ista 'Nulla propositio est'. Et sint a b omnes propositiones. Tunc quaero utrum subjectum in b supponat pro ipsa propositione cujus est pars aut pro qualibet alia propositione distincta ab ipsa. Primum non concedet, eo quod repugnat suae positioni. Secundum autem negare non potest, eo quod sequens est. Ex quo arguitur propositum sub ista forma: In omnibus contradictoriis formaliter inter se contradicentibus termini supponunt pro eisdem<sup>67</sup>; a et b sunt contradictoria inter se contradicentia; igitur, in a et b termini<sup>68</sup> supponunt pro eisdem. Patet consequentia et consequens.

Et ex<sup>69</sup> consequente sic: In b subjectum supponit pro a; tamen a sit propositio alia<sup>70</sup> a b; in a aliquis terminus supponit pro a, quod est probandum. Et tantum contra primum dictum in ista opinione.

55.) <sup>71</sup>Contra secundum, in quo dicitur quod propositio dicta a Sorte significat Sortem dicere aliam propositionem ab illa quam dicit: Contra quod arguitur primo sic: Sit ista propositio 'Falsum est' omnis propositio. Et arguo sic: Iste terminus 'falsum' est terminus communis supponens respectu verbi de praesenti; igitur, tantum supponit pro his quae sunt. Haec consequentia est sua.<sup>72</sup> Sed tantum haec propositio est; igitur, juxta principia sua, in ista propositione 'Falsum est' subjectum non supponit pro alia propositione ab illa cujus est pars.

56.) <sup>73</sup>Secundo sic: Sint a b duae tales propositiones: 'Falsum est', 'Falsum est', quarum prima sit in anima Sortis et alia in anima Platonis. Et non sint aliae propositiones quam a et b. Tunc, juxta istam<sup>74</sup> rationem, subjectum a significat b, et subjectum b significat a. Quaero igitur, utrum a sit verum vel falsum. Si verum, igitur b est falsum. Probo consequentiam: a significat



b esse<sup>75</sup> falsum; igitur, si sic est, sicut a significat, b est falsum. Si autem quod a<sup>76</sup> est falsum, arguitur sic: a est falsum; igitur, b est verum.<sup>77</sup> Patet consequentia, eo quod tunc non est, sicut illa significat. Igitur, isto casu posito, cum ista positione non stat quod a sit verum, nisi b<sup>78</sup> sit falsum, nec quod b (49rb) sit verum, nisi a sit falsum; et tamen omnis ratio per quam intellectus aliquis concludit quod a verificatur pro b, consimiliter et per idem medium concludere habet quod b verificatur pro a, et omnino eadem ratione qua a falsificatur pro b, b falsificatur pro a. Quia pono quod Sortes et Plato simul sic componant, et quod nullus prius alio, quod etiam tam a quam b praecise significant juxta compositionem terminorum. Talis igitur opinio concedere habet propositionem vel negare, et tamen nullam causam assignare potest quare plus eam concedere [eam] quam negare, vel e contrario. Quod rationi et regulis logicae<sup>79</sup> repugnat manifeste.

57.)<sup>80</sup> Tertio sic: Si propositio dicta a Sorte significat Sortem dicere aliam propositionem quam dicit, quaero quam aliam. Quaecumque detur, sit illa a. Et arguo sic: a est suppositum istius<sup>81</sup> termini 'falsum' in propositione dicta a Sorte; igitur, extremum propositionis

dicta a Sorte significat a. Consequens falsum, cum tunc intellectus possit devenire et actualiter intellegere quam propositionem, aliam a<sup>82</sup> propositione dicta a Sorte, extremum propositionis dictae a Sorte significaret.

58.) Confirmatur istud per exemplum: Si a esset ista propositio 'Homo est asinus', tunc ista in anima converterentur: 'Sortes dicit falsum' et 'Sortes dicit istam "Homo est asinus" non significantem sicut est'; sed palam est quod non sequitur, isto casu posito: 'Sortes dicit falsum; igitur, Sortes dicit hominem esse asinum'; et quam non sequitur de ista, tam non sequitur de quacumque alia falsa; igitur, nullam aliam falsam significat hoc extremum 'falsum' in propositione dicta a Sorte.

59.) <sup>83</sup>Quarto sic: Sit a intellectus qui sine omni medio videre potest rem quamcumque intellectus Sortis<sup>84</sup> potest videre per medium vel media. Et applicet se ille intellectus ad videndum significatum illius termini 'falsum' in propositione dicta a Sorte. Quo posito, quaero utrum videt aliquam propositionem esse suppositum illius termini<sup>85</sup> 'falsum' aut videt quod nullum est suppositum illius termini 'falsum'. Si videat quod nullum, igitur, cum, per casum sequitur quod

videt sicut est, cum non potest decipi, sequitur quod de facto iste terminus 'falsum' non significat aliquam propositionem aliam a propositione dicta a Sorte. Si autem detur quod videt aliquam propositionem esse suppositum illius termini 'falsum': Contra: Quod ~~(non prius)~~<sup>86</sup> videt unam propositionem falsam quae non est dicta a Sorte quam aliam, ut patet diligenter consideranti; igitur, vel quamlibet possibilem videt esse suppositum illius termini 'falsum' vel nullum. Si quamlibet possibilem videt, tum propter impossibilitatem earum simul in falsitate, tum propter finitatem talis intellectus, infirmitatem talium objectorum, fictio est igitur, ponere quod propositio dicta a Sorte significat Sortem dicere aliam propositionem ab illa quam dicit.

60.) <sup>87</sup>Quinto sic: Sit a propositio dicta a Sorte. Et arguitur sic: Nullum extremum in a supponit pro tota illa propositione cuius est pars, nec pro aliqua alia propositione; aliquod extremum in a supponit; igitur, pro nulla propositione aliquod extremum in a supponit. Consequentia evidens. Et prima pars antecedentis sequitur ex hoc, quod pars non supponit pro toto cuius est pars. Secunda pars arguitur: quia, sint b c d, gratia argumenti, omnes propositiones posibles. Tunc

pro nulla istarum aliquod extremum in a supponit; quaelibet propositio est aliqua istarum; igitur, pro nulla propositione aliquod extremum in a supponit. Cujus rationis major sic ostenditur: quia, si b non esset (49va) nec esse posset, nihil minus staret quod a significaret, sicut si quod<sup>88</sup> modo significat; igitur, nullum extremum a supponit pro b; et, per idem, nec pro c nec pro d; <sup>89</sup>et sicut arguitur de istis tribus, sic argui potest, dato quod essent infinitae propositiones b, etc., quod, si datur quod propositio dicta a Sorte significat propositionem aliam ab illa, nullam tamen aliam significat.

61.) <sup>90</sup>Contra: Nullus terminus stat confuse<sup>91</sup> tantum, nisi propter aliquod syncategorema vel aliquem alium terminum praecedentem habentem vim faciendi terminum sequentem sic supponere; sed in propositione dicta a Sorte, quae est haec: 'Sortes dicit falsum', nullum est tale <syn>categorema aut aliquis talis terminus, ut manifestum est; igitur, in propositione dicta a Sorte nullus terminus sic supponit, quod est oppositum dati.

62.) <sup>92</sup>Sexta sic: Haec positio cum prima videtur coincidere, cum vocaliter casum insolubilium concedat et

in effectu realiter illum negat. Est enim unus<sup>93</sup> particulus<sup>94</sup> casus, quod Sortes non dicat aliquam aliam ab illa unica quam <dicat>; igitur, illa negativa excludit Sortem dicere aliquam aliam; et propositio dicta a Sorte ponit Sortem dicere aliquam aliam, quae significat Sortem dicere aliquam aliam; igitur, propositio dicta a Sorte excludit<sup>95</sup> casum. Probatur consequentia; Propositio affirmativa<sup>96</sup>--quod casus negat; igitur, etc.

63.) <sup>97</sup>Tertio dicit ista opinio quod propositio dicta a Sorte nec est vera nec falsa. Pro quo dicto, tantum ponit quod, sicut concedendum quod Sortes non dicit verum neque falsum aliud ab isto quod dicit, sic concedendum est quod propositio dicta a Sorte nec est vera nec falsa.<sup>98</sup> Sed palam est quod ista ratio non valet. Stat enim quod Sortes non dicit aliud ab illo quod dicit, et tamen quod dicit verum vel falsum, ut, si esset alius Sortes qui diceret quod homo est asinus et tantum illam, et iste Sortes tantum istam 'Sortes dicit falsum', tunc, ista<sup>99</sup> 'Homo est asinus'<sup>1</sup> dicta ab alio Sorte, tunc propositio dicta a Sorte est vera, et tamen tunc Sortes non diceret aliud ab illo quod dicit.

64.) Est tamen alius qui hoc dictum profundius investigat, qui pro principali conclusione tenet in hac

materia quod propositio dicta a Sorte nec est vera nec falsa, quae est quarta opinio, ultima in ordine. Contra quam et istam simul obiciam convenienter.

65.) <sup>2</sup>Quarta opinio, igitur, pro principali conclusione ponit quod propositio insolubilis est talis, quod nec est vera nec falsa. Quae opinio ad id probandum multa praemittit.<sup>3</sup> Ponit enim duas definitiones, quattuor<sup>4</sup> suppositiones, et viginti quattuor conclusiones.<sup>5</sup> Sed, quia ista positio ex suis principiis poterit declarari<sup>6</sup> brevius, ideo solum illa recitabo ex quibus, tamquam<sup>7</sup> ex necessariis, haec dependet.

66.) Stat enim principaliter in duabus suppositionibus et tribus conclusionibus.<sup>8</sup> Definitio prima est talis: Signum verum est signum praecise qualiter est significans.<sup>9</sup> Secunda: Signum falsum est signum qualiter non est significans.<sup>10</sup> Suppositio prima: Et veritas significati est causa veritatis signi.<sup>11</sup> Secunda: Falsitas significati est causa falsitatis signi.<sup>12</sup> Conclusio prima: Veritas signi praesupponit, tamquam prius veram causa(m), veritatem sui significati, quam ipsum significatum.<sup>13</sup> Secunda ad propositum est talis: Quaelibet falsitas signi, tamquam causam sibi, naturaliter primam falsitatem sui

significati et ipsius significati contradictorium  
 praesupponit. (49vb) <sup>14</sup>Tertia: Significatum illius  
 propositionis 'Omne<sup>15</sup> verum <est>' et cujuslibet consimilis  
 nec est verum nec falsum, quae est opinio in terminis.

67.) <sup>16</sup>Et haec sic arguitur ex praemissis: Sit a  
 ista propositio 'Omne verum est'. Et arguitur quod a  
 nec est verum nec falsum. Nam omne verum praesupponit,  
 tamquam <prius> vera<m> causa<m>, <sup>17</sup>veritatem sui significati,  
 quam ipsum significatum, ex prima conclusione; sed, cum  
a sit significatum ipsius a, a sic non praesupponit.  
 Consequentia arguitur ex [ex] hoc, quod nihil aliquo  
 ordine se ipsum praesupponit. Et quod a non sit falsum<sup>18</sup>  
 arguitur ex alia conclusione sic: a est falsum; igitur,  
 ipsius a significatum prius naturaliter est falsum.  
 Consequentia paret secundam conclusionem. Igitur, ex  
 opposito consequentis sequitur oppositum antecedentis<sup>19</sup>;  
 oppositum autem consequentis est verum. Nam significatum  
 ipsius a est ipsamet<sup>20</sup> a; et ipsamet a non est prius  
 falsum quam ipsum sit falsum; igitur, ipsius a significatum  
 non est plus naturaliter falsum quam ipsum est falsum.<sup>21</sup>

68.) <sup>22</sup>Contra istam quartam opinionem arguo  
 tripliciter: primo contra conclusionem in se; secundo



quod ista opinio destruit se ipsam; et tertio contra<sup>23</sup> rationem positionis.

69.) Pro primo arguitur primo sic: Sit a talis propositio: 'Omne verum est'. Et sit hoc a, gratia argumenti, omne a, quae secundum istam opinionem nec est vera nec falsa. Tunc sic: a est signum; aut, igitur, a est signum praecise qualiter est significans aut non est signum praecise qualiter est significans. Si detur primum, igitur, per descriptionem suam,<sup>24</sup> a est signum verum. Si detur secundum, igitur a est signum falsum. Probo consequentiam: Nam arguitur sic: Nullum a est signum praecise qualiter est significans; quodlibet a est signum aliququaliter [est] significans, cum sit signum complexe significans; igitur, quodlibet a est signum aliter quam<sup>25</sup> qualiter est significans.

70.)<sup>26</sup> Confirmatur breviter consequentia sic: Quodlibet totale significare ipsum a est tale <quod habet> correspondentiam adaequatam vel est tale quod non habet. Si est tale quod habet, igitur praecise sicut est significat, juxta descriptionem primam. Si non habet, igitur significat aliququaliter, et taliter non est; igitur, est signum falsum. Consequentia paret descriptionem suam secundam.

71.) <sup>27</sup>Secundo sic: Quod a sit verum vel falsum probatur inductive: Aliqua propositio vera est vera; et nulla sit propositio vera quin illa sit vera; igitur, omnis propositio vera est vera. Deductio patet, et totum antecedens est verum. Quia, si aliqua propositio vera sit quae non sit vera, aliqua propositio est vera et illa non est vera, quae est contradictio. Et, per consequens, sequitur quod consequens illatum est verum.

72.) Item, inductiva<sup>28</sup> probatur sic: Haec propositio vera est vera, et haec propositio vera est vera, et sic de singulis; igitur, omnis propositio vera est vera. Deductio patet; et totum antecedens verum<sup>29</sup>; igitur, consequens verum.<sup>30</sup>

73.) <sup>31</sup>Tertio sic: Falsum solum est privatio veri in propositione; igitur, eo ipso quod aliqua propositio simplex categorica est non vera, est falsa. Probo assertum: Nam sit a ista propositio 'Sortes est' praecise significans juxta compositionem terminorum, quae nunc sit vera. Et arguo sic: Si, manente ista propositione praecise significante sicut modo significat, Sortes corrumpetur et nihil omnino generaretur, ista propositio, Sorte corrupto, esset falsa: 'Sortes est';

igitur, falsum in propositione nihil omnino est, nisi privatio veri. Ad hoc: quod a sit falsa, postquam fuerit vera, requiritur aliqua positio et non solum positionis privatio.

74.) <sup>32</sup>Quarto sic: Sit a propositio dicta a Sorte quae est propositio mere de inesse de praesenti affirmativa. Et quaero utrum ita sit, sicut a primo significat aut non est <sup>33</sup> ita, sicut a primo significat. Divisio patet, eo quod sit per partes contradictionis. Si est ita, sicut a primo significat, igitur a est propositio vera. Patet consequentia per definitionem propositionis verae. <sup>34</sup> Si non est ita, sicut a primo significat, igitur a est propositio falsa. (50ra) Patet etiam consequentia, per descriptionem propositionis <sup>35</sup> falsae.

75.) <sup>36</sup>Quinto sic: Hoc disjunctum 'verum vel falsum' est convertibile cum isto termino 'propositio', ut colligi potest per <sup>37</sup> Aristotelem, 2<sup>o</sup> Posteriorum, capitulo 2<sup>o</sup>, <sup>38</sup> ubi loquitur de passionibus disjunctis; sed propositio dicta a Sorte est propositio; igitur, propositio dicta a Sorte est vera vel falsa. Consequentia patet cum toto antecedente.

76.) <sup>39</sup>Sexto sic: Omnis conceptus compositus in anima in quo est actus componendi vel dividendi est verus vel <sup>40</sup>falsus; propositio in anima est huiusmodi; igitur, omnis propositio in anima est vera vel falsa. Consequentia patet et minor. Et maior in terminis est propositio Aristotelis, 3<sup>o</sup> De anima, textu commenti 26<sup>ti</sup>.<sup>41</sup> Et Commentator in commento<sup>42</sup> dicit quod hoc est proprium huic<sup>43</sup> propositioni esse verum vel falsum.

77.) <sup>44</sup>Septimo arguitur contra istam conclusionem per auctoritates, ostendendo quod sit contra mentem Aristotelis et suorum sequacium. Dividit enim Aristoteles, primo Periermenias, capitulo 4<sup>o</sup>,<sup>45</sup> orationem in orationem enuntiativam et orationem non enuntiativam, enuntiativam vocans "propositionem" quae, secundum eum, primo Priorum,<sup>46</sup> "est oratio affirmativa vel negativa alicujus de aliquo", ut communiter definiens orationem enuntiativam dicit quod oratio enuntiativa est in qua est verum vel falsum; igitur, cum dicit propositionem esse nec verum nec falsum, principiis philosophiae Aristotelis<sup>47</sup> clare contradicit.

78.) <sup>48</sup>Item, Aristoteles, 2<sup>o</sup> Periermenias, capitulo 2<sup>o</sup>,<sup>49</sup> concludit sic in terminis: "Semper enim vel veram vel falsam esse negationem" in propositione[m] negativa[m]

"necesse est"; sed quam necesse est unam partem contradictionis esse veram vel falsam, tam necesse est alteram. Alioquin imaginalliter possent simul stare in veritate vel falsitate. Igitur, necesse est utramque partem esse veram vel falsam.

79.) <sup>50</sup>Item, Boethius, primo Topicorum suorum, capitulo primo,<sup>51</sup> definiens propositionem dicit, "Propositio est oratio verum vel falsum significans."

80.) <sup>52</sup>Item, Anselmus,<sup>53</sup> De veritate, capitulo 2<sup>o</sup>,<sup>54</sup> "Cum significat", inquit, enuntiatio "esse quod est, tunc est in ea veritas et est vera." Cujus probatio<sup>55</sup> dicit quod tunc "significat quod debet".<sup>56</sup> Et, si significat quod recte significat, quare concludit quod tunc est in ea veritas et<sup>57</sup> recitudo ad lineam<sup>58</sup>; sed absolute impossibile quod aliqua linea sit quae nec sit recta nec curva<sup>59</sup>; igitur, absolute impossibile est quod sit propositio quae nec sit vera nec falsa.

81.) Item, sit a propositio data quae nec sit vera nec falsa, et b ejus contradictorium. Tunc quaero utrum b sit verum vel falsum vel neutrum. Non neutrum, propter repugnantiam ad primum principium demonstrationis. Si verum, igitur a est falsum. Patet consequentia, per necessitatem primo principii demonstrationis. Si b est falsum, igitur a est<sup>60</sup> verum.

82.) <sup>61</sup>Item, Aristoteles, 6<sup>o</sup> Metaphysicae, textu commenti octavi, <sup>62</sup>vult quod cujuslibet contradictionis, si affirmativa erit «vera», negativa erit falsa, et e contrario. Super quam litteram dicit Commentator, <sup>63</sup>"Cum affirmativa est vera," inquit, "per compositionem, negativa est falsa per divisionem. Et similiter, quando negativa est vera per divisionem, affirmativa est falsa" generaliter "per compositionem."

83.) Secundo arguitur<sup>64</sup> principaliter contra positionem in se, arguendo quod destruit semet ipsam. Nam, juxta imaginationem illius opinionis, ex principiis suis non sequitur aliqua<sup>65</sup> conclusio vera vel falsa. Quod ostenditur sic: Nullum principium suum<sup>66</sup> est verum vel falsum; igitur, etc. Assertum arguitur sic: Accipiendo primam definitionem suam, quae est haec: 'Omne signum verum est signum praecise qualiter est significans', etiam et a.<sup>67</sup> Tunc sic: Subjectum in a est terminus communis significans totam illam propositionem cujus est pars; igitur, cum veritas significati sit causa veritatis signi, per primam conclusionem, prius esset a vera. Consequentia haec omnino arguitur, sicut arguitur conclusio sua principalis. (50rb) Et antecedens et arguo per eum: quia, qua

ratione in ista propositione 'Omne verum est verum', subjectum supponit pro toto cuius est pars, eadem ratione per 'omne'<sup>68</sup> in a pars pro toto supponere potest. Debet quod, si dicatur quod definitio est una particularis et non universalis, et ideo non sequitur quod infertur: sed hoc non solvit. Nam aut illa definitio est data bene aut non. Si bene, igitur est convertibile cum definito, per Aristotelem, 2<sup>o</sup> Posteriorum, capitulo 2<sup>o</sup><sup>69</sup>; et, per consequens, si signum universale additur subjecto, vere praedicabitur de illo illa definitio. Si male autem detur illa definitio, habeo quod intendo. Per idem medium concluditur quod quaelibet conclusio sua est talis, quarum nulla est vera vel falsa.

84.) Secundo arguitur contra opinionem in se, eo quod ratio cui nititur est nimis diminuta,<sup>70</sup> quae est quod nihil aliquo ordine naturae <prae> supponit se ipsum. Nam sit Sortes filius Platonis. Tunc constat quod Sortes, ea ratione qua est filius Platonis, est posterior Platone, quia sic est effectus Platonis, non solum ut Plato est Plato, sed ut Plato est pater,<sup>71</sup> quia sic Plato est causa Sortis; similiter, filius prius naturaliter est Platone, ut Plato est pater, eo quod Plato ideo est pater, quia



habet filium; igitur, ipsum habere filium est causa quare ipse est pater; filius, igitur, ea ratione qua est causa quare pater est pater, est prius naturaliter se ipso, ea ratione qua est a patre. Et hoc est quod vult Avicenna, 6<sup>o</sup> Metaphysicae suae, capitulo ultimo,<sup>72</sup> ubi dicit quod causa, inquantum causa, prior est causato, inquantum causatum, et tamen causa, inquantum causa, simil est cum causato simultate<sup>73</sup> requisita ad relativa; igitur, secundum eum, causa, inquantum est illud a quo est causatum, est prius naturaliter se ipsa, inquantum est correlativum cum causato.

85.) Tertio sic: Sit a species lapidis existens in anima Sortis. Et arguitur sic: a est intellegibilis; aut, igitur, per se aut per aliam speciem. Si per aliam speciem, quaero de illa alia. Et sic vel erit processus in<sup>74</sup> infinitum vel aliqua species in anima naturaliter praesentat se ipsam ipsi animae, quae species sit b. Tunc sic: b est signum sui ipsius; igitur, b praesupponit se ipsum ut significatum sibi met ipsi, ut signo vero. Patet consequentia per primam conclusionem, et antecedens per descriptionem illius termini 'significare'.<sup>75</sup> Quod etiam b sit signum verum dicit Aristoteles, 3<sup>o</sup> De anima, textu commenti 26<sup>ti</sup>,<sup>76</sup> ubi vult Aristoteles et etiam

Commentator<sup>77</sup> quod intellectus simplex semper est verus; sed intellectus b est intellectus simplex; igitur, b est signum verum. Sic, terminus in anima se ipsum repraesentans ipsi animae Sortis secundum rationem est se ipse<sup>78</sup> ea ratione qua repraesentatur ipsi animae. Consimiliter accidit in multis aliis, propter quod positio ista omnino vera non est.<sup>79</sup>

86.) <sup>80</sup>Tertio principaliter arguitur contra rationem positionis. Ista enim positio in hoc concordat cum secunda, quod innit<sup>ur</sup><sup>81</sup> partem posse supponere <pro toto> cuius est pars. Innitur enim illi propositioni, tamquam suo principali fundamento, qua negata, omnia argumenta sua peccarent fallaciam aequivocationis, et similiter non causam ut causam.

87.) Arguitur<sup>82</sup> contra<sup>83</sup> hoc sic: Pars supponit pro toto cuius est pars; igitur, est signum verum totius vel signum falsum totius. Consequens patet, arguendo contra conclusionem principalem illius opinionis. Et consequens falsum, secundum istam opinionem, cum non praesupponat propositionem cuius est pars esse veram neque falsam esse, quia sic se ipsam praesupponeret, quod ista opinio non admittit.

88.) Isto posito, arguitur quod<sup>84</sup> principia sua sunt nimis<sup>85</sup> diminuta.<sup>86</sup> Pro quo primo sic: Nam, quando sic dicit: "Signum verum est signum praecise qualiter est significans," quaero quid determinat hoc verbum 'est' in<sup>87</sup> illa definitione: (50va) aut ipsa propositio sic significans, aut ipsum significare, aut res quae significatur. Si primo modo, igitur omnis propositio est vera et nulla falsa. Probo consequentiam: Nam quaelibet propositio praecise significat taliter, qualiter est significans, cum haec sit impossibilis: 'Quaecumque propositione demonstrata, illa significat aliter quam est significans'. [E]idem sequitur, si ipsum significare determinat hoc verbum 'est' in ipsa definitione. Igitur, ipsius divisionis<sup>88</sup> concedenda<sup>89</sup> est pars ultima, quod res [quod res] quae significatur per propositionem determinat hoc verbum 'est'. Ex quo arguitur propositum sic: Sit a ista propositio 'Antichristus erit', quae solum significet juxta compositionem terminorum, et primo quod modo non sit Antichristus nec aliquid ejus. Tunc sic arguo: a est signum verum; et non praecise qualiter est significat; igitur, non quodlibet signum verum praecise qualiter est significat, quod est oppositum illius definitionis. Patet major. Et minor arguitur: Nam hoc verbum 'est' determinat res significata[s] per a;

sed nulla est res significata per a; igitur, a non significat sicut est. Consequentia evidens. Et prima<sup>90</sup> pars antecedentis patet per divisionem prius positam, et secunda pars per casum.

89.) <sup>91</sup>Secundo sic: Sit aliqua propositio vera mere de praeterito vel de futuro, ut talis 'Adam fuit' vel talis 'Dies crastina<sup>92</sup> erit'. Tunc sic: a est propositio vera; et tamen a non praecise qualiter est significat; igitur. Minor sic: Quam determinatur verbum unius temporis ad praecise significandum tempus ejusdem dicere, tam determinatur<sup>93</sup> verbum alterius<sup>94</sup> dicere ad praecise consignificandum tempus alterius dicere; igitur, sicut verbum praesentis temporis non consignificat futurum tempus vel praeteritum, sic verbum praeteriti temporis vel futuri non consignificat tempus praesens; non plus, igitur, significat propositio de futuro, quamvis vera, sicut est, quam propositio de praesenti vera significat sicut erit.

90.) Item, propositio de contingenti, ut talis 'Album possibile est esse nigrum', non plus significat sicut est, quam propositio negativa vera de inesse significat sicut potest esse.

91.) <sup>95</sup>Item, secunda definitio est insufficiens et falsa. Insufficiens est enim, eo quod multa sunt vera quorum quodlibet qualiter non est significat. Quod arguitur sic: Nulla negativa vera de praesenti praecise qualiter est significat; et aliqua<sup>96</sup> negativa vera de praesenti est; igitur, aliqua negativa vera de praesenti qualiter non est significat. Consequentia evidens est. Et assertum probo: Sit a ista propositio 'Antichristus potest non esse', quae sit vera. Et arguo sic: a non significat quod aliquid est; nec a significat quod aliqualiter est; igitur, a non significat sicut est. Patet consequentia: Nam ex opposito sequitur oppositum.<sup>97</sup> Igitur, a non praecise qualiter est significat; et, sicut arguitur de <ista>, ita de qualibet negativa alia; igitur, nulla negativa,<sup>98</sup> etc.

92.) Item, a significat primo Antichristum non esse; igitur, a non significat primo aliquid [non] esse. Patet consequentia, cum Antichristum non esse non sit aliquid esse, sed aliquid non esse.<sup>99</sup>

93.) <sup>1</sup>Item, quod illa definitio secunda<sup>2</sup> sit falsa concluditur ex hoc, quod definitio praedicatur de opposito definiti.

94.) <sup>3</sup>Item, contra primam conclusionem, quae dicit quod veritas signi praesupponit, tamquam prius natura, tam veritatem sui significati, quam suum significatum: Ista conclusio omnino stare non potest. Nam sit a ista propositio: 'Possibile est Sortem esse'. Et demonstro per 'Sortem' qui<sup>4</sup> numquam erit, poterit tamen fore. Et arguo sic: Si nihil esset, nisi causa prima et una anima et<sup>5</sup> a et partes ejus, quae anima in se a propositionem componeret, a propositio esset vera; sed tunc a non praesupponeret veritatem sui significati, (50vb) cum talis veritas non esset veritas praecise esse, nec veritas animae, nec veritas complexa illius propositionis; igitur, non sequitur quod quaelibet propositio vera veritatem sui significati naturaliter praesupponeret.

95.) Item, si veritas significati praesupponitur <a> veritate<sup>6</sup> signi, aliqua veritas significati non dependet a veritate <signi>, ut<sup>7</sup> exigit ad unum esse<sup>8</sup> veritatem signi, eo quod accidentaliter solum et non per se sequitur aliquam propositionem aliquam rem significantem esse.<sup>9</sup> Ex quo una cum conclusione arguo quod, si nihil esset, nisi Deus, adhuc infinita essent. Probatur consequentia: quia, si nihil esset, nisi Deus, adhuc infinitae propositiones verae distinctas res significantes

possent esse; sed omnium illarum rerum veritates modo sunt; igitur, etc.

96.) Item, si infinitae tales propositiones essent in actu, tunc infinitae veritates significatorum per illas propositiones essent in actu; sed nulla illarum veritatum dependet a positione<sup>10</sup> propositionis significantis rem cuius est veritas; igitur, jam est quaelibet illarum.

97.) Item, componat Sortes sic in anima sua: 'Antichristus non est', quae sit a, quae modo sit vera. Tunc arguitur sic: a est verum; igitur, a praesupponit tam veritatem <significati> sui quam ipsum significatum. Quaero, igitur, aut suum significatum quod praesupponit est in anima Sortis aut extra animam.<sup>11</sup> Non extra animam, quia nihil est extra animam quod est Antichristum non esse, nec aliquid erit extra, nec fuit; igitur, si praesupponit significatum suum, praesupponit ipsum in anima Sortis in esse subjecti <v>o vel objecti <v>o. Consequentia patet. Et consequens falsum: Nam, dato consequente, duo contradictoria possent esse simul vera. Quod arguo sic: Sit significatum illius a b. Et veritas b sit c. Tunc sic: Quandocumque erunt a b c, erit a verum, eo quod a in esse vero solum dependet a b



et c, per conclusionem primam. Alioquin, quando erit a b c, erit haec vera: 'Antichristus est'. Igitur, aliquando quando a erit verum, erit haec vera: 'Antichristus est'; et a est ista: 'Antichristus non est'; igitur, aliquando quando erit haec vera 'Antichristus non est', erit haec vera 'Antichristus est'; et ista sunt contradictoria; igitur, etc. Et minor primae consequentiae arguitur sic: Quod est in anima Sortis potest manere <cum> positione Antichristi in esse, eo quod Antichristus non repugnat alicui vel aliquibus qui sunt in anima Sortis; igitur, cum a b c sunt in anima Sortis, a b c possunt manere cum positione<sup>12</sup> Antichristi; qua posita reducta ad actum, sequitur minor in terminis.

98.) Ex isto sequitur etiam quod oppositum conclusionis secundae suae fore verum, quae dicit quod signum falsum praesupponit tam significatum falsum<sup>13</sup> quam ipsius significati contradictorium.<sup>14</sup> Haec enim propositio 'Antichristus est' est falsa, et tamen ista propositio nec praesupponit significatum falsum, nec contradictorium illius significati. Quod arguitur sic: quia, nec in re, nec in intellectu; igitur, etc. Non in re, quia nihil est<sup>15</sup> Antichristum esse in re, quando

Antichristus non est; nec in intellectu, propter argumentum prius factum; igitur, etc.

99.) <sup>16</sup>Item, per Aristoteles, 5<sup>o</sup> Metaphysicae,  
textu commenti 34<sup>ti</sup>, <sup>17</sup> nullum falsum est aliquod ens in  
rebus, ut patet per exempla sua per totum capitulum de  
falso; igitur, si propositio falsa praesupponit suum  
significatum, praesupponit illud solum in intellectu,  
quod etiam non permittit deductio prius facta.

100.) Ultimo arguitur quod propositio non praesupponit  
contradictorium sui significati: quia quaero quid  
intellegit per 'oppositum significati propositionis  
falsae': aut contradictoriam propositionem aut oppositum  
significatum; sed sive sic sive sic, non praesupponit  
ejus contradictorium; igitur, etc. Antecedens arguo  
breviter (5lra) sic: Nam ad hoc, quod ista propositio  
sit falsa: 'Antichristus est', non requiritur quod  
prius re vel ratione fuerit ista propositio 'Antichristus  
non <est>', nec significatum illius propositionis, cum  
nihil sit Antichristum non esse.

101.) Item, unum contradictorium non<sup>18</sup> praesupponit  
reliquum, cum nullum ordinem<sup>19</sup> habere posset<sup>20</sup> ad ipsum.

102.) Item, secundum Aristotelem 2<sup>o</sup> Elenchorum,<sup>21</sup> contradictio solum est inter propositiones; sed una pars contradictionis formalis, maxime pars affirmativa, sive vera sive falsa, non praesupponit aliam; igitur, nihil est ponere quod propositio falsa praesupponit tam significatum falsum quam contradictorium<sup>22</sup> significati. Et ista contra opiniones sufficiunt.

103.) <I>mprobatis igitur illis opinionibus, tamquam insolubilia insufficienter solventibus, restat alia principia ponere, ex quibus eorum solutio poterit clarius apparere. Unde, pro eorum solutione, praemittendae sunt aliquae divisiones. Secundo, ponendae sunt aliquae suppositiones. Tertio, addendae sunt descriptiones. Et quarto eliciendae sunt aliquae conclusiones, ex quibus patebit positio alia in hac materia.

104.) Divisiones autem sunt tres. <sup>23</sup>Prima: Omnis suppositio in propositione est materialis vel significativa.<sup>24</sup> Haec patet ea quae prius dicuntur in materia suppositionum.<sup>25</sup> <sup>26</sup>Secunda est ista: Quaelibet propositio simplex categorica est vera vel falsa. Haec patet ex his quae arguuntur contra principalem conclusionem quartae opinionis. <sup>27</sup>Tertia: Omne<sup>28</sup> insolubile est categoricum vel hypotheticum.<sup>29</sup>

105.) Suppositiones vero sunt quinque, quarum prima est haec: <sup>30</sup>Quaelibet propositio simplex categorica affirmativa de inesse et de praesenti quae praecise significat primo sicut est est vera. Addo autem hoc determinativum 'primo' ad hoc verbum 'significat', quia rationabiliter posset dici quod nulla propositio praecise significat sicut est, eo quod quaelibet propositio significat principaliter sicut significat suum subjectum, quod non significat [quod non significat] esse, nec significat non esse; et ideo non significat sicut est. Similiter, aliqua talis propositio significat multa quorum aliquod non est, ut haec propositio 'Sortes intellegit Antichristum'; igitur, non praecise significat quod est, nec praecise sicut est. Totalis tamen significatio propositionis et prima integratur ex significatione omnium suorum partium; et ideo praecise significat primo affirmativa de praesenti et de inesse sicut est, quamvis secundo, ut partialiter, significat significatum alicujus alterius suae partis.

106.) <sup>31</sup>Secunda est ista: Quaelibet simplex categorica affirmativa de inesse et de praesenti quae non praecise significat primo sicut est est falsa. Haec sequitur ex prima, una cum secunda in divisione.

107.) <sup>32</sup>Tertia est ista: Si qua simplex categorica negativa de praesenti et de inesse quae praecise significat primo sicut est est propositio falsa--haec sic: Si qua talis sit, est falsa. Consequentia patet et assertum, quoad primam partem. Similiter, si [si] qua talis sit, significat primo rem non esse. Et quod significat rem non esse quae est arguitur ex hoc, quod significat sicut est; igitur, sicut res est vel saltem sicut praesentialiter<sup>33</sup> est; sed nihil nec aliququaliter praesentialiter est, nisi res; igitur, a primo: significat <sicut> est; igitur,<sup>34</sup> significat sicut res est; et significat illam rem non esse; igitur, quaelibet talis significat primo rem non esse quae est, quod est probandum.

108.) Ex ista sequitur quarta, quae talis:  
<sup>35</sup>Quaelibet simplex negativa de inesse et de praesenti quae praecise significat primo sicut non est est propositio vera. Haec, quamvis manifeste sequatur ex priori, arguitur tamen breviter sic: Quaelibet talis significat rem non esse (5lrb) aliud; igitur, significat rem non esse sicut res non<sup>36</sup> est, et habeo propositum, aut significat rem non esse non eo modo quo res non est, et constat quod tunc non est vera; igitur, ad hoc, quod sit vera, requiritur quod significet primo sicut non est. Quae

est suppositio data. Et accipetur in istis suppositionibus iste terminus 'sicut' prout habitudinem denotat et proportionem inter rem significatam et terminum significantem.<sup>37</sup>

109.) <sup>38</sup>Quinta: Omne insolubile, sive categoricum sive hypotheticum, ortum habet ex casu aliquo vel suppositione ordinata ad tale insolubile. Haec [sexto<sup>39</sup>] dinorabitur per processum: Nam, Sorte loquente talem propositionem 'Sortes dicit falsum' vel intellegente talem propositionem 'Sortes intellegit falsum', stat ipsum Sortem verum dicere vel verum intellegere ab haesitatione et dubio<sup>40</sup> ut, si intellegeret vel diceret hominem esse asinum, et pro ea diceret vel componeret 'Sortes dicit falsum', vera esset talis propositio; sed, suppositis cum hoc aliis particulis quae<sup>41</sup> sunt in casu, quae sunt quod Sortes dicat illam et nullam aliam, et quod sit unicus Sortes, et quod illa significet juxta compositionem terminorum, tunc primo redditur talis propositio insolubilis; et ideo insolubile oritur, tamquam ex causa sua totali, ex casu aliquo vel suppositione ordinata ad tale insolubile, quae est opinio data.

110.) Ex quo sequitur quod male dividitur insolubile, quando dicitur quod aliquod insolubile oritur ex actu

nostro et aliquod<sup>42</sup> ex proprietate vocis,<sup>43</sup> cum omne insolubile oriatur praecise ex casu vel suppositione aliqua ordinata ad tale insolubile. Nec ratio ducta pro illa opinione aliquid cogit, cum dicitur quod ideo<sup>44</sup> oritur tale insolubile 'Sortes dicit falsum' ex actu nostro, quia, si illae propositiones essent amotae ab actu nostro, non essent insolubiles.<sup>45</sup> Sed contra hoc breviter sic: Quaero utrum intellegit haec opinio quod in tali propositione 'Sortes dicit falsum' actus noster sit tota causa quare talis propositio est insolubilis vel intellegit quod actus sit tantum causa partialis. Si primo modo, tunc, in quacumque propositione esset actus noster, illa propositio esset insolubilis; igitur, cum omnis propositio insolubilis sit falsa, secundum istam opinionem,<sup>46</sup> omnis talis propositio in qua ponitur actus noster, ut sunt istae propositiones: 'Sortes dicit falsum' 'Sortes scribit falsum' 'Sortes audit falsum', nullo alio casu posito, esset falsa; igitur, si detur altera pars, quod actus noster non sit causa totalis, sed partialis, quare talis propositio est insolubilis, illa divisio tunc non exprimit sufficienter unde oritur ratio propositionis insolubilis, ut, si quaeratur "Quare scribis", et<sup>47</sup> respondes "Quod habeo penna", insufficientem causam



assignas, quia, quamvis necessario fuerit penna  
requisita ad scribendum, multa tamen alia requiruntur.

111.) Descriptiones vero sunt duae. <sup>48</sup>Prima:  
Insolubile simplex categorica est illud cujus alterum  
extremum vel utrumque, sub apparente <sup>49</sup>suppositione  
pro complexo, praecise complexum vel complexa significat  
vel supponit. <sup>50</sup>Secunda: Insolubile hypotheticum est  
illud cujus aliqua pars, sub apparente <sup>51</sup>suppositione  
pro complexis, praecise supponit pro complexo vel  
significat [in] complexa. <sup>52</sup>Quomodo autem istae duae  
descriptiones sequuntur ex <sup>53</sup>quinta <sup>54</sup>divisione <sup>55</sup>inferius <sup>56</sup>  
ostendetur.

112.) His praemissis, sequuntur conclusiones, quae  
sunt quinque in numero, quarum prima est haec: <sup>57</sup>Quaelibet  
species termini in voce vel in scripto existens in anima  
est praecise agentis propriae et sui ipsius naturaliter  
ostensiva. <sup>58</sup>Haec conclusio habet duas partes. Pro  
utraque simul generaliter arguitur sic: Illam rem  
species existens in anima praecise naturaliter significat  
quam, seclusa omni impositione, (51va) significat; sed  
omni impositione seclusa, nullam aliam <sup>59</sup>rem a se ipsa  
et ab agente proprio significat; igitur, quaelibet

species praecise naturaliter<sup>60</sup> se ipsam et agens proprium significat.

113.) Sed, quia non aequè primo in intellectu conjuncto significat se ipsam et agens a quo causatur, ideo probo generaliter quod quaelibet species termini in voce vel in scripto significet naturaliter agens proprium a quo causatur. Pro quo arguitur sic: Quaelibet species rei sensibilis est agentis proprii naturaliter significativa; quaelibet species termini in voce vel in scripto est species rei sensibilis; igitur, quaelibet species termini in voce vel in scripto est agentis [et] proprii naturaliter significativa. Consequentia patet et major, cum non aliter sensibilia naturaliter intelleguntur. Et minor etiam, cum omnis terminus in voce vel in scripto est ab aliquo sensu perceptibilis, ut quilibet terminus scriptus visu et quilibet terminus prolatus auditu.

114.) Secundo, arguitur quod illa species [in anima] existens in anima est naturaliter ipsi animae sui ipsius ostensiva; tamen, quia aliquid existens in anima est sui ipsius ostensiva, igitur, cum quaelibet<sup>61</sup> existens in anima sit aequè praesens sicut aliquid existens in ipsa anima, sequitur quod<sup>62</sup> quaelibet existens in

anima est naturaliter sui ipsius ostensiva. Tamen etiam, quia quaelibet species existens in anima se ipsam animae repraesentans potest esse extremum propositionis mentalis, igitur, cum nullum extremum in propositione mentali significet, nisi naturaliter, sequitur quod quaelibet species in anima naturaliter sui ipsius est<sup>63</sup> significativa.

115.) Confirmatur tota conclusio breviter sic: Nihil quod non<sup>64</sup> est illa species vel agens ipsam speciem sine impositione vera vel aequivalenti aliqua species in anima significat; igitur, praecise naturaliter sui ipsius et agentis proprii est species existens in anima [naturaliter] significativa. Antecedens arguitur ex hoc, quod quaelibet species quodlibet aliud imponi potest ad significandum, ut patere poterit inductive. Et ista pro hac conclusione sufficiant. Quae conclusio non<sup>65</sup> est una simplex categorica de copulato extremo, sed virtualiter est una conjunctiva includens duas categoricas.

116.) <sup>66</sup>Secunda conclusio: Nullum extremum propositionis extra animam aliquid ex impositione significat, nisi quod naturaliter et a priori significat extremum propositionis mentalis. Haec arguitur sic: Omnis terminus significans ex impositione subordinatur in

significando termino mentali actu idem significanti,  
ex Aristotele, primo Perihermenias, capitulo primo<sup>67</sup>;  
igitur, nullus terminus ex impositione aliquid significat,  
nisi quod prius naturaliter significat terminus mentalis.  
patet consequentia ex descriptione illius complexi  
subordinare in significando.<sup>68</sup>

117.)<sup>69</sup> Confirmatur ratio sic: Omni actuali  
significatione termini mentalis subducta, quilibet  
terminus extra animam omnino intrinsice et extrinsice  
se habe[n]t, sicut habuit quando<sup>70</sup> nihil significavit;  
igitur, omni actuali significatione termini mentalis  
subducta, terminus extra nihil significat. Patet  
consequentia cum antecedente.

118.)<sup>71</sup> Confirmatur iterum sic: Actualis  
comprehensio talis rei a per talem terminum b est  
causa particularis et in actu quare<sup>72</sup> b significat  
mihi a; igitur, desinente actu comprehensionis ipsius<sup>73</sup>  
a per b, desinit b significare a; sed b non potest  
mihi significare ex impositione a, nisi in ratione  
signi mediet inter b et ipsum a terminus mentalis  
naturaliter significans mihi a, cum b non determinat  
intellectionem meam plus ex natura sua ad tendendum<sup>74</sup>

super a, quam super<sup>75</sup> aliud ab a; igitur, pro omni  
 mensura pro qua b ex impositione significat mihi a,  
 in ratione signi mediat inter b et ipsum a terminus  
 mentalis naturaliter mihi significans (51vb) a; et  
 ultra: igitur, quodcumque b mihi significat a,  
 prius naturaliter significat a aliquis terminus  
 mentalis; et sicut arguitur<sup>76</sup> de b ad a, sic argui  
 potest de quolibet termino significante ex impositione  
 et ejus significato; igitur, nullus terminus aliquid  
 ex impositione significat, nisi quod naturaliter et  
 a priori significat terminus mentalis.<sup>77</sup> Patet consequentia  
 ultima ex hoc, quod, sicut terminus extra animam habet  
 quod sit terminus in anima, ex correspondentia et  
 subordinatione ad terminum mentalem, sic<sup>78</sup> extremum  
 propositionis extra habet quod sit extremum, ex  
 subordinatione et correspondentia ad extremum propositionis  
 in anima. «Igitur, nullum extremum» propositionis<sup>79</sup>  
«extra animam»<sup>80</sup> aliquid ex impositione significat,  
 nisi quod naturaliter et a priori significat extremum  
 propositionis mentalis, quod est probandum.

119.) <sup>81</sup>Tertia: Quidquid aliqua propositio vel  
 ejus extremum denotat significare, ipsum necesse est  
 quod actualiter significet. Et intellegitur iste

terminus 'necesse' prout determinaret<sup>82</sup> inhaerentiam praedicati ad subjectum. Hoc probatur ostensive: quia si aliqua propositio aliquid vel aliqua denotat significare, aut igitur alicui aut nulli. Si nulli, igitur non plus aliquid per ipsum concipitur.<sup>83</sup>

120.) Contra, si nihil aliud a se denotaret: sed, si nihil <aliud> a se denotaret, tunc nihil aliud intellectum a se repraesentaret; ex quo formaliter sequitur quod nihil aliud a se significaret; igitur, vel staret materialiter vel omnino nihil denotaret.

121.) Ad idem sic: Sit illud quod aliqua propositio extra animam dicitur<sup>84</sup> denotare a, et propositio b. Tunc quaero aut b denotat a naturaliter aut ex impositione; non naturaliter, cum sit propositio extra animam; igitur, ex impositione. Quo dato, arguo propositum sic: <sup>85</sup>a denotat b ex impositione; igitur, pro omni mensura pro qua a denotat b, subordinatur intentioni naturaliter significanti b; et ultra: igitur, a significat b; igitur, a primo, a denotat b; igitur, a significat b. Omnes consequentiae intermediae patent per ea quae de subordinatione terminorum superius declarantur.<sup>86</sup>

122.) <sup>87</sup>Quarta<sup>88</sup> conclusio: Nullum extremum propositionis in anima supponere potest pro ipsa propositione tota. Hoc probatur generaliter tam de affirmativis quam de negativis.<sup>89</sup> Et primo de affirmativis arguo primo sic: Omnis actus compositionis praesupponit naturaliter ordine naturae<sup>90</sup> ea quae illo actu componuntur; omnis actus quo res expressa per praedicatum affirmatur de re expressa per subjectum est actus compositionis; igitur, omnis actus quo res expressa per praedicatum affirmatur de re expressa per subjectum praesupponit necessario ordine naturae ea quae illo actu componuntur. Iste discursus patet in primo primae,<sup>91</sup> cujus major ex se evidens est.<sup>92</sup> <sup>93</sup>Et minor patet per Aristotelem, primo Periermenias, capitulo primo,<sup>94</sup> <sup>95</sup>et Commentatorem, 6<sup>o</sup> Metaphysicae, capitulo ultimo,<sup>96</sup> et per Aristotelem et Commentatorem, 3<sup>o</sup> De anima, textu commenti 21<sup>97</sup> et commento correspondente.<sup>98</sup>

123.) Sit igitur ab aliqua propositio mentalis. Et sit<sup>99</sup> c actus quo res significata per b affirmatur de re significata per a. Et arguo sic: c praesupponit ordine naturae tam significatum a quam significatum b; sed c ordine naturae non praesupponit<sup>1</sup> ipsum c; igitur, c non est significatum a nec significatum b.



Ista consequentia patet et de illo ordine naturae qui est inter causam et effectum distinctum, quia de illo ordine intellegitur minor illa. Non enim potest c prius natura esse intuitive cognitum, quam sit in natura.

<sup>2</sup>per idem, nec (52ra) c est pars alterius significati, eo quod sicut  $\langle \text{totum} \rangle$  significatum b<sup>3</sup> praecedit c, sic totum significatum<sup>4</sup> a praecedit c, cum c sit actus uniendi<sup>5</sup> totum significatum a cum toto significato b, sumendo significatum pro supposito. Et sicut arguitur de ista propositione 'a est b', sic de qualibet in speciali argui potest; igitur, conclusio generaliter vera.

124.) Secundo sic: Si sit possibile quod in aliqua propositione in anima pars supponit pro toto cujus est pars, sit in ista 'a est b' sic, quod b, quod est praedicatum, supponat pro tota illa propositione. Et arguo hoc esse impossibile dupliciter: primo, per medium assertum a priori, et secundo ex ipso concessio, deducendo impossibile. Arguo sic: Quaecumque duo se habent in ordine essentiali respectu tertii, respectu illius tertii prius est illud quod in illo ordine est prius; notitia simplex et notitia complexa respectu ipsius animae sunt huiusmodi, quod respectu illius prius essentialiter est notitia simplex quam notitia

complexa cujus ipsa est pars; igitur, etc. Consequentia patet, et major de se, eo quod oppositum majoris est simpliciter impossibile. Et minor ostenditur sic: Quaelibet potentia intellectiva acquirens notitia<sup>m</sup> per discursum essentialem ordinem habentem [in illo ordine] respectu illius potentiae, in illo ordine aliquid est primum, cum in essentialiter ordinatis procedere in<sup>6</sup> infinitum sit impossibile; sed nihil poni potest priusquam<sup>7</sup> notitia incomplexa; igitur, notitia <in>complexa prior est illo ordine, quam aliqua notitia quae magis appropinquat ad discursum. Haec consequentia de se evidens est cum toto suo antecedente. Ex consequente, igitur, sic: Quaelibet notitia [in]complexa magis appropinquat ad discursum, quam aliqua<sup>8</sup> notitia incomplexa ejusdem; igitur, respectu potentiae intellectivae acquirentis notitiam per discursum, prior essentialiter est notitia [est notitia] incomplexa, quam notitia complexa, quod est probandum.

125.) Confirmatur illa minor breviter sic: Notitia incomplexa potest esse sine notitia complexa, et e contrario non; igitur, notitia incomplexa est prior.

126.) Confirmatur iterum minor illa sic: Quam adhaerentia conclusionis cognitae per praemissas praesupponit in esse tali ad[in]haerentiam praemissarum, tam notitia complexa alterius praemissae praesupponit notitiam habitam per extrema propositionis illius notitiae complexae; sed adhaerentia conclusionis talis necessario praesupponit adhaerentiam praemissarum; igitur, et notitia complexa alterius praemissae necessario praesupponit notitiam habitam per utrumque extremum. Assertum patet, cum respectu ejusdem animae sit essentialis<sup>9</sup> ordo utrobique. Ex isto sequitur formaliter oppositum hypothesis,<sup>10</sup> cum nihil essentialiter vel essentiali ordine praesupponit se ipsum.

127.) Confirmatur ratio iterum sic: Quaelibet propositio quae est in anima sufficienter naturaliter repraesentatur intellectui per se ipsam. Alioquin enim esset processus in infinitum in mediis naturaliter repraesentantibus, quod natura abhorret. Igitur, nullum extremum propositionis in anima naturaliter repraesentat intellectui<sup>11</sup> totam illam propositionem cujus est pars. Consequentia patet ex hoc, quod natura nihil agit frustra, nec agere potest; sed quodlibet extremum propositionis in anima naturaliter significat quidquid

significat, cum uniatur actui naturaliter significanti; igitur, nullum extremum alicujus propositionis in anima significat totam illam propositionem cujus est pars. Sic igitur arguitur conclusio a priori.

128.) A posteriori autem, deducendo ad impossibile, arguitur breviter sic: Prius (52rb) naturaliter intellectus intellegit significatum per extremum istius propositionis 'a est b', quam habet actum affirmandi significatum unius extremi de alio, cum non aliter affirmat quam intellegat; igitur, prius naturaliter intellectus intellegit significatum istius termini b, quam intellegit significatum illius propositionis 'a est b'. Patet consequentia, cum non prius intellegat istam propositionem, quam producat eam. Patet haec de notitia intuitiva, de qua est sermo.

129.) Et quod non prius intellegit significatum illius<sup>12</sup> termini b, quam significatum illius propositionis 'a est b': data hypothesi, arguitur ex hoc, quod significatum illius<sup>13</sup> termini est significatum illius propositionis; sequitur, igitur, utraque pars contradictionis formalis, hypothesi<sup>14</sup> hac concessa.<sup>15</sup> Et pro ista conclusione, cum illis quae prius dicuntur<sup>16</sup> contra secundam opinionem,<sup>17</sup> haec sufficiant.

130.) <sup>18</sup>Quinta conclusio: Si in nulla propositione in anima potest pars supponere pro toto cuius est pars, in nullo extra animam pars pro toto supponere potest. Haec sequitur immediate ex secunda conclusione sic: Nullum extremum propositionis extra animam aliquid significat, <sup>19</sup> nisi quod a priori significat extremum propositionis mentalis; igitur, si nullum extremum in propositione in anima supponat pro toto cuius est pars, nullum extremum propositionis extra pro toto cuius est pars supponere potest. <sup>20</sup>

131.) <sup>21</sup>Ad idem sic: Sit 'a est b' aliqua propositio in anima cui subordinatur extra animam ista propositio 'c est d'. Tunc quaero utrum c <sup>22</sup> praecise subordinetur <sup>23</sup> a in significando, quatenus c hic supponit, <sup>24</sup> aut non. Si sic, propositum habetur, quod esset: 'Rem habet a pro supposito quam c habet pro suo supposito.' S<sup>(1)</sup> c non praecise subordinatur a in significando, igitur a et alicui alteri in anima, puta toti illi propositioni cuius a est pars, quia quodcumque aliud suppositum esset impertinens. Et si <sup>25</sup> sic, igitur c non est idem terminus et in una significatione et in alia. Consequentia patet, cum unitas termini infertur ex unitate significationis. Et, per consequens, nullus terminus unus extra animam

potest supponere pro toto cuius est pars, nisi a priori terminus in anima sic supponere posset.

132.) Confirmatur: Si<sup>26</sup> c habeat pro supposito suo tam illud quod<sup>27</sup> a habet pro supposito, quam etiam totam propositionem cuius ipse est pars, tunc ista convertuntur: 'c est d' et istae duae categoricae: 'c est d', pro supposito a, et 'Haec propositio "c est d" est d'; et, per consequens, d non praecise subordinatur in significando huic propositioni in anima 'a est b', nec alicui ejus parti. Et consequentia prior paret Aristotelem, primo Periermenias,<sup>28</sup> ubi ponit pro regula quod, si iste terminus 'tunica' significat equum et hominem, quod talis propositio 'Tunica est alba' non est simplex<sup>29</sup> categorica, sed aequivalet istis duabus categoricis: 'Equus est albus' 'Homo est albus'. Ex quibus sequitur conclusio in terminis.

133.) <sup>30</sup><S>ed, quia istae duae ultimae conclusiones, inter ceteras, magis videntur dubitabiles, ideo contra eas solum arguam, ut, objectionibus solutis, earum magis paterent<sup>31</sup> veritates. <sup>32</sup>Arguitur igitur primo sic: Terminus est significativus ad placitum; igitur, quamlibet rem indifferenter potest<sup>33</sup> significare; omnis propositio

est aliqua res; igitur, omnem<sup>34</sup> propositionem<sup>35</sup> quilibet terminus potest significare; igitur, cum pars propositionis sit terminus, videtur partem posse significare totam propositionem cujus est pars; si sic, igitur et supponere pro toto.

134.) <sup>36</sup>Secundo sic: Quamlibet rem terminus significat quam reducit ad actum intellegendi; sed totam propositionem cujus ipse terminus est pars reducit terminus ad actum intellegendi; igitur, totam propositionem cujus ipse est pars terminus significat. Minor videtur experimentalis, ut frequenter, audito unico termino, intellegit quis unam magnam orationem.

135.) Item, ab aliis<sup>37</sup> arguitur sic contra<sup>38</sup> conclusionem hanc: In aliquibus pars supponit pro toto, sicut in istis 'Aliquid est' 'Ens est' 'Propositio est'; igitur, in talibus<sup>39</sup>: 'Falsum est' 'Sortes dicit falsum' potest (52va) pars supponere pro toto cujus est. Probatio consequentiae: cum aequaliter terminus privativus se habeat ad suum significatum, sicut terminus positivus ad suum. Et additur quod hoc <negare><sup>40</sup> non est, nisi figmentum illorum qui aliter ad insolubilia respondere non sciunt.



136.) <sup>41</sup>Quarto sic <sup>42</sup>: Dicat Sortes istam: 'Falsum dicitur a Sorte'. Audiatur Plato subjectum. Tunc, per illud, dicitur quod Plato intellegit omne falsum; igitur, falsum dictum a Sorte; igitur, subjectum illud sic significat. Antecedens arguitur: Iste terminus 'falsum' est signum naturale omnis falsi.

137.) <sup>43</sup>Quinto sic <sup>44</sup>: Haec intentio 'falsum' in anima est naturalis similitudo cujuslibet falsi; igitur, repraesentat intellectui aliquod falsum; sed a naturali significatione et repraesentatione non cadit; igitur, sic intellectui significat; igitur, posita tali propositione in anima: 'Sortes dicit falsum', 'falsum' significat totum cujus est pars; igitur, etc.

138.) <sup>45</sup>Sexto, per auctoritates, primo sic <sup>46</sup>:  
Ex Aristotele, primo Metaphysicae, capitulo ultimo, <sup>47</sup>  
contra ponentes omnia falsa, sic arguunt: "Qui vero omnia falsa, et ille se ipsum", ubi videtur respondere talem consequentiam: 'Omnia sunt falsa; igitur, haec oratio est falsa: "Omnia sunt falsa"'; igitur, pars potest supponere pro toto cujus est pars. Nam aliter consequentia non valeret.

139.) Item, sic loquatur tantum Sortes et dicat istam propositionem: 'Deus est', et Plato istam: 'Homo est asinus'.<sup>48</sup> Et non sint plures loquentes, nisi Sortes et Plato, nisi tantum Cicero,<sup>49</sup> qui dicat istam propositionem: 'Solus Sortes dicit verum'. Et probatur quod iste terminus 'verum' in ultima propositione supponat pro tota illa propositione. Arguitur sic: 'Verum' supponit pro omni propositione vera; propositio dicta a Cicerone<sup>50</sup> est propositio vera; igitur, etc.

140.) Item, sic ad idem: Omnis propositio significans praecise sicut est<sup>51</sup> est propositio vera; haec propositio 'Solus Sortes dicit verum' est propositio significans sicut est; igitur, etc.

141.) Item sic<sup>52</sup>: Dicat Sortes istas duas propositiones: 'Homo est animal', et aliam quae sit ista: 'Omne dictum a Sorte est falsum', quae sit a. Tunc a est falsum, ut patet; et a est in toto esse et dicitur de omni; igitur, nihil contingit accipere sub subjecto de quo non vere dicitur praedicatum. Consequentia patet ex Philosopho, primo Priorum,<sup>53</sup> et ulterius ex commento.<sup>54</sup> Sed a est aliquid subjecti a, cum a sit unum falsum; igitur, etc.

142.) <sup>55</sup>Ad haec respondens, primo <sup>56</sup>tamen videndum est quid requiritur ad hoc, quod terminus aliquis aliquam rem potest significare ad placitum. <sup>57</sup>Cum enim significare ad placitum distinguatur contra significare naturaliter per hoc, quod ad signum ad placitum requiritur impositio ad hoc, quod sit signum, quae non requiritur ad signum naturale, manifestum est <sup>58</sup>quod nullam aliam rem <sup>59</sup>terminus significare ad placitum potest, quam illam quam ex impositione ordinata ad talem rem potest significare; igitur, ad omnem impositionem praeexigitur notitia intellectualis tam <sup>60</sup>rei quae debet significari per terminum, quam etiam ipsius termini <sup>61</sup>qui debet talem rem significare; sequitur quod nullam rem potest terminus significare ex impositione, nisi illam inter quam et terminum talis ordo poterit reperiri. Hoc patet, cum aliter impossibile est imaginare vere impositionem fieri. Igitur, ubi talis ordo est impossibilis in intellegendo, impossibile est talem terminum talem rem significare; sed generaliter repugnat talem ordinem <sup>62</sup>esse inter propositionem et ejus extremum, quod prius propositio intellegatur, quam suum extremum, cum e contrario sit ordo essentialis in esse cognito.

143.) <sup>63</sup>Sed contra istam imaginationem, ut magis pateat, arguitur sic: Ista imaginatio tantum hoc

concludit, quod ipsa propositio prior est ~~cognita~~  
 ab anima intellectiva, quam pars supponat pro tota  
 illa propositione cuius est pars. Sed ex hoc non  
 infertur evidenter,<sup>64</sup> quoniam, postquam ipsa talia,  
 utrumque istorum: tam propositionem quam partem ejus,  
 intellexerit propriis conceptibus, possit ipsa anima  
 (52vb) imponere partem supponere pro toto. Quod arguitur  
 sic: Omnem rem potest terminus significare ad placitum  
 quae distincta intentione vel intentionibus ab intentione  
 termini potest intellegi; sed hujusmodi est propositio  
 respectu suae partis; igitur, etc.

144.) Item sic: Voluntas est<sup>65</sup> agens lib(er)um;  
 igitur, ex sua libertate potest imponere terminum  
 quamlibet rem indifferenter significare. Probatio  
 consequentiae: quia da oppositum, et sequitur quod  
 respectu talis non est voluntas libere agens.

145.) Sed ista non obviant imaginationi<sup>66</sup> ex  
 qua<sup>67</sup> necessario prius intellegitur tam propositio  
 quam pars ejus, quam pars illa supponat pro tota illa  
 propositione cuius est pars; tunc, necessario prius  
 propositio habet significationem aliquam determinatam,  
 et, per consequens, quodlibet ejus extremum, antequam  
 aliquod ejus extremum supponat pro tota illa propositione.

sit igitur totum significatum unius extremi pro tunc a, et significatum alterius extremi b. Et sit illa propositio c, et actus uniendi in illa propositione, quae dicitur "copula" d. Et arguitur sic: Impossibile est c manere, d corrupto; sed impossibile est d manere, nisi pro mensura vel tempore pro quo praecise a est significatum unius extremi ipsius c, et b item significatum alterius extremi ejusdem; igitur, impossibile est c manere pro aliqua mensura vel tempore pro quo totum c est significatum a vel b. Consequentia patet, cum totum c modo non sit significatum a vel b, ex hypothesis. Et etiam major, cum ipsum d sit pars essentialis ipsius c. Minor autem arguitur sic: Impossibile est aliquam relationem manere, deducto altero ejus extremo; d est actus uniendi a cum b, qui actus vel est relatio vel necessario relationem includens; igitur, impossibile est d manere, nisi a sit totum significatum unius extremi c, et b totum significatum alterius.

146.) Confirmatur<sup>68</sup> breviter hoc: Quam repugnat quod eadem relatio specifica sit inter individua distinctorum specierum, tam repugnat quod eadem relatio in numero sit inter b et aliquod aliud ab a quae est inter b et a; unde necessario sequitur quod, si anima eliciat

actum componendi respectu alicujus termini significantis c, quod ille erit alius actus componendi, quam fuit actus mediante quo composuit a cum b. Et per hoc patet quod assertum in primo argumento<sup>69</sup> est negandum, prout iste terminus 'significare' convertitur cum isto termino 'supponere'.

147.) <sup>70</sup>Ad secundum, de voluntate<sup>71</sup>: Patet quod consequentia non valet, quia, quantumcumque fuerit voluntas libera, non poterit aliquid velle, nisi respectu cujus potest esse vel fuit prius intellegere, cum non sit possibile aliquid esse volitum quod prius non fuit cognitum. Similiter, non est magis libera respectu impositionis,<sup>72</sup> quam respectu proprii velle, cum tota libertate non potest habere velle respectu mali quatenus malum. Tamen hoc sophisma de libertate multos decipit in hac materia.

148.) Per hoc etiam patet ad primum principale contra conclusiones, quando sic arguitur: "Terminus est significativus ad placitum," etc.<sup>73</sup> Patet quod consequentia non valet.

149.) Ad secundum, cum assumitur "Quamlibet rem terminus significat quam reducit ad actum intellegendi",<sup>74</sup>



conceditur consequentia. Negetur minor. Non enim terminus post actum compositionis vel divisionis repositus in memoria intellectiva sic reducit ad actum intellegendi totam propositionem illam cuius ipse est pars, quod, manente<sup>75</sup> terminus sic significante, sicut prius significavit, significet ille terminus totam illam propositionem cuius est pars. Quia haec est contradictio, [sed] cum prius non significavit totam illam propositionem. Sed sic tantum potest reducere ad actum intellegendi totam illam propositionem cuius ipsa est pars, (53ra) quod potest facere animam<sup>76</sup> aliquis terminus sibi naturaliter vel ad placitum significans<sup>77</sup> componere, sicut prius composuit. Et haec conclusio experimentalis est.

150.) Vel potest brevius dici ad argumentum, distinguendo de hoc composito 'reducere ad memoriam'.<sup>78</sup> Nam aliquid potest reducere aliud ad memoriam dupliciter: mediate vel immediate. Et mediate dupliciter: uno modo, quod nihil mediat<sup>79</sup> inter<sup>80</sup> ipsum et rem quae debet significari, nisi terminus naturaliter significans illam rem; alio modo, quando plura sunt media, tantum unum naturale, sicut accidit in proposito. Et isto ultimo modo reducere ad memoriam non est<sup>81</sup> significare, sed solum duobus modis primis.



151.) <sup>82</sup>Ad tertium, cum arguitur "In aliquibus pars supponit pro toto"<sup>83</sup> cujus est pars, nego illud. Concedo tamen consequentiam: 'Si pars posset supponere pro suo toto respectu termini positivi, quod etiam posset supponere pro suo toto respectu termini privativi', quia terminum esse privativum vel positivum impertinens est ad casum illum.<sup>84</sup> Quare terminus non potest supponere pro suo toto, ut prius dictum est. Argumentum tamen non concludit propositum<sup>85</sup> suum, cum ad hoc fiat, ut probetur terminum posse supponere pro suo toto. Et ideo casum addit, quod negare partem posse supponere pro suo toto, etc., non est, nisi unum figmentum illorum qui aliter nesciunt respondere ad insolubilia. Credo me scire quod discutienti<sup>86</sup> processum Philosophi 2<sup>o</sup> et 3<sup>o</sup> De anima,<sup>87</sup> videtur satis et innotescit quod concedens partem posse supponere pro suo toto, sive illa pars sit terminus positivus sive privativus, mutat ordinem essentialem actuum animae, si numquam esset propositio insolubilis in rerum natura.

152.) <sup>88</sup>Ad quartum<sup>89</sup>: Concedo casum, quod Sortes dicat tantum istam: 'Falsum dicitur, etc.' Et cum additur quod Plato per istum terminum 'falsum' intellegit omne falsum, nego illud: non plus quam

Sortes, mediante se ipso, intellegit Platonem.<sup>90</sup> Et cum arguitur: "Iste terminus 'falsum'" auditus<sup>91</sup> a Platone "est signum naturale omnis falsi,"<sup>92</sup> falsa est propositio, quia est signum ad placitum; igitur, non naturale.<sup>93</sup>

153.) Similiter,<sup>94</sup> ex impositione significat propositionem falsam; igitur, non naturaliter; sed, ex secunda conclusione principali,<sup>95</sup> nullus terminus significat in actu ex impositione, nisi tantum illud vel illa quae ad actum intellegendi de facto reducit; sed sic non facit iste in casu isto; igitur, etc.

154.) <sup>96</sup>Ad aliud, de auctoritate Philosophi in quarto Metaphysicae, capitulo ultimo,<sup>97</sup> dico quod consequentia potest dici valere dupliciter: vel in se vel<sup>98</sup> ad hominem. Haec divisio sic: Nam consequentia quae ab homine necessario est concedenda, contingenter respondendo, quae in se similiter est neganda. Verbi gratia: contra concedentem omnem hominem male respondere valeret haec consequentia: 'Tu es homo; igitur, tu male<sup>99</sup> respondes', quae tamen consequentia in se non valet. [contra] Tamen concludit talis consequentia contra hominem ita bene, sicut melior consequentia de mundo. Et forte sibi efficacius concludit.

155.) Sic in proposito<sup>1</sup> arguebat contra homines<sup>2</sup> tantum, quia contra Heraclitum<sup>3</sup> et Anaxagoram,<sup>4</sup> quorum alter dicebat omnia esse vera et alius dicebat omnia esse falsa, quorum opinio fuit quod non potuit aliter esse.<sup>5</sup> Contra eos arguebat Aristoteles non per<sup>6</sup> consequentias formales neque bonas sibi, sed tantum contra eos satis concludebat,<sup>7</sup> ut deducendo eas ex concessis ab eis, quod aliqua propositio est vera et aliqua propositio est falsa.

156.) Sed opiniones eorum successive arguendo: Contra Heraclitum qui<sup>8</sup> posuit omnia vera, nec posset propositio esse, nisi esset vera: <sup>9</sup>Arguit sic: Haec propositio quam tu dicis: 'Omnia sunt vera' aut est vera (53rb) aut falsa. Si sit vera, et ejus oppositum est propositio; igitur, ejus oppositum est propositio<sup>10</sup> falsa. Haec consequentia est bona in se. Tamen Heraclitus negaret eam, quia satis concederet oppositum primi principii dati a Philosophi, eodem libro,<sup>11</sup> quod est quod de quolibet dicitur affirmatio vel negatio, etc. Et tamen hanc consequentiam quam facit Philosophus in textu non bene posset negare, eo quod tunc fundatur super aliquod<sup>12</sup> principium datum a Philosopho. Ideo arguit sic contra eum<sup>13</sup>: Omnis

propositio est vera; oppositum illius propositionis est propositio; igitur, oppositum istius propositionis est verum. Haec consequentia non valet, cum nulla propositio vel extremum ejus<sup>14</sup> potest supponere pro ejus formali opposito, cum apud Heraclitum plus concedebat<sup>ur</sup> quam<sup>15</sup> prima consequentia. Ideo magis per tales consequentias voluit Philosophus arguere contra eum, quam per bonas. Et haec eadem<sup>16</sup> ratio ideo movebat ad sic arguendum contra Anaxagoram.<sup>17</sup>

157.) Et allegare talem modum et fundare positionem super illum modum est assumere auctoritatem Philosophi sine processu Philosophi--immo contra processum Philosophi. Nam frequenter auctoritas unde<sup>18</sup> intellectum et processus vocaliter contradicunt. Summenda est igitur auctoritas Philosophi pro confirmatione positionis ubi Aristoteles ex intentione tractat materiam illam quae debet fundari.

158.) <sup>19</sup>Ad alium<sup>20</sup> dico: Concedo<sup>21</sup> casum. Et ad argumentum, cum assumitur <quod> 'verum' supponit pro omni vero: Nego illud. Sed ad plus: Non supponit, nisi pro omni vero alio ab illa propositione cujus est pars.

159.) <sup>22</sup>Ad aliam formam<sup>23</sup>: Concedo consequens ad quod deducitur, quod propositio dicta a Cicerone<sup>24</sup> est propositio vera, nec illa repugnat illi exceptivae dictae a Cicerone, quia per illas non excipitur.

160.) <sup>25</sup>Simile huic est ista: Ponatur quod a sit ista: 'Deus <est>', et b: 'Homo est animal', et quod non sint plures propositiones praeter istam universalem: 'Quodlibet verum est aliquod istorum'. Tunc haec est vera: 'Quodlibet verum est aliquod istorum', denotando per hoc 'istorum' a, b, quae sit c.

161.) Item, sint a b omnes propositiones, et sint affirmativae. Tunc stat quod haec sit vera: 'Nulla propositio est negativa', eo quod sequitur ad eas, si formetur. Quae similiter sit c. Et similia.

162.) <sup>26</sup><D>eclaratur primus casus<sup>27</sup> sic: Dictio exclusiva addita subjecto attribuit praedicatum subjecto et excludit tantum praedicatum illius propositionis ab opposito subiecti, ut sic dicendo: 'Solus Sortes currit', attribuit cursum Sorti et excludit cursum ab omni alio a Sorte. Non tamen excludit omnem motum<sup>28</sup> ab opposito subiecti, sed tantum motum illum qui est cursus. Et causa: quia nullus alius motus<sup>29</sup> est

suppositum talis praedicati, sed tantum motus<sup>30</sup> qui est cursus. Sic in proposito: Sic dicendo 'Solus Sortes dicit verum', haec dictio exclusiva 'solus' attribuit praedicatum subjecto. Hoc est, dictu attribuit rem suppositam per praedicatum rei suppositae per subjectum, et excludit illam expressam per praedicatum ab opposito subjecti; cum, igitur, suppositum talis praedicati 'verum' non sit tota illa propositio cujus est pars, illam non excludit ab opposito subjecti; in casu, igitur, ista tantum propositio dicta a Sorte est suppositum istius praedicati 'verum'<sup>31</sup>; unde, in casu isto ista propositio 'Solus Sortes dicit verum' aequivalet istis<sup>32</sup> duabus: 'Sortes dicit verum' et 'Plato non dicit verum'. Modo non sequitur: 'Sortes dicit verum; et Plato non dicit verum; igitur, Cicero<sup>33</sup> non dicit verum'. Sic nec sequitur ejus convertibilis. Et sic patet quod ad illud quod ulterius non procedit. In tractando materiam insolubilium diffusius, tractabo hujusmodi sophismata, propter juvenes, minus.<sup>34</sup>

163.) <sup>35</sup>Per hoc etiam patet quod ultimum argumentum<sup>36</sup> non concludit contra propositum ad formam. Tamen concedo casum, et concedo (53va) quod a est falsum. Et ulterius, nego, cum dicatur quod "a est aliquod subjecti a". Peccat

enim hoc argumentum petitione principii. Deberet enim probare quod pars posset supponere pro toto cuius est pars. Hoc tamen sine probatione assumit, cum dicit quod a sit pars talis propositionis a. Sic igitur patet ad objectiones contra conclusiones positas et adductas.<sup>37</sup>

164.) <sup>38</sup>~~(H)~~is igitur praemissis, restat ad solutionem insolubilium jam posita applicare. Et primo ad illud insolubile quod inter ceteras est magis commune.<sup>39</sup> <sup>40</sup>Ponatur igitur quod sit unus Sortes, qui dicat istam et nullam aliam: 'Sortes dicit falsum', et quod illa sic significet, quae propositio sit a. Tunc quaeritur utrum a sit propositio categorica vel hypothetica. Dico quod est mere categorica, ut paret casum. Igitur, juxta compositionem terminorum, tunc sic: a est propositio categorica; igitur, a est propositio vera vel falsa. Consequentia tenet per divisionem secundam.<sup>41</sup>

165.) <sup>42</sup>Responsio: Concedo consequens.

166.) Tunc sic: a est propositio vera vel a est propositio falsa; sed a non est propositio vera; igitur, a est propositio falsa. Consequentia tenet a



tota disjunctiva<sup>43</sup> cum opposito unius partis ad alteram partem.<sup>44</sup>

167.) <sup>45</sup>Responsio: Concedo similiter istam consequentiam, sed nego minorem.

168.) Contra: Cujuslibet contradictionis formatae cujus negativa est falsa, ejus affirmativa est vera; 'a est propositio vera' 'Nullum a est propositio vera' sunt contradictoria formata, quorum negativa est falsa, per te; igitur, ejus affirmativa est vera; igitur, a est propositio vera.

169.) <sup>46</sup>Responsio: Concedo consequens ad quod ultimo deducitur.

170.) <sup>47</sup>Contra: a est propositio vera; et a est propositio simplex categorica, etc.; igitur, ita est,<sup>48</sup> sicut<sup>49</sup> a praecise significat primo. Consequentia patet ex suppositione<sup>50</sup> prima.<sup>51</sup> Sed a praecise significat primo quod Sortes dicit falsum; igitur, ita est, quod Sortes<sup>52</sup> dicit falsum. Et ulterius ex consequente sic: Ita est, quod Sortes dicit falsum; et Sortes praecise unicam dicit propositionem, ex casu; igitur, non est ita, quod Sortes dicit verum, quod est oppositum concessi.<sup>53</sup>

171.) <sup>54</sup>Responsio, negando minorem primi argumenti, quae fuit ista: 'a praecise significat primo <quod> Sortes dicit falsum'. Non enim illa propositio dicta a Sorte significat quod Sortes dicit propositionem falsam, sicut significat illa minor. Ideo nego eam. Quomodo autem et quid propositio dicta a Sorte significat statim patebit.

172.) <sup>55</sup>Contra: Haec est vera et concedenda, per te: 'Sortes dicit falsum'; igitur, haec est concedenda a te: 'Sortes dicit propositionem falsam'. Probatio: Nam formaliter sequitur: Sortes dicit falsum; igitur, Sortes dicit propositionem falsam. Probatio consequentiae: Omne falsum est propositio; igitur, omne dicens falsum dicit propositionem; et non propositionem veram; igitur, falsam propositionem. Haec consequentia est bona; et concedis antecedens; igitur, non habes negare consequens.

173.) <sup>56</sup>Item sic: a est propositio <vera><sup>57</sup>; igitur, qui dicit a dicit verum; sed Sortes dicit a; igitur, Sortes dicit verum; et Sortes, ex casu, praecise dicit istam propositionem: 'Sortes dicit falsum'; igitur, ita est, sicut illa praecise significat primo. Consequentia tenet per divisionem primam.<sup>58</sup> Et illa praecise significat

primo quod Sortes dicit falsum; igitur, ita est, quod Sortes dicit falsum. Et sequitur: Sortes praecise dicit unicam propositionem, et illa est falsa; igitur, Sortes non dicit verum.

174.) <sup>59</sup>Responsio ad primum: Sumendo hunc terminum 'falsum' significative, concedo quod ex impositione et pro suo supposito sibi correspondet propositio. Et sic sumendo, valet haec consequentia: 'Sortes dicit falsum; igitur, Sortes dicit propositionem falsam'. Sumendo tamen hunc terminum 'falsum' prout sibi non correspondet propositio pro supposito, non valet consequentia, sed consequens est impertinens antecedenti. Et quia sic sumitur in proposito, si antecedens sit propositio dicta a Sorte, ideo nego consequentiam.

175.) <sup>60</sup>Ad secundam formam: Concedo totum,<sup>61</sup> quousque dicitur "ita est, quod Sortes dicit falsum".<sup>62</sup> Nam ibi sumitur aliter quam sumitur in proposito. Ideo, nego consequentiam illam.

176.) <sup>63</sup>Contra: Aut a est propositio vera aut falsa.

177.) <sup>64</sup>Responsio: (53vb) Dico quod est propositio vera.

178.) Contra: a est verum; et Sortes dicit a;  
igitur, Sortes dicit verum.

179.) <sup>65</sup>Responsio: Concedo consequens.

180.) Contra: Sortes tantum dicit unam propositionem,  
et illa non est vera; igitur, Sortes non dicit verum.

181.) <sup>66</sup>Responsio: Concedo consequentiam. Et  
nego secundam partem antecedentis.

182.) <sup>67</sup>Contra: Illa est convertibilis cum una  
propositione falsa; igitur, illa est falsa.

183.) <sup>68</sup>Responsio: Concedo consequentiam, et  
nego antecedens.

184.) <sup>69</sup>Contra: Haec consequentia est bona:  
'Sortes dicit falsum; igitur, Sortes dicit falsum'.  
Et volo quod antecedens sit propositio dicta a Sorte.  
Tunc quaero utrum consequens sit verum vel falsum. Si  
verum, et illud praecise significat primo quod antecedens  
est falsum; igitur, antecedens falsum; et antecedens est  
propositio dicta a Sorte; igitur, propositio dicta a  
Sorte est falsa. Si detur quod consequens sit falsum,  
et consequentia est bona; igitur, antecedens falsum,  
quia ex vero non sequitur, nisi verum.

185.) <sup>70</sup>Responsio, distinguendo de consequente, eo quod 'falsum' in consequente potest supponere pro toto antecedente vel potest esse convertibile cum praedicato antecedentis. Primo modo non valet haec consequentia: 'Sortes dicit falsum; igitur, Sortes dicit falsum', plus quam talis: 'Canis currit; <igitur, canis currit>', denotando per antecedens animal latrabile, et per consequens caeleste sidus. Quia, sicut in hac consequentia, quamvis, secundum vocem, consequens convertitur cum antecedente, tamen realiter non convertitur, sed est sibi<sup>71</sup> impertinens, sic nec in prima consequens, secundum rem, convertitur cum antecedente, sic, ut prius dictum est, sumendo consequens. Quia tunc iste<sup>72</sup> est sensus: "Sortes dicit falsum pro propositione." Nec valet consequentia propter aliam causam, quia arguitur a termino stante materialiter ad terminum stantem significative. Secundo modo sumendo hunc terminum 'falsum', concedo consequentiam, quia sic consequens est convertibilis cum antecedente.

186.) Haec omnia ex praemissis sic patet in propositione dicta a Sorte: Hoc extremum 'falsum', cum sit terminus communis in voce, species ejus est ens in anima; praecise agentis proprii extra animam est

naturaliter significativa, ex conclusione prima<sup>73</sup>;  
 sed, cum sit extremum propositionis extra animam, nihil  
 significat, nisi quod a priori significat extremum  
 propositionis mentalis; sed casus qui ponit quod Sortes  
 non dicit<sup>74</sup> aliquam aliam excludit extremum propositionis  
 dictae a Sorte supponere pro aliquo alio<sup>75</sup>; igitur, si  
 pro<sup>76</sup> aliquo supponeret, necessario pro ipsa propositione  
 cujus est pars supponeret; sed hoc non permittunt conclusio  
 quarta<sup>77</sup> et quinta.<sup>78</sup> Nec valet fictio ponentium quod  
 propositio dicta a Sorte denotat Sortem dicere aliquam  
 aliam, cum, eo quod aliqua propositio aliquid denotat,  
 ipsum significat. Et dicit tertia conclusio s<ic>.<sup>79</sup>

187.) <sup>80</sup>Ex quibus formaliter<sup>81</sup> arguitur sic:  
 Iste terminus 'falsum' in a non supponit pro a, nec  
 pro aliqua propositione alia ab a; igitur, non supponit  
 pro aliquo. Et sic patet quod in propositione dicta a  
 Sorte cum casu est impossibile quod aliquid aliud a  
 se hoc extremum 'falsum' det intellegere.

188.) <sup>82</sup>Sed contra hoc obicitur sic: Sit a, ut  
 prius, propositio dicta a Sorte. Et dicat Plato istam  
 aliam: 'Sortes dicit falsum', quae sit b. Et quaero  
 utrum b sit propositio vera vel falsa.

189.) <sup>83</sup> Dicendum quod b est propositio falsa, eo quod est simplex, etc., quae non praecise significat primo sicut est. Consequentia paret suppositionem secundam.<sup>84</sup>

190.) <sup>85</sup> Contra: b est falsum; et b convertitur cum a; igitur, a est falsum.

191.) <sup>86</sup> Dicendum quod antecedens est falsum pro altera sui parte. Non enim b convertitur cum a, cum aliquod extremum b supponat pro a, et nullum extremum in a supponit pro a, nec pro aliqua alia propositione ab a, ut prius est declaratum; et ideo, alterum extremum in a stat non significative.

192.) Contra: Alterum in a non stat significative; igitur, non stat eodem modo quo ponitur stare per casum. Probatio consequentiae: Nam ponitur per casum quod Sortes dicit istam: (54ra) 'Sortes dicit falsum', et quod illa sic significet.

193.) Dicendum quod consequentia non valet. Immo, et veritate, sequitur oppositum consequentis ex illo antecedente, cum, per casum, concluditur ne supponat pro alia propositione a se ipsa, ut prius declaratur, arguendo<sup>87</sup> contra opinionem tertiam<sup>88</sup>; et pro ipsa



propositione cuius est pars supponere non potest, ex conclusionibus quarta<sup>89</sup> et quinta<sup>90</sup>; et ideo, ex prima conclusione,<sup>91</sup> cum nihil ex impositione significat, praecise se ipsum intellectui repraesentat.

194.) Contra: Si<sup>92</sup> iste terminus 'falsum' in a propositione praecise se ipsum intellectui repraesentat, a propositio aequipollet: 'Sortes dicit talem vocem'<sup>93</sup> "falsum". Consequens falsum.

195.) <sup>94</sup> Dicendum quod consequens est verum<sup>95</sup> necessario sequens ex conclusionibus et ex casu.

196.) Contra: Iste terminus 'falsum' non excluditur a suo significato quod ex impositione solet significare, nec per casum nec per aliquod aliud; igitur, etc.

197.) Dicendum quod iste terminus 'falsum' in a<sup>96</sup> excluditur, ut prius dictum est,<sup>97</sup> ne pro alia propositione a se ipsa supponat; nec pro ipsa cuius est pars supponere potest; et sic excluditur, quamvis latenter,<sup>98</sup> ne pro aliquo supponat. Et ideo, cum dicitur in casu quod illa sic significet, etc., deponitur, quamvis non prima facie, huius termini 'falsum' impositio. Propter illa significat quod Sortes dicit falsum pro tali voce

'falsum', quod, cum sit absolute possibile, sequitur quod totus casus est possibilis.

198.) Tertio,<sup>99</sup> principaliter arguitur quod a non est propositio vera, quia, si a sit propositio vera, igitur, a simili, qui dicit<sup>1</sup> se esse mentitum,<sup>2</sup> et praecise illud,<sup>3</sup> diceret verum. Consequens falsum et contra Philosophum, 2<sup>o</sup> Elenchorum, capitulo de fallacia,<sup>4</sup> ubi in textu ponit istam propositionem: 5"Qui," inquit, "jurat se esse perjurum bene. jurat jurans hoc solum."

199.) Dicendum quod consequentia non valet, nec est ibi similitudo, quantam ad veritatem propositionis vel falsitatem. Sed est ibi confirmatio totius propositionis hujus. Nam ibi, in illo capitulo, loquitur Aristoteles ex intentione de insolubilibus, et ideo, per Philosophum ibidem, confirmatur haec positio sic: Si enim in illa propositione iste terminus 'perjurus' supponeret pro alia propositione ab illa<sup>6</sup> cujus ipse est pars, non argueretur veritas hujus exclusivae 'Solum hoc jurans bene jurat se esse perjurum'. Exemplum: Si enim iste terminus 'perjurus' supponeret pro tali propositione: 'Homo est asinus', tunc consequens<sup>7</sup> esset impertinens antecedenti, cum tunc iste esset sensus: "Qui jurat se esse perjurum

pro ista propositione 'Homo est asinus' bene <jurat>  
jurans hoc solum"; sed palam est quod haec consequentia  
non valet: 'Qui jurat se esse perjurum pro ista propositione  
"Homo est asinus" bene jurat; igitur, qui jurat se esse  
perjurum bene jurat jurans hoc solum'. Consequens enim  
impertinens est toti antecedenti. Et ideo haec exclusiva  
'solum' excludit hunc terminum 'perjurum' in proposito  
habere aliquam aliam propositionem pro supposito ab illa  
cujus ipse est pars.

200.) <sup>8</sup>Est igitur iste sensus Aristotelis in  
talibus propositionibus: 'Qui jurat se esse perjurum,  
etc.': Prima propositio ibi inclusa est falsa, quae  
est ista: 'Qui jurat se esse perjurum'. Nam ista  
exclusiva 'jurans hoc solum', ex vi exclusivae, excludit  
sic jurantem aliquid aliud jurare ab ista propositione  
'jurans se esse perjurum', ut, si quis praecise juraret, 'Per  
Deum, ego sum perjurus'. Nec pro tota propositione stare  
potest cujus ipsa est pars, quia hoc non permittunt  
quarta<sup>9</sup> et quinta<sup>10</sup>; <sup>11</sup>igitur, ex prima conclusione,<sup>12</sup>  
praecise stat pro illo pro quo stetit absque omni  
impositione. Nam sequitur: Iste terminus 'perjurus'  
non supponit pro alia (54rb) propositione a se ipsa,

nec pro se ipsa; igitur, pro nulla supponit. Patet consequentia et antecedens ex praemissis.

201.) Et ultra sequitur: Iste terminus 'perjurus' non [non] supponit pro alia propositione; et praecise ex impositione significat propositionem; igitur, nihil significat ex impositione; stat, igitur, omnino sicut stetit priusquam aliquid imponebatur ad significandum; sed, si fuisset extremum propositionis talis: 'Sortes est perjurus' antequam imponebatur ad significandum, tunc illa propositio fuisset falsa, sive fuisset in anima sive extra animam. Quia, sive sit in anima sive extra, sit illa a. Et arguitur sic: a est affirmativa de inesse, etc., non praecise significans primo sicut est; igitur, est propositio falsa. Consequentia tenet per secundam suppositionem.<sup>13</sup> Et tunc antecedens ex hoc arguitur, quod in a affirmatur talis terminus 'perjurus' de illo quod non est ille terminus. Unde, jurans se esse perjurum dicit falsum dicens hoc solum. Et hoc est quod vult Philosophus per hanc propositionem 'bene jurat'. Nam bene pejerare est male vel false jurare. Et sic, qui bene jurat se esse perjurum necessario dicit falsum. Nam aliter non bene jurat se esse perjurum. Et sic, ex intentione Philosophi, patet quod, posito

casu illo qui reddit propositionem esse insolubilem, excluditur aliquod<sup>14</sup> extremum illius propositionis ab illa specie suppositionis quam extra casum insolubilium ex communi modo tale extremum solet habere.

202.) <sup>15</sup>Contra istam confirmationem arguitur,<sup>16</sup> arguendo quod Aristoteles in isto processu sit magis ad oppositum illius opinionis, quam pro ea. Nam, ex Philosopho in illo, habetur quod insolubile est falsum; igitur, ex Philosopho in isto loco, non habetur quod insolubile sit verum; allegare igitur Aristotelem in hoc loco ad concedendum insolubile esse verum est magis destruere quam confirmare.

203.) <sup>17</sup>Dicendum quod intentio Aristotelis principaliter in hoc loco non est ad concludendum insolubile fore verum vel falsum. Sed ad hoc est sua intentio, et ad hoc allegata, ut prius dictum est: quod, posito casu quo aliqua propositio est insolubilis, excluditur ab altero extremo illius propositionis supponere pro complexo.

204.) Contra: Si sic, igitur neutra istarum consequentiarum valeret: 'aest propositio insolubile; igitur, est propositio vera,' nec ista: 'a est propositio

insolubilis; igitur, est propositio falsa'. Consequens falsum, eo quod tunc respondendum<sup>18</sup> esset secundum qualitatem ad insolubile, sicut ad aliam propositionem.

205.) Dicendum quod consequens est verum, eo quod aliquod insolubile est verum et aliquod insolubile est falsum. Et ideo, bene respondendo, concedenda est talis propositio vel neganda, admissio casu, secundum qualitatem propositionis. Patet consequentia. Et probatur<sup>19</sup> antecedens: Et primo quod<sup>20</sup> aliquod insolubile est verum, sic arguendo: Aliquod insolubile est simplex categorica affirmativa de inesse et de praesenti praecise significans primo sicut est; igitur, aliquod insolubile est verum. Consequentia paret suppositionem primam.<sup>21</sup> Et antecedens arguitur de propositione dicta a Sorte, quae sit a, ut prius. Nunc sic: a<sup>22</sup> praecise significat primo quod Sortes dicit falsum pro tali voce 'falsum'; et sic est; igitur, a est propositio vera. Patet consequentia et major ex prius declaratis. Et minor arguitur: Nam formaliter sequitur: Sortes dicit totam illam propositionem: 'Sortes dicit falsum'; igitur, Sortes dicit quamlibet vocem quae est aliquod extremum illius propositionis, cum contradictorium includat quod dicens illud quod est totum non dicat illud quod est pars totius; igitur, etc.

Et quod aliquod insolubile sit falsum patet in exemplo Aristotelis, ut prius declaratum est.

206.) Contra: Concedere insolubile esse verum (54va) est negare regulas ab aliis positas in hac materia, quae omnes ponunt omne insolubile fore falsum.

207.) Dicendum quod illa quae ponuntur ab aliis non sunt regulae, eo quod fundantur super isto principio falso et impossibili, quod pars potest supponere pro toto cuius est pars. Cui principio patet <quod> quarta conclusio<sup>23</sup> et quinta conclusio<sup>24</sup> contradicunt.

208.) <sup>25</sup>Quarto principaliter arguitur sic [sic]:  
a est verum; igitur, Sortem dicere falsum est verum.  
Et ultra: igitur, verum est quod Sortes dicit falsum.

209.) <sup>26</sup>Dicendum, sumendo 'falsum' in consequente sicut in antecedente, tunc consequentia est bona et consequens verum. Et sic de secunda consequentia. Aliter tamen sumendo, neutra consequentia valet. Quia in antecedente sumitur iste terminus 'falsum' materialiter; si, igitur, in consequente sumatur significative, non valet consequentia propter variationem medi. Posset tamen negari utraque consequentia, eo quod in neutro consequente est aliquid impediens istum terminum 'falsum'



ad supponendum significative, sicut est casus applicatus ad primum antecedens.

210.) <sup>27</sup>Quinto sic: a est verum; et suum contradictorium est; igitur, suum contradictorium est falsum. Consequens falsum, quia dicat Plato talem propositionem 'Sortes dicit falsum', quae sit b. Tunc oppositum b est oppositum a; et oppositum b est verum; igitur, oppositum a est verum; et a est verum; igitur, duo contradictoria simul vera.

211.) <sup>28</sup>Dicendum quod b et a non convertuntur, quia a est propositio vera et b est propositio falsa. Et sicut a et b non convertuntur, sic nec contradictoria eorum convertuntur, sed in significatione sunt totaliter disparatae.

212.) <sup>29</sup>Contra: Probo quod oppositum b est oppositum a. Arguitur sic: Quidquid negatio negat, negat universaliter et distributive,<sup>30</sup> sicut in ista propositione negativa: 'Sortes non dicit falsum', quae est b, negatio negat hoc praedicatum 'falsum'; igitur, negat illam universaliter et distributive. Tunc sic: Negat distributive; igitur, negat hoc falsum de Sorte, et illud falsum, et sic de singulis; sed falsum dictum a Sorte est aliquod falsum; igitur, negat falsum dictum a Sorte. Ex quo sequitur <quod> haec propositio negativa:

'Sortes non dicit falsum' universaliter negat quod hoc propositio dicta a Sorte affirmativa particularis affirmat; igitur, est ejus opposita; et ista eadem est opposita b<sup>31</sup>; igitur, oppositum b<sup>32</sup> est oppositum<sup>33</sup> a, quod est probandum.

213.) <sup>34</sup>Dicendum quod prima consequentia est bona. Et concedendum est totum quod deducitur, usque dicatur quod propositio dicta a Sorte est aliquod falsum. Significat enim illa propositio quod aliquod falsum sit dictum a Sorte, quod in casu isto est negandum. Et sic argumentum ulterius non procedit.

214.) <sup>35</sup>Sexto sic: Sortes dicit falsum; igitur, falsum dicitur a Sorte. Haec consequentia est bona, eo quod arguitur ab activo ad passivum; et antecedens est verum, per te; igitur, consequens. Vel concedes quod in consequentia bona ex vero sequitur falsum.

215.) <sup>36</sup>Dicendum quod consequentia est bona. Sed antecedens est mihi dubium, et consequens similiter.

216.) Contra: 'Antecedens est verum' scitum a te esse verum; igitur, antecedens non est a te dubitandum.

217.) <sup>37</sup>Dicendum quod hoc assertum est falsum.

218.) <sup>38</sup>Contra: Antecedens est<sup>39</sup> propositio dicta a Sorte; et illa per te est vera. Et hoc dicis te bene scire, eo quod bene sequitur per te illam esse veram, ex casu et veritate; igitur, illud assertum est verum.

219.) <sup>40</sup>Dicendum quod lateat me utrum illa propositio quae est antecedens dicatur a Sorte, cum hoc non ponatur in argumento, nec in casu pro argumento; et ideo illa a me est rationabiliter dubitanda.

220.) <sup>41</sup>Contra: Pono quod illa propositio sit dicta a Sorte. Et fiat argumentum ut prius.<sup>42</sup>

221.) Dicendum quod, si tunc subjectum consequentis sit terminus univocus cum subjecto antecedentis, haec consequentia est bona, et consequens verum.

222.) Si [1] autem consequentia non valet, sed est fallacia ae<qu>ivocationis, (54vb) eo quod arguitur a termino stante materialiter ad terminum stantem significative,<sup>43</sup> adhuc ad principale arguitur sic: a est verum; igitur, Sortem dicere falsum est verum; igitur, Sortes dicit falsum; igitur, propositio dicta a Sorte est falsa.

223.) <sup>44</sup>Dicendum, sumendo terminos uniformiter, et deducta omni aequivocatione a terminis, prima consequentia

est bona, et secunda similiter; sed tertia non valet, propter fallaciam aequivocationis.

224.) Simile est huic quodlibet istorum: 'Sortes scribit falsum' 'Sortes audit falsum' 'Sortes intellegit falsum' 'Propositio est'<sup>45</sup> 'Verum est' 'Falsum est' et hujusmodi, quorum quodlibet, casu insolubilium posito, est verum; et ideo ad quodlibet istorum et ad omnia similia similiter est dicendum.

225.) <sup>46</sup>Quia tamen aliquod insolubile simplex categoricum est falsum, ideo de eo post insolubile simplex categoricum et verum aliquid<sup>47</sup> breviter est dicendum.  
<sup>48</sup>Ponatur, igitur, quod Sortes dicat istam et nullam aliam: 'Hoc est falsum'. Et sit illa propositio omnis propositio. Quod autem iste casus sit possibilis patet, arguendo contra opinionem primam.<sup>49</sup> Quae propositio, propter brevitatem et certitudinem exprimendi eam, sit a. Tunc quaero utrum a sit verum vel falsum. Si falsum, et a est simplex categorica; igitur, a non praecise significat primo sicut est. Consequentia patet ex suppositione secunda.<sup>50</sup> Et tunc arguo ex consequente sic: a non praecise significat primo sicut est; et a praecise<sup>51</sup> significat<sup>52</sup> primo quod hoc est falsum;

igitur, non est ita,<sup>53</sup> quod hoc est falsum; igitur, hoc est verum. Consequentia patet ex divisione secunda.<sup>54</sup> Si autem detur quod a est verum, arguitur sic: a est simplex categorica vera; igitur, a<sup>55</sup> praecise significat primo sicut <est>, per eversam<sup>56</sup> primae suppositionis<sup>57</sup>; et a praecise significat primo quod hoc est falsum; igitur, ita est, quod hoc est falsum; et ultra: igitur, non est verum; igitur, si a est verum, non est verum.

226.) <sup>58</sup> Dicendum quod a est falsum, distinguendo de minor in eo quod potest esse propositio dicta a Sorte vel alia sibi similis. Si illa dicta a Sorte, consequentia non <valet>, eo quod tunc subjectum in illa propositione non supponeret [non supponeret] pro complexo, neque praedicatum.<sup>59</sup> Quod sic ostenditur: Sit enim c subjectum et b praedicatum. Tunc arguitur sic: Species ipsius b vel c non naturaliter significat aliquam propositionem; nec hic ex impositione aliqua propositio est suppositum alterius illarum; igitur, in ista propositione 'Hoc est falsum', nec subjectum nec praedicatum supponit pro aliqua propositione. Consequentia paret secundam conclusionem,<sup>60</sup> quae dicit quod nullum extremum propositionis aliquid ex impositione significat, nisi quod naturaliter, etc.<sup>61</sup> Igitur, utrumque extremum in a propositione supponit eo

modo quo supponeret, si neutrum extremum aliquando<sup>62</sup> fuisset impositum ad significandum. Consequentia<sup>63</sup> tenet per hoc, quod, si aliquod extremum in a aliquid ex impositione significaret, isto casu posito,<sup>64</sup> illud esset propositio; sed nullam aliam propositionem ab ipsa propositione cujus est pars potest b vel c significare et pro ipsa supponere, ut patet ex deductione priori<sup>65</sup>; igitur, si pro aliqua supponeret c vel d,<sup>66</sup> pro ipsa propositione cujus c vel d est pars. Consequentia patet. Et consequens falsum, juxta quartam<sup>67</sup> et quintam<sup>68</sup> conclusiones. Subjectum, igitur, in a tantum pro se ipso supponit, de quo non vere affirmatur iste terminus 'falsum'; et ideo est, quod a est propositio falsa.

227.) <sup>69</sup>Sed contra istam responsionem potest sic argui: Vel aliquid vel aliquid significat primo; et non, nisi hanc esse falsam, se ipsa demonstrata; igitur, significat se esse falsam; igitur, cum casu, stat quod iste terminus 'falsum' pro supposito habet propositionem.

228.) <sup>70</sup>Item, sic: Hoc pronomen demonstrativum 'hoc' potest causare naturaliter speciem se ipsam significantem, ex prima conclusione,<sup>71</sup> et quodlibet aliud ex impositione; igitur, hanc totam propositionem cujus iste terminus

demonstrativus 'hoc' est pars potest ejus species intellectui repraesentare. Tunc ultra sic: Quidquid potest <species> illius termini 'hoc' repraesentare potest iste terminus 'hoc' repraesentare<sup>72</sup>; (55ra) sed totam propositionem cujus iste terminus 'hoc' est pars potest species ejus repraesentare; igitur, totam propositionem cujus iste terminus <'hoc' est pars> potest iste terminus 'hoc'<sup>73</sup> repraesentare.

229.) <sup>74</sup>Dicendum ad primum: Neganda est minor, quia a non significat illam propositionem esse falsam, sed significat subjectum non significative sumptum esse 'falsum'.

230.) <sup>75</sup>Ad secundam: Nego consequentiam assumptam pro secunda parte, quia, licet totum sit aliud a parte, totum tamen cujus est pars ex impositione non <potest> significare. Cujus causa prius assignatur in arguendo pro conclusione quarta,<sup>76</sup> et in respondendo ad argumenta quae sunt contra eam.<sup>77</sup> Ex quibus studioso causa hujus impossibilitatis satis, credo, poterit apparere.

231.) Ulterius: Etiam negatur secunda consequentia, quia, quamvis intellectus potest imponere speciem existentem in ipso ad significandum totam propositionem extra animam



cujus terminus causans illam speciem est pars, tamen, illa specie sic significante ex impositione, esse extremum propositionis mentalis est impossibile, ut prius ostenditur<sup>78</sup>; sed ad hoc, quod aliquod extremum propositionis extra animam supponeret pro tota cujus est pars, requireretur a priori quod aliquod extremum propositionis in anima pro eadem supponeret, ex conclusione<sup>79</sup> secunda<sup>80</sup> et probatione conclusionis quintae.<sup>81</sup> Ex quibus patet quod consequentia non concludit.

232.) Retento tamen casu priori, aliter argui potest: Sit a, ut prius, propositio dicta a Sorte. Tunc a est falsum; et suum contradictorium est; igitur, suum contradictorium est verum. Quae est b. Tunc arguo sic: b est verum; et b significat quod a non est falsum; igitur, a non est falsum; et a est propositio; igitur, a est propositio vera, quod est oppositum dicti.

233.) <sup>82</sup>Ad istud, dicendum ad primum: Concedo quod contradictorium a est verum. Sed nego minorem respectu argumenti, quae est quod b significat quod a non est falsum. Nam, cum a et b sunt contradictoria, ex posito, et in a 'falsum'<sup>83</sup> solum se ipsum intellectui repraesentat, ex prius positis, requi<ri>tur quod in b

subjectum non repræsentat a, sed solum ipsius a subjectum, cum in contradictoriis oportet terminos<sup>84</sup> stare pro eisdem. Et sic ulterius argumentum non procedit.

234.) <sup>85<sup>a</sup></sup> Simile est: Ponatur quod Sortes et Plato incipiant simul loqui, quorum Plato dicat 'Falsum est hoc', et Sortes aliam sibi similem in terminis et in voce. Et sint a b omnes propositiones. Tunc arguitur sic: a et b convertuntur. Quia de b est verum, et tunc sic: a est verum; et b est verum; igitur, nullum falsum hoc. Ista consequentia est bona; antecedens verum; igitur, consequens. Et consequens est oppositum tam a quam b, vel saltem a vel b. Si a est falsum, igitur, b falsum; igitur, aliquod falsum est hoc; et ultra: igitur, falsum est hoc. Ista secunda consequentia est bona; et antecedens est verum; igitur, consequens; et, per consequens, hoc est verum: 'Falsum est hoc'.

235.) <sup>85<sup>b</sup></sup> Ad istud respondendum est sicut ad primum, dicendo tam a esse falsum quam b, cum non sit aliqua propositio pro qua subjectum in a potest supponere, quia nec ipsamet cujus est pars, nec alia. Nam, si pro aliqua alia posset extremum in a supponere, hoc esset pro b. <Si> in a supponeret pro b, requireretur quod b prius esset, quam esset actus componendi in a pro b, propter

quam causam nec extremum in a potest supponere pro b, nec extremum in b potest supponere pro a.<sup>86</sup> Negandum est, igitur, quod assumitur, quod a b convertuntur, cum in utra<que> subjectum pro se ipso<sup>87</sup> supponat, et subjectum unius non est subjectum alterius. Constat, et sic ulterius argumentum non procedit.

236.) <sup>88</sup>Simile est, si ponatur quod Sortes et Plato incipiant sic loqui dicentes: 'Verum est hoc' 'Verum est hoc', quae sint a b. Hoc posito, quod a b sint omnes propositiones,<sup>89</sup> deinde si proponatur quod b sit contradictorium a, vel<sup>90</sup> concedendum est quod c est verum.<sup>91</sup> Et ad omnes deductiones (55rb). respondendum est sicut ad proximum praecedens, et ad omnia similia similiter est dicendum. Et de insolubilibus categoricis haec quae dicuntur sufficiant.

237.) <S>uperest igitur, post insolubilia simplicia, de compositis aliquid disserere, et, propter faciliorem intellectum, a disjunctivis incipiatur. Sit igitur a ista disjunctiva: 'Deus non<sup>92</sup> est, vel disjunctiva prolata a me est falsa'. Et sit nulla alia prolata a me. Et termini significant sicut communiter datur intellegere. Et non oportet addere, sicut communiter additur, quod

una disjunctiva sit omnis disjunctiva, quia quotquot fierunt disjunctivae aliae, sive in conceptu sive extra, ab aliis prolatae vel formatae, nihil<sup>93</sup> ex hoc infertur a disjunctivam non esse insolubilem, eo quod iste terminus 'disjunctiva' pro nulla illarum supponit, cum nulla illarum sit prolata a me. Tunc quaero utrum a sit vera vel falsa. Si vera, et non pro prima parte; igitur, pro secunda parte. Patet consequentia, cum non stat ibi plures partes. Arguitur, igitur, sic: Secunda pars est vera; et est simplex categorica de praesenti; igitur, praecise significat primo sicut est; sed illa significat primo quod illa disjunctiva est falsa; igitur, ita est, quod est falsa; et ultra: igitur, non est vera. Si a sit disjunctiva<sup>94</sup> falsa, igitur secunda pars est falsa; et ultra: igitur, secunda pars non praecise significat primo sicut est. Consequentia tenet per suppositionem secundam.<sup>95</sup> Et ultra: Ex consequenti, non significat primo sicut est; et illa significat primo quod disjunctiva a me prolata est falsa; igitur, non est ita, quod disjunctiva a me prolata est falsa; et ista disjunctiva a me prolata est, ex casu; igitur, disjunctiva a me prolata<sup>96</sup> est vera. Tenet consequentia per divisionem secundam.<sup>97</sup>

238.) Item, arguat sic proferens illam disjunctivam: prima pars disjunctivae<sup>98</sup> prolatae a me est falsa; et secunda pars disjunctivae a me prolatae est falsa<sup>99</sup>; et non sunt plures partes illius disjunctivae; igitur, disjunctiva a me prolata est falsa. Ista consequentia est bona; et totum antecedens est verum; igitur, consequens verum; et consequens est secunda pars disjunctivae prolatae a me, vel convertibile cum ea; igitur, secunda pars disjunctivae prolatae a me est vera.

239.) <sup>1</sup>Dicendum quod, isto casu posito, a est disjunctiva falsa. Quod sic ostenditur: Iste terminus 'disjunctiva', qui<sup>2</sup> est pars subjecti in secunda categorica, praecise ex impositione significat duas categoricas vel plures, mediante inter illas ista conjunctione 'vel'. Modo, in isto casu, iste terminus 'disjunctiva' nullam aliam disjunctivam<sup>3</sup> a se ipsa potest habere suppositum. Quia, si aliam, vel aliam prolatam a me vel aliam non prolatam a me. Primam non, quia hoc repugnat casui. Nec aliam, quia hoc non permittit hoc complexum 'prolatum a me'. Nec<sup>4</sup> pro tota disjunctiva cujus est pars potest supponere, ex quarta<sup>5</sup> conclusione<sup>6</sup> et quinta<sup>7</sup>; igitur, pro nulla disjunctiva supponit; sed<sup>8</sup> ex impositione solum imponitur ad significandum disjunctivam;

sequitur quod hic nihil ex impositione significat; ex<sup>9</sup> prima igitur conclusione,<sup>10</sup> species ejus existens in anima praeter ipsam disjunctivam nihil aliud ab isto termino 'disjunctiva' intellectui repraesentat; illa igitur propositio in anima cui subordinatur secunda pars illius disjunctivae est talis: 'Iste terminus "disjunctiva" est "falsa"',<sup>11</sup> et cum, ex secunda conclusione,<sup>12</sup> nullum extremum propositionis extra animam aliquid ex impositione significat, nisi quod naturaliter et a priori, etc., extremum, igitur, in secunda<sup>13</sup> parte disjunctivae extra solum pro se ipso supponit; sed de isto termino 'disjunctiva' non vere affirmatur iste terminus 'falsum'. Constat, propter quod disjunctiva est falsa.

240.) <sup>14</sup>Ad secundum in oppositum: Cum assumitur<sup>15</sup>: a est falsum; igitur,<sup>16</sup> secunda pars a non significat primo sicut est, concedo consequens. Sed ulterius cum assumitur quod<sup>17</sup> pars illa significat primo quod disjunctiva prolata a me est falsa, illa potest negari, eo quod ibi rationabiliter potest dici<sup>18</sup> illum terminum 'disjunctiva' significative supponere. (55va) Universaliter potest dici ad quodlibet tale, distinguendo penes aequivocationem, eo quod talis terminus potest indifferenter

supponere<sup>19</sup> materialiter vel significative. Si primo modo, quaelibet talis est concedenda, quia vera. Si secundo modo, neganda, quia falsa.

241.) Sed contra rationem illius<sup>20</sup> positionis obicitur breviter, sicut casus ponit quod et termini in ista disjunctiva significat sicut dant communiter intellegere [propositiones]; sed extra materiam insolubilium iste terminus 'disjunctiva' et iste terminus 'falsum' et hujusmodi communiter dant intellegere propositiones; igitur, et in ista.

242.) Sed istud non movet, quia, quando dicitur quod casus ponit quod: termini significant prout communiter dant intellegere; sed iste terminus 'disjunctiva' communiter dat intellegere propositionem; igitur, isto casu posito, dat intellegere propositionem--patet enim quod consequentia non valet, sed est fallacia consequentis.

243.) <sup>21</sup>Exemplum: Frater studiosus communiter est in choro, et similiter communiter<sup>22</sup> est in studio. Si, igitur, sic arguatur: Frater est ubi communiter solet esse; sed communiter solet esse in choro; igitur, frater est in choro--constat enim quod est fallacia consequentis. Sequitur enim e contrario et non sic. Nam bene sequitur:



Frater communiter solet esse in choro; et jam est in choro; igitur, jam est ubi communiter solet esse. Sic est in priori argumento. Nam terminus communis communiter solum se ipsum intellectui<sup>23</sup> repraesentat, et terminus communis communiter<sup>24</sup> aliud a se ipso repraesentat. Quando autem primo modo repraesentat et est extremum in propositione, supponit materialiter; quando autem istud extremum est extremum et supponit secundo modo, supponit significative. Arguere, igitur, ex hoc, quod terminus communis supponit sicut communiter solet supponere, quod supponit significative, est peccare fallacia consequentis.

244.) Confirmatur<sup>25</sup> tamen positio sic: Quilibet terminus respectu hujus<sup>26</sup> verbi 'est'<sup>27</sup> indifferenter potest pro se ipso vel pro alio a se ipso supponere; quilibet istorum: 'disjunctiva' 'conjunctiva' 'exclusiva' 'exceptiva' 'verum' 'falsum' et hujusmodi est hujusmodi; igitur, quilibet istorum, etc. Minor autem non solum est unius, sed multorum volentium, et quasi omnium qui pro regula generali ponunt quod omnis terminus, sive communis sive proprius, supponens respectu verbi vel praedicati, quod ex natura suae significationis non determinat subjectum ad unam speciem suppositionis, <et> quod indifferenter potest illud subjectum habere unam<sup>28</sup> suppositionem vel aliam.

245.) Alii enim generalius ponunt, qui ponunt quod nec verbum nec<sup>29</sup> praedicatum potest determinare subjectum. Dicunt quidam <quod> respectu cujuslibet verbi, generaliter potest terminus communis sive proprius indifferenter habere unam suppositionem vel aliam. Si, igitur, ponatur aliquis casus cum quo et<sup>30</sup> veritate non stat terminum aliquem habere unam suppositionem, non tamen excludit ab illo termino<sup>31</sup> aliam. Ille casus non est negandus, quamvis non poterit esse cum illo casu, quod terminus habeat suppositionem personalem, sed, quia cum illo casu stare potest, quod terminus habeat suppositionem materialem,<sup>32</sup> quam aequae nata est habere sicut personalem, casus, tamquam possibilis, est generaliter admittendus.

246.) Confirmatur ratio: Omnis casus est admittendus qui, juxta formam terminorum illius casus, est possibilis. Et hoc maxime a sophistis.<sup>33</sup> Nam aliquem talem casum negare non est, nisi fuga volentium vel non scientium respondere. Sed iste casus qui ponit quod sit unica propositio talis: 'Sortes dicit falsum' vel talis 'Deus non est vel disjunctiva a me prolata est falsa', juxta formam terminorum, est possibilis; igitur, quilibet talis est a sophistis concedendus. Probatur minor, ostendendo quod casus positus pro prima propositione est

possibilis, juxta formam terminorum. Casus enim ille quattuor habet partes, quarum prima est quod sit unicus Sortes; secunda, quod dicat istam propositionem: 'Sortes dicit falsum'; (55vb) tertia, quod ille Sortes non dicat aliquam aliam; et quarta, quod ista propositio significet juxta compositionem terminorum, et quod isti termini ejus repraesentant intellectui<sup>34</sup> quod communiter solent repraesentare, et, ex consequenti, ipsa propositio sic repraesentet. Omnes tres primae partes ex se evidenter sunt possibiles, et ad invicem compossibiles. Et quod quarta sit cum aliis compossibilis patet satis ex hoc, quod iste terminus 'falsum' communiter se ipsum intellectui repraesentat, ut quilibet in se ipso, non solum de isto termino, sed de quolibet alio termino communiver viso vel audito poterit experiri<sup>35</sup>; et, si sic solum in ista propositione repraesentet, constat quod illa particula in se est possibilis, et cum aliis compossibilis<sup>36</sup>; igitur, cum sic ipse communiter repraesentet, sequitur quod in casu possibile est istam propositionem 'Sortes dicit falsum' significare sicut ejus termini communiter dant intellegere; et sicut arguitur de isto casu, sic de quolibet alio<sup>37</sup> in hac materia argui potest; igitur, quilibet casus in hac <materia> communiter positus est possibilis; igitur, et admittendus.

247.) Confirmatur iterum sic: Sit a terminus aequivocus habens b c d significata. Tunc sic: Ex hoc, quod ponitur aliquis casus excludens a habere b significatum, cum hoc, quod ille casus permittit a habere c<sup>38</sup> significatum, ille casus est possibilis, ut, si casus solum excluderet illum terminum 'canis' ad supponendum pro marina belua, non propter hoc ille casus esset negandus, eo quod potest supponere pro alio suo significato; igitur, cum iste terminus 'falsum' et iste terminus 'disjunctiva', quando supponunt pro significato ab illis distincto, excludit ex hoc aliquem talem terminum supponere pro significato ab eo distincto, <non> excludit ex hoc aliquem terminum talem pro se ipso supponere<sup>39</sup>; quilibet, igitur, talis casus est possibilis, cum in uno quem facit poterit esse verus.<sup>40</sup> Multa alia vera exempla adduci possent pro positione ista, quae studioso derelinquuntur.<sup>41</sup>

248.) Habita igitur hac declaratione, ex qua apparere poterit qualiter in huiusmodi insolubilibus supponunt, faciliter ad omnia argumenta quae sunt in hac materia poterit responderi. Nam, si sic arguatur, retento casu priori, quod a sit haec disjunctiva: 'Deus non est vel disjunctiva a me prolata est falsa', cujus secunda pars sit b; et tunc, si sic arguatur: Ad omnem propositionem

falsam sequitur suum dictum esse falsum; b est <falsum>; igitur, ad b sequitur suum dictum esse falsum; igitur, disjunctivam prolatam a me esse falsam est falsum; et ultra: igitur, falsum est quod disjunctiva prolata a me est falsa; tunc sic: Falsum est quod disjunctiva prolata a me est falsa; igitur, non est ita, quod disjunctiva prolata a me est falsa; et est vera vel falsa, ex quo est propositio, ex secunda divisione<sup>42</sup>; igitur, a disjunctiva prolata a me est vera.<sup>43</sup>

249.) Sed istud non movet, intellectis istis principiis. Nam primo, cum assumitur quod "ad omnem propositionem falsam", illud rationabiliter poterit negari, cum nihil sit verum vel falsum, prout hic est sermo de vero et falso, nisi propositio, ex Aristotele, primo Periermenias, capitulo de oratione,<sup>44</sup> ubi, per hoc disjunctum 'verum vel falsum', essentialiter distinguit propositionem a quolibet quod non est propositio; dictum autem propositionis non est propositio; et ideo, dictum propositionis nec est verum nec falsum.

250.) Ratio etiam super quam communiter fundatur illa major assumit falsum. Nam ratio dicitur ab illis qui concedunt illam majorem, quod ex omni propositione falsa sequitur suum dictum esse falsum: hoc, quod quaelibet

propositio significat suum dictum. Sed hoc simpliciter est falsum, cum dictum propositionis sit oratio infinitiva significans idem indeterminate, quoad suppositum, quod oratio indicativa quae est propositio significat determinate.

251.) Consequitur<sup>45</sup> cum illa (56ra) maiore et tota consequentia: Haec consequentia non valet<sup>46</sup>: "Disjunctivam prolata a me esse falsam est falsum;...igitur, falsum est quod disjunctiva prolata a me est falsa", propter variationem medi, ut frequenter prius ostensum est.

252.) Simile est, si ponatur ista disjunctiva: 'Rex sedit vel disjunctiva prolata a te est tibi dubia', quae sit omnis disjunctiva prolata a te. Ad quod, et ad omnes similes disjunctivas quae realiter insolubiles sunt, per omnes, sicut ad primum consimiliter est dicendum. Et ideo de disjunctivis sufficiant.

253.) <sup>47</sup>Pro conjunctivis autem sic: Hoc exemplum ponatur, quod Sortes tantum dicat istam conjunctivam: 'Tu es homo', denotando responsalem, 'et aliqua conjunctiva prolata a Sorte est falsa'.<sup>48</sup> Et sit unus Sortes<sup>49</sup> omnis Sortes. Et posito,<sup>50</sup> sicut in omnibus prioribus, supponitur quod ista conjunctiva significet

juxta compositionem terminorum, cujus conjunctivae secunda pars sit a. Et quaeritur utrum a sit verum vel falsum. Si verum, et prima pars conjunctivae illius est vera; igitur, tota conjunctiva est vera; et aliqua pars illius conjunctivae significat primo quod conjunctiva prolata est falsa; igitur, ita est, quod conjunctiva prolata a Sorte est falsa; et hoc significat a; igitur, a est falsum; et ultra: igitur, a non est verum. Si igitur detur in principio quod a sit falsum, arguitur sic: Sit b data conjunctiva. b est falsum; et b est aliqua conjunctiva prolata a Sorte; igitur, aliqua conjunctiva prolata a<sup>51</sup> Sorte est falsa. Ista consequentia est bona; et antecedens totum est verum; igitur, consequens; sed consequens est secunda pars conjunctivae prolatae a Sorte, vel convertibilis; igitur, conjunctiva prolata a Sorte est vera.

254.) <sup>52</sup>Sed, isto casu posito, dicendum est, eo quod a est propositio affirmativa de praesenti praecise significans primo sicut est, ex prima conclusione<sup>53</sup> supposita virtute conclusionis quartae.<sup>54</sup> <sup>55</sup>Ad formam argumenti: Conceditur tota deductio, quousque ad minorem ultimi argumenti, quae est ista, quod consequens est secunda pars conjunctivae prolata a Sorte. Illa enim est neganda, ut frequenter prius ostenditur. Non enim est ista pars conjunctivae, sed alia sibi similis in



voce, cum extrema in illis pro diversis supponunt. Si tamen ponatur quod sit convertibilis cum illa prolata a Sorte, tunc neganda est consequentia, eo quod tunc in argumento committitur fallacia equivocationis.

255.) <sup>56</sup>De exclusivis autem sit hoc exemplum:  
 'Tantum Sortes dicit falsum'. Et sit ista propositio omnis propositio, quae sit a.<sup>57</sup> Tunc quaeritur utrum a sit propositio vera vel falsa. Si vera, et praecise significat primo quod tantum Sortes dicit falsum; igitur, verum est tantum Sortem dicere falsum; et ultra: igitur, Sortes<sup>58</sup> dicit falsum; et Sortes dicit propositionem; igitur, dicit propositionem falsam. Si dicas quod a est propositio <falsa>, igitur non est ita, sicut a primo significat; et a primo significat quod tantum Sortes dicit falsum; igitur, non est ita, quod tantum Sortes dicit falsum; igitur, vel Sortes non [non] dicit falsum vel alius a Sorte dicit falsum; sed nullus alius a Sorte dicit falsum, per casum; igitur, non est ita, quod Sortes dicit falsum; et Sortes dicit a; igitur, a non est falsum; igitur, si a est falsum, a non est falsum.

256.) Sed istud et omnia similia, intellectis prioribus, faciliter dissolvuntur. a enim in isto casu posito est propositio vera, eo quod sua convertibilis

est vera, quae est talis<sup>59</sup>: 'Solus Sortes dicit talem vocem "falsum"'. Quam esse suam convertibilem<sup>60</sup> conclusio<sup>61</sup> prima<sup>62</sup> secunda<sup>63</sup> quarta<sup>64</sup> et quinta<sup>65</sup> satis manifestant. <sup>66</sup>Ad argumentum autem respondendum est per omnia sicut ad proximum praecedens.

257.) <sup>67</sup>Exemplum autem de exceptivis sit talis: 'Nullus praeter Sortem dicit verum'. Et ponatur consimiliter sicut prius, et similiter tunc per omnia est dicendum.<sup>68</sup>

258.) Si autem ponatur sic casus, quod Sortes tantum dicit istam 'Deus est', et Plato istam 'Homo est asinus', et tertius istam 'Solus Sortes dicit verum', quae sit a, tunc a non est insolubile, ut paret descriptiones prius positas,<sup>69</sup> eo quod quilibet terminus in a supponit pro complexo qui<sup>70</sup> communiter pro complexo supponere (56rb) solet. Et ideo de talibus, non hic, sed convenienter in obligationibus,<sup>71</sup> quae sentio et de aliis, inferam, prout possum. De insolubilibus igitur in se sufficiant quae dicuntur.<sup>72</sup>

Expliciunt Insolubilia

APPENDICES

## APPENDIX A

Four Texts on Insolubilia from John  
Dumbleton's Summa logicae et  
philosophiae naturalis

The following texts of John Dumbleton are used by the anonymous author of the treatise edited above as the basis for his discussion of the "prima opinio". They are taken from the first part of Dumbleton's Summa logicae et philosophiae naturalis. The texts have been transcribed from one manuscript only, Vat. lat. 6750. They are in no sense critically edited. The manuscript has been examined in microfilm copy only.

a) f. 5ra:

Tertia conclusio: Nulla propositio in anima per intentionem (5rb) simplicem, sed per complexum, comprehenditur....

b) f. 5va:

Quarta conclusio sequens ex tertia est haec:  
Cujuscumque propositionis significantis pro complexo subjectum vel praedicatum est propositio et alteri vel utrique propositio correspondet. Nam si sit propositio

in anima, patet, per tertiam conclusionem, subjectum vel praedicatum vel utrumque esse propositionem, eo quod nulla intentio simplex<sup>1</sup> propositionem significat. Si talis propositio significat pro complexo et sit propositio extra animam, tum nihil extra significat, nisi quatenus est comprehensio per idem ab anima, ut patet per primam conclusionem; igitur, nullus terminus extra significat propositionem, nisi in anima eidem<sup>2</sup> propositioni propositio correspondet.

c) f. 5<sup>va</sup>:

His praepositis jam probatis, superest responsionem insolubilium cum solutione objectionum tangere. <sup>3</sup>Descriptio insolubilis talis est: Insolubile est propositio quae, ex apparenti casu possibili posito<sup>4</sup> admissio, concluditur esse vera et falsa. Haec patet juxta communes casus insolubilium. Primo, posito quod unica sit propositio quae sit haec: 'Verum est', cujus nomen sit a, causa veritatis vel falsitatis assignetur, quia a est propositio significans aliquammodo pro complexo (5vb). Patet, per secundam et quartam conclusionem, subjectum vel praedicatum a esse propositionem, vel alteri vel utrique propositionem correspondere, quare casus non est admittendus.

Eadem responsio danda est, posito hoc: Quaelibet propositio sit haec: 'Falsum est' vel 'Nullum falsum est', vel talis: 'Propositio est'.

d) f. 4ra:

Tertio, pono a propositionem solum<sup>5</sup> significantem falsum esse praecise. a tunc<sup>6</sup> non falsificat se propter significationem veram<sup>7</sup> quam habet; igitur, propter falsam significationem, etc.<sup>8</sup> Et, per consequens, a non<sup>9</sup> significat solum quod falsum est, cuius oppositum ponit haec positio.

Ad illud sic: Si ita est<sup>10</sup> a, quod est falsum, posito casu communi, igitur aliqua<sup>11</sup> propositio est suppositum huius termini 'falsum'; sed nulla est propositio, nisi a; nec a<sup>12</sup> est suppositum istius termini 'falsum', nisi propter significationem falsam; igitur, a non solum significat sicut est in casu communi.

## APPENDIX B

Two Texts of William of Ockham  
on Insolubilia and Self-Reference

The following texts are taken from Ockham's Tractatus logicae (= Summa logicae), Paris: [Johannes Higman], 1488 (Hain #11948). They are in so sense critically edited, but are simply transcriptions of that incunabula edition. Certain obvious errors have been corrected, however, and, in one case, a homoeoteleuton has been expanded, following the readings of Vat. lat 952, f. 117ra and Cambridge, Gonville & Caius, 464/571, f. 58va. These two manuscripts have been examined in photocopy only.

a) a passage from Ockham's treatise on obligationes (Tractatus logicae III, 3, 38, f. 107vb):

Obligationis autem multae species assignantur, scilicet institutio, petitio, positio, depositio, dubitatio, et sit verum. Institutio est alicujus vocabuli nova impositio pro tempore disputationis, et non vult duratura.... De ista specie dantur aliquae regulae. Una est quod numquam pars potest significare totum cujus est pars. Sed ista regula capit instantiam. Nam in ista



propositione 'Omnis propositio est vera', subjectum significat totam propositionem. Similiter, idem potest si<g>nificare se; ergo, pars eadem ratione potest significare totum. Antecedens patet. Nam hoc nomen 'vox' significat omnem vocem, et per consequens se ipsam. Similiter, hoc nomen 'nomen' significat omnia nomina, quia omni nomini competit definitio nominis; ergo, se ipsum significat. Ideo dicendum est quod, quamvis pars posset significare totum cuius est pars, tamen talis institutio non est semper admittenda. Quando enim, per institutionem partis habentis eandem institutionem, totum significatum mutaretur a veritate in falsitatem, et e converso, tunc non est talis institutio admittenda.

b) Ockham's Insolubilia (Tractatus logicae III, 3, 45, f. 109rb-vb):

Circa insolubilia est sciendum quod non ideo dicuntur sophismata aliqua insolubilia, quia nullo modo possunt solvi, sed quia cum difficultate solvuntur. Unde sciendum quod insolubilia sophismata sunt, quando, per consequentias apparentes quae videntur regulari per regulas necessarias, ex propositione aliqua contingente infertur sua opposita, quae ideo dicuntur insolubilia, quia difficile est tales consequentias impedire. Et talia argumen-(109va) ta

non possunt fieri, nisi quando actus humanus respicit istum terminum 'falsum' vel aliquem consimilem affirmative, vel hunc terminum 'verum' vel aliquem consimilem negative, sicut est de ista: 'Sortes dicit falsum', et de ista: 'Sortes non dicit verum'. Et fit hoc modo insolubile: Incipiat Sortes sic loqui: "Sortes dicit falsum", et nihil aliud loquetur. Tunc quaeritur an Sortes dicit verum an falsum. Si dicas quod Sortes dicit verum, et non dicit, nisi istam propositionem: 'Sortes dicit falsum'; ergo, haec est vera 'Sortes dicit falsum'; ergo, si dicit verum, dicit falsum. Si dicas quod Sortes dicit falsum, ergo haec est vera 'Sortes dicit falsum'; et Sortes dicit hoc; ergo, Sortes dicit hoc quod est verum, et, per consequens, Sortes dicit verum. Et ita, si Sortes dicit falsum, Sortes dicit verum, isto casu posito. Illud argumentum dicitur insolubile, quia de difficili solvitur.

Et ideo ad solutionem istius et omnium aliorum est sciendum quod talis propositio contingens ex qua debet inferri sua repugnans vel habet hunc terminum 'falsum' vel aliquem consimilem, vel hunc terminum 'verum' vel aliquem consimilem.<sup>1</sup> Si primo modo, oportet quod sit affirmativa, et tunc debet dici universaliter quod propositio est falsa. Unde, si Sortes incipiat sic

loqui 'Sortes dicit falsum', et nihil aliud dicat, dicendum est quod illa propositio est falsa. Si autem incipiat sic loqui 'Sortes dicit falsum', non posset fieri tale argumentum apparens. Si autem propositio habeat hunc terminum 'verum' vel aliquem consimilem, oportet quod propositio supra quam fundatur insolubile sit negativa, et tunc est concedendum quod illa propositio est vera, sicut, si Sortes incipiat sic loqui 'Sortes non dicit verum', concedendum est quod haec est vera.

Et si arguatur quod haec sit vera 'Sortes non dicit verum'; et Sortes dicit hanc propositionem; ergo, Sortes dicit hanc propositionem veram, respondendum est quod illa consequentia non valet: 'Sortes dicit hanc propositionem; et haec propositio est vera; ergo, Sortes dicit propositionem veram'. Et ratio hujus negationis est quia, in ista propositione 'Sortes non dicit verum', praedicatum non potest supponere pro tota illa propositione cujus est pars, quamvis non praecise propter hoc quod est pars ejus. Et ideo ista propositio 'Sortes non dicit verum' aequivalet isti 'Sortes non dicit aliquod verum ab isto "Sortes non dicit verum"'. Et ideo, sicut non sequitur: 'Haec est vera; et Sortes dicit illam; ergo, dicit aliquam veram propositionem ab ista', ita non sequitur: 'Sortes dicit istam propositionem "Sortes non dicit verum"; et haec

est vera; ergo, Sortes dicit verum', et hoc quia, sicut dictum est, istae duae aequivalent: 'Sortes non dicit verum' et 'Sortes non dicit aliquod verum ab isto'.

Et eodem modo dicendum est proportionabiliter ad argumentum praecedens, secundum quod, quando Sortes incipit sic loqui: 'Sortes dicit falsum', et quaeratur an Sortes dicit verum aut falsum, dicendum est quod nec dicit verum nec falsum, sicut concedendum est quod nec dicit aliud verum nec aliud falsum ab isto. Et ideo non sequitur: 'Haec est falsa "Sortes dicit falsum"; et Sortes dicit hanc propositionem; ergo, Sortes dicit falsum', sicut non sequitur: 'Sortes dicit hoc; et hoc est falsum; ergo, dicit aliud falsum ab isto', et hoc quia istae duae aequivalent: 'Sortes dicit falsum' et 'Sortes dicit aliud falsum ab isto'. Et propter hoc prima consequentia non valet, quia in ista 'Sortes dicit falsum' praedicatum non potest supponere pro ista propositione.

Et si dicatur: "Hic arguitur ab inferiori ad superius sine negatione et sine distributione; ergo, consequentia est bona", dicendum est quod illa consequentia non valet, nisi quando illud superius in illo consequente potest supponere pro illo inferiori. Unde in ista 'Homo est animal', si li 'animal' non posset supponere (109vb) pro homine, haec consequentia non valeret: 'Sortes est homo; ergo, Sortes est animal'.

In ista autem propositione 'Sortes dicit falsum', praedicatum non potest supponere pro tota propositione; ideo, non sequitur: 'Sortes dicit hoc falsum; ergo, Sortes dicit falsum'.

Per praedicta potest studiosus respondere ad omnia insolubilia, si solvendo ea velit naturam insolubilium advertere, quod relinquo studiosis. Et ista de insolubilibus pro nunc sufficiant.

## APPENDIX C

Five Texts from Thomas  
Bradwardine's Insolubilia

The following texts of Thomas Bradwardine argue that a part of a proposition can stand for the whole proposition of which it is a part. They are used by the author of the Insolubilia edited above as arguments against his fourth and fifth conclusions. Other texts of Bradwardine's Insolubilia used by the author are cited above, p. #29.

In this part of his Insolubilia, Bradwardine is refuting the opinion of those who attempt to solve insolubles by restricting terms, so that they do not permit a term to stand for all its significates or for all its singulars. Of those who take this approach, some solve the insolubles secundum quid et simpliciter.<sup>1</sup> It is these with which Bradwardine is concerned here.

The texts have been transcribed from Bruges, Bibliothèque publique de la ville, MS 500, ff. 134r-143v. This manuscript contains several passages which seem to be corrupt. Such passages have been omitted in the following transcriptions, even though they seem to be integral parts of Bradwardine's arguments. The

establishment of the correct text will have to await the examination of the other manuscripts of Bradwardine's treatise. The purpose here is simply to provide some evidence that the author is in fact using Bradwardine's Insolubilia.

The manuscript has been examined in microfilm copy only.

a) f. 134vb; cf. above, par. 138:

In fundamento<sup>2</sup> vero est triplex partium, secundum numerum radicum suarum. Nam illud fundamentum obtinet tres radices. Quarum prima pars ponit quod pars non potest supponere pro toto cuius est pars. Secunda dicit quod pars non potest supponere pro opposito sui totius. Tertia ponit quod pars non potest supponere pro convertibili cum suo toto nec ejus opposito in talibus privativis.

Peccatum autem primae radice apparet, quia pars potest supponere pro toto, ut patet per Aristotelem, 4<sup>o</sup> Metaphysicae, capitulo ultimo in fine,<sup>3</sup> ubi arguit contra omnes ponentes<sup>4</sup> sic, dicens: "Accidit autem in quoque<sup>5</sup> quod fundamentum est de<sup>6</sup> talibus orationibus ipsas se ipsas destruere." Et addit paulo post<sup>7</sup>: "Qui vero omnia falsa, et ipse se ipsum", ubi intendit talem consequentiam: 'Omnia sunt falsa; ergo, ista oratio



est falsa'. Quae tamen non valet, nisi pars pro suo toto supponeret.

b) Ibid., immediately following text a); cf. above, par. 137:

Secundo, sicut haec intentio 'falsum' in anima est naturalis similitudo cujuslibet falsi, ergo vere repraesentat intellectui quodlibet falsum; et ab illa naturali significatione et repraesentatione non cadit; ergo, significat intellectui suum oppositum.

c) f. 135ra; cf. above, par. 135:

Quarto sic: In aliquibus pars potest supponere pro toto, sicut in istis: 'Aliquod est ens' 'Vox est' 'Propositio est'; ergo, et<sup>8</sup> in talibus privativis, quia non potest....Posset autem fingi haec ratio: Si pars pro suo toto supponeret in talibus, sequeretur eandem propositionem esse veram et falsam, et quod insolubilia nullo modo possent solve. Neutra sequitur, ut in sequentibus ostendetur. Hoc igitur non est, nisi figmentum illorum qui ad insolubilia nequeunt respondere.

d.) Ibid., immediately following text c); cf. above, par. 136:

Quinto, sit a, Sorte dicente, 'Falsum dicitur a Sorte'; et audiat Plato subjectum tantum. Tunc Plato per illud

intellegit<sup>9</sup> omne falsum in universali; ergo, et  
 'Falsum dicit a Sorte'; ergo, subjectum illius....  
 quia est vox significativa ad placitum; ergo, potest  
 imponi ad repraesentandum quodcumque.

e) Ibid.; cf. above, par. 141:

Septimo sic: Dicat Sortes tantum istam 'Omne  
 dictum a Sorte est falsum', quae sit a. Tunc a est  
 falsum. Et ibi est esse in suo toto, ut constat,  
 et dici de omni<sup>10</sup>; ergo, nihil est subjecti de quo  
 non dicitur praedicatum. Consequentia patet per  
 definitionem dici de omni posita primo Priorum<sup>11</sup>  
 in textu dicente: "Dicimus autem de omni praedicari  
 quando nihil est subjecti de quo alterum non dicatur".  
 Sed a est aliquid subjecti a; et quia a est<sup>12</sup> falsum,  
 et subjectum a est... (f. 135rb).... Illud patet ex  
 significatio nominis. Si enim praedicatum dicatur  
 de omni subjecti, ergo de hoc, quia arguitur: De  
 aliquo subjecti diceretur et de aliquo non; ergo, non  
 de omni.

ABBREVIATIONS, NOTES

INDICES, BIBLIOGRAPHY

List of Abbreviations of  
Works Frequently Cited

- AL Minio-Paluello, L. Aristoteles Latinus ("Union academique internationale: Corpus philosophorum medi aevi academiaram consociatarum auspiciis et consilio editum"), Bruges-Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1939- .
- ASI Albert of Saxony. Insolubilia (published with his Sophismata), Paris: Félix Baligault, 1495, folios unnumbered. (Hain #582).
- FL Bocheński, I.M. Formale Logik ("Orbis Academicus: Problemegeschichten der Wissenschaft in Dokumenten und Darstellungen"), Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 1956.
- Hain Hain, Ludwig. Repertorium Bibliographicum in quo Libri Omnes ab Arte Typographica Inventi usque ad Annum MD, 4 vols., Milan: G.G. Görlich, 1948.
- Junt. Averrois commentaria et introductiones in omnes libros Aristotelis cum eorum versione latina, Venice, apud Juntas, 12v., 1562-1574.
- LM Paul of Venice. Logica magna, Venice: Albertinus (Rubeus) Vercellensis, for Octavianus Scotus, 1499 (Hain #12505).
- MS Mediaeval Studies, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1939- .
- Perierm. Aristotle. Periermenias, Boethius tr., L. Minio-Paluello, ed., AL 2, 1, pp. 1-38.
- PL Migne, J.P. Patrologiae cursus completus... series latina, 22lv., Paris: apud Garnier fratres, 1844-64.

- SL William of Ockham. Summa logicae, Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., ed., ("Franciscan Institute Publications, Text Series No. 2"), St. Bonaventure's, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1951. Boehner's edition is incomplete, stopping at the end of the prima pars tertiae partis. References to later sections of the work are given according to the incunabula edition, Tractatus logicae, Paris: [Johannes Higman], 1488 (Hain #11948).
- SLPN John Dumbleton. Summa logicae et philosophiae naturalis, MS Vat. lat. 6750.
- Soph. el. Aristotle, Sophistici elenchi
- TBI Thomas Bradwardine. Insolubilia, MS Bruges, Bibliothèque publique de la ville, 500, ff. 134rb-143va.
- TC Moody, Ernest A. Truth and Consequence in Mediaeval Logic ("Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics," L.E.J. Brouwer et al., eds.), Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1953.

Notes to the Study

(to p.\*1)

1. For a bibliography of the material from 1868 to 1958, see Francesca Rivetti Barbo, L'antinomia del mentitore nel pensiero contemporaneo da Peirce a Tarski, 681-699. The more important items from this literature are gathered together, with Italian translations, Ibid., 334-677. There is no comparably convenient bibliography of the material after 1958.

2. See the important texts in Bertrand Russell, "Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types," The American Journal of Mathematics, 30 (1908), 222-244; and Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathematica, 2nd ed., I, "Introduction," ch. 2, pp. 31-65.

3. Especially as presented by Tarski, "Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen," L. Blaustein, tr., Studia Philosophica 1 (1935), 261-405. Reprinted in Rivetti Barbo, op. cit., 392-677.

4. For brief histories of this recent work, see FL, 448-467, esp. 448-450; and John van Heijenoort, "Logical Paradoxes," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, V, 49f.

5. Cf. the remarks by Bocheński, FL, 275-277, esp. his statement that the development of the problem from Ockham to Paul of Venice is almost completely unknown (p. 277). The text edited below is from this period.

6. Bocheński states that the earliest known use of the word 'insolubilia' in a technical sense occurs in Albert the Great (FL, 276; cf. Albert the Great, Libri II elenchorum, tract. 3, c. 2, in Opera omnia, Vives ed., II, 691):

Attendendum etiam, quod super hunc locum sophisticum [i.e., secundum quid et simpliciter] fit solutio insolubilium: insolubilia autem dico quaecumque talis sunt, quae quaecumque parte contradictionis

data deducuntur ad oppositum et inconveniens,  
sive ad redargutionem, ut hoc: aliquis jurat  
se perjurare, aut jurat verum, aut non.

There may, however, be yet an earlier use of the work in its technical sense, dating from the second quarter of the thirteenth century. The Old French poem La bataille des .VII. arts, by Henri d'Andeli, contains the following lines: "Ele se desfent d'issolubles,/ De soluces et de fallaces." (lines 425f. Cf. Louis John Pastow, The Battle of the Seven Arts, 59. On the date, Ibid., 54.) I am grateful to Albert Judy, O.P., for calling my attention to this passage.

Although the word 'insolubilia' was used in a technical sense to refer to sophisms of a certain kind, there is no evidence that the work was used at this time to refer to strictly semantic antinomies. The earliest known explicit use of the work 'insolubilia' to refer to semantic antinomies occurs in Lambert of Auxerre's Summulae logicales, written sometime before 1253 (Cf. my unpublished paper "Aristotle's Sophistici Elenchi and the Mediaeval Development of the Problem of Semantic Antinomies to the End of the Thirteenth Century".).

7. See, e.g., the excellent article by W.V. Quine, "The Ways of Paradox," in The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, 3-20; and John Buridan, Sophisms on Meaning and Truth, Theodore Kermit Scott, tr., ch. 8, pp. 180-223.

8. Van Heijenoort, op. cit., 49.

9. Quine, op. cit., 7.

10. Ibid., 11.

11. Not enough detailed information is available to warrant any final judgment about the circumstances surrounding the Megarian-Stoic origin of the problem in antiquity. Cf., however, I.M. Bochenski, Ancient Formal Logic, 100-102; FL, 150-153 (sec. 23); Benson Mates, Stoic Logic, 84, and the references in these places.



12. The following quotations are from F.P. Ramsey, The Foundations of Mathematics, 20-21.

13. The exclusiveness of this dichotomy is open to question. Cf. van Heijenoort, op. cit., 49.

14. On the parva logicalia and what they comprised, cf. the quotation from the Copulata Tractatum Logicalium in Philotheus Boehner, Mediaeval Logic: An Outline of Its Development from 1250 to c. 1400, p. 117, n. 13.

15. Ibid.

16. In fact, he devotes a mere two paragraphs to them (pars. 255-56), and but a single, very brief paragraph (par. 257) to the similar "exceptive" type of insolubles.

17. Cf. James A. Weisheipl, O.P., "Ockham and Some Mertonians", MS 30 (1968), 196 & 202-204.

18. Cf. Edward A. Synan, "The 'Insolubilia' of Roger Nottingham, O.F.M.", MS 26 (1964), 270.

19. Cf. A.B. Emden, A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to a.d. 1500. On the identification of the authors of the codex, see John E. Murdoch and Edward A. Synan, "Two Questions on the Continuum: Walter Chatton (?), O.F.M., and Adam Wodeham, O.F.M.", Franciscan Studies 26 (1966), "Introduction", II, pp. 225-232.

20. Emden, op. cit.

21. par. 1.

22. pars. 3-102.

23. par. 104.

24. pars. 105-109.

25. par. 111.

26. pars. 112-132.

27. pars. 133-141.

28. pars. 142-163.

29. pars. 164-224.

30. pars. 225-236.

31. pars. 237-252.

32. pars. 253-254.

33. pars. 255-256.

34. par. 257.

35. par. 258.

36. par. 1.

37. f. 46v. Transcription mine.

38. Grabmann's transcription has 'solvetur'. Cf. Martin Grabmann, Die Introductiones in logicam des Wilhelm von Shyreswood († nach 1267), "Einleitung", p. 20.

39. The text goes on to say that this description is too general, and gives a more precise definition. Cf. Grabmann, op. cit., 21.

40. ASI, the incipit.

41. SL, III, 3, 15, f. 109rb. Cf. below, Appendix B, b), p. 130.

42. SL, III, 3, 15, f. 109va. Cf. Below, Appendix B, b), p. 131.

43. The same notion is perhaps expressed by the anonymous author of an Insolubilia preserved in the MS Rome, Angel. 1017 (R. 6. 32), ff. 14a-19b, incipit: "Insolubile est difficilis...". (Cf. Gaudens E. Mohan, O.F.M., "Incipits of Logical Writings of the XIIIth-XVth Centuries," Franciscan Studies 12 (1952), 409.

44. SL, III, 3, 15, f. 109rb. Cf. below, Appendix B, b), p. 130.

45. Compare this passage with the incipit of the unascribed De insolubilibus found in the Erfurt MS Amplon. Qu. 395, f. 104: "Sciendum quod insolubilia sophismata sunt, quando..." (Cf. Mohan, op. cit., 459). Perhaps this is a copy of Ockham's chapter on insolubles, lacking the first sentence.

46. par. 111.

47. par. 258.

48. Ibid.

49. pars. 3, 4, 5-23.

50. SLPN. On Dumbleton, cf. Weisheipl, op. cit., 199-207.

51. par. 3: "quo propositio redditur insolubilis".

52. pars. 109-110.

53. "significat juxta compositionem terminorum" (par. 246). The point is that the proposition mean what one would expect it to mean, judging from the terms and the way they are put together. This proviso is presumably to exclude the possibility that Sortes utter the proposition 'Sortes dicit falsum', and mean by that something quite different from what is ordinarily meant--for example, that the king is sitting.

54. par. 246.

55. SLPN, f. 5ra. Cf. below, Appendix A, a), p. 126.

56. SLPN, f. 5va. Cf. below, Appendix A, b), p. 126. Cf. also the clearer reference to this same conclusion in par. 21.

57. par. 5.

58. In the statement of the argument in par. 5, the text has "significat aliquo aliter pro complexo". Compare the statement of the second conclusion, in the same par. Par. 21 has "supponit".

59. The first conclusion (Dumbleton's third) is said to be involved in this argument (par. 5), but it does not in fact appear. Contrast "per tertiam ad quartam conclusionem" in par. 5, and "patet per secundam et quartam conclusionem" in Dumbleton's text, f. 5vb (cf. below, Appendix A, c), p. 127). Nevertheless, the third conclusion does play a role, insofar as its function is to ground the fourth conclusion. Cf. Dumbleton's statement of the argument for the fourth conclusion, f. 5va (below, Appendix A, b), pp. 126f.).

60. SLPN, f. 5va-vb. Cf. below, Appendix A, c), pp. 127f.

61. IM, II, 15, f. 192va.

62. Ibid.

63. Synan, op. cit. The anonymous treatise edited below immediately precedes Nottingham's treatise in MS British Museum, Harley, 3243, the unique extant MS in which either treatise is contained.

64. Cf. ibid., 270, the colophon, and also above, p. #7.

65. Synan, op. cit., 269 (par. 36). Roger did not think, however, that this example is a real insoluble. Cf. ibid., 268 (par. 53): "Et tantum pro recta solutione insolubilium nunc ultra notandum quod multae sunt propositiones quae conceduntur esse insolubilia, et tamen non sunt...."

66. A few brief remarks will suffice to point out certain obscurities.

1) The first three arguments involve the notion that there is a mental proposition which corresponds to each spoken or written proposition, and to which the spoken or written proposition is subordinated. This is not the same as the first opinion's fourth conclusion, which concerns only mental propositions corresponding to the extremes of certain spoken or written propositions.

cf., for example, pars. 8, 9, 10 and 12. In par. 10, the phrase 'illa esset impossibilis' must refer to the proposition in the soul corresponding to the whole of the spoken proposition 'Rex sedet' est propositio vera, and not merely corresponding to the predicate of that spoken proposition; otherwise, the argument is unintelligible.

2) The argument in par. 11 is problematic. Proposition b stands either for itself or for another (proposition). The second alternative does not seem to have been adequately considered. Perhaps the last sentence of the par. is meant to deal with this part of the dichotomy, but the relevance of that sentence to the argumentation is not clear.

3) The last sentence of par. 12 may, it seems, be expanded as follows: "Propositio in a et(iam) solum talis (propositio--i.e., solum vera propositio--) in anima correspondet."

4) Pars. 13-17 are presumably meant to treat the second half of the dichotomy set up in the second sentence of par. 12, even though the ground has shifted somewhat.

5) Par. 19 is an argument against the first opinion's fourth conclusion (cf. par. 18). Yet it also constitutes a direct refutation of the argument's third conclusion.

6) The fifth argument (pars. 21-23) adumbrates the author's own solution.

67. pars. 3, 4, 24-44.

68. par. 3.

69. par. 4.

70. The statement of these principles is taken from par. 24.

71. This seems to be connected with the notion of material consequence ut nunc or simpliciter. Cf. TC, 73-79, and FL, 222-226 (secs. 30.12-30.16).

72. The argument is given in par. 25. The last step is not explicit in par. 25; cf., however, par. 24.

73. ASI:

Quantum ad secundum sit prima suppositio: Omnis propositio est affirmativa vel negativa. Secunda: Omnem propositionem affirmativam esse veram est idem



esse pro quo supponit ejus subjectum et praedicatum. Et, e converso, se ipsam esse falsam est non idem esse pro quo supponit ejus subjectum vel praedicatum. Tertia suppositio: Omnem propositionem negativam esse veram est non idem esse pro quo supponit subjectum ejus et praedicatum. Et, e converso, et ipsam esse falsam est esse idem pro quo supponit subjectum et praedicatum ejus, et e converso. Quarta est: Omnis propositio affirmativa significat idem pro quo supponit ejus subjectum et praedicatum. Et hoc manifeste ostendit nobis copula in ea affirmativa. Quinta: Omnis propositio negativa significat non esse idem pro quo supponit ejus subjectum et praedicatum. Et hoc manifeste ostendit nobis copula in ea negativa. Sexta suppositio: Impossibile est eandem propositionem esse veram et falsam.

Quantum ad tertium, sit prima conclusio: Omnis propositio affirmativa significat se esse veram.... Secunda conclusio: Omnis propositio negativa significat se esse veram.... Tertia conclusio: Omnis propositio mundi significat se esse veram.... Quarta conclusio: Omnis propositio affirmativa significans se esse veram et se esse falsam est falsa.... Quinta conclusio: Omnis propositio negativa significans se esse veram et se esse falsam est falsa.... Septima conclusio: Omni propositioni copulativae contradicit una disjunctiva composita ex partibus contradicentibus partibus illius copulativae.

John Buridan seems to have at one time agreed with Albert's view. Cf. his Sophismata, c. 8, soph. 7; Eng. tr. by Theodore Kermit Scott, John Buridan: Sophisms on Meaning and Truth, 194.

74. par. 26

75. Bruges, Bibl. pub., MS 497, ff. 43rb-44va. Cf. A. de Poorter, Catalogue des manuscrits de la bibliothèque publique de la ville de Bruges. This same MS contains two other works by Robert Fland: a Consequentiae (ff. 41ra-43rb), incipit: "Nota quod consequentia dividitur duobus modis, nam quedam est formalis et quedam materialis", explicit: "...vel aliud sit impossibile. Expliciunt consequentie Roberti Fland"; and an Obligationes (ff. 44va-46ra), incipit: "Notandum primo est quod obligatio", explicit: "Hec autem de

obligationibus sufficient. Expliciunt obligationes Roberti Fland." To the best of my knowledge, this Robert Fland is known only through these three works preserved in this unique MS.

76. Ibid., f. 43rb. The explicit (f. 44va) is: "Pro solutione ad insolubilia sufficient dicta hec. Expliciunt insolubilia Fland."

77. Buridan, op. cit., 195.

78. par. 27.

79. pars. 28-44.

80. par. 28.

81. par. 29.

82. "nullum omnino habent (scil. deductiones) colorem." (par. 28)

83. par. 30. Compare this approach to the author's own fourth and fifth conclusions, pars. 122 and 130.

84. pars. 30-40.

85. par. 41.

86. pars. 42-44.

87. pars. 3, 4, 45-64.

88. par. 4.

89. par. 45. This opinion is similar to the more elaborate fourteenth opinion in Paul of Venice's list of fifteen solutions (IM, f. 194ra): "Ad quod ostendendum, praesupponit quod in nulla propositione pars supponit pro toto cujus est pars, nec convertibili cum toto, nec antecedente ad totum. Ex quo patet quod ista propositio 'Sortes dicit falsum' significat quod Sortes dicit falsum-- non quidem falsum quod ipse dicit, sed falsum distinctum ab illo; sed quia nihil dicit, nisi istam propositionem, ideo ipsa est falsa."

This fourteenth opinion, however, ultimately regards insolubles as instances of the fallacy of accident. (Ibid.)



90. Cf. below, Appendix B, b), pp. 130-134.

91. par. 4.

92. par. 45.

93. par. 63.

94. Cf. below, Appendix B, b), p. 133.

95. Appendix B, b), pp. 130-134.

96. par. 50.

97. Cf. below, Appendix B, a), pp. 129f. Ockham nevertheless realizes the conflict between this and his solution to insolubles, and explicitly excludes insolubles from the possibility of having a part which stands for the whole (Ibid).

98. par. 46.

99. It is not clear whether this refers to the general conclusion of the opinion as a whole, namely, that some insolubles are true and some false, a conclusion which the author of the present treatise would confirm, or whether it refers only to the first principle, that a part cannot stand for the whole of which it is a part, a principle which Ockham accepted without proof, and which the author of this treatise would agree to be true.

1. par. 46.

2. pars. 48-50.

3. pars. 51-54. The author seems to use the words 'significare' and 'supponere' at times almost interchangeably. He will frequently switch from one to the other in the course of an argument. Par. 130 provides a good example of this.

4. pars. 55-62.

5. par. 63.

6. par. 64.

7. Cf. pars. 122 and 130.
8. pars. 133-163.
9. pars. 3, 4, 65-102.
10. par. 65.
11. The statement of these principles is taken from par. 66.
12. Cf. Roger Nottingham, *Insolubilia*, E.A. Synan, ed., 260, 262 (pars. 2, 15): "Prima conclusio sit ista: Omnis propositio vera eatenus est propositio vera quatenus ipsa aliqualiter primario significat, et naturaliter antecedenter sic est quemadmodum ipsa propositio primario significat."
- "Et causa est quia .a. esse verum infertur ab illis sicut a priori et a causa, et .a. esse verum infert illa sicut effectus infert suam causam, et naturaliter posterius suum prius, quia, sicut declaratum est, .a. esse verum dependet ex .a. aliqualiter primario significare et naturaliter antecedenter sic esse quando ipsum primario significat, et per Commentatorem ubi supra, compositio in re est causa veritatis propositionis, et secundum Algazelem, primo *Metaphysicae* capitulo 10: 'Inter causam et causatum est ordo naturalis' et solvitur instantis."
13. In par. 3, the fourth opinion is said to be "cujus fundamentum est quod quaelibet propositio insolubilis antecedenter significat se esse veram et falsam." The sense of this is not altogether clear. It does not seem quite to conform to the exposition of the opinion given in pars. 66-67.
14. par. 67.
15. *IM*, f. 192va.
16. par. 65.
17. pars. 69-82. The second of these arguments, given in two forms in pars 71-72, is totally inadequate. The conclusion, that "omnis propositio vera est vera", in no way refutes the fourth opinion. Nor, indeed, is it the

desired conclusion, which, according to par. 71, was to have been "quod a sit verum vel falsum".

18. pars. 83-85. There are three arguments. The first, par. 83, is a rather sophisticated argument to the effect that, if an insoluble is neither true nor false, then, by the same reasoning, the author's own principles are neither true nor false, and thus no true or false conclusion can follow from them. The second argument, par. 84, is against the opinion's notion that nothing can presuppose itself. It shows that this principle says too much. The third, par. 85, argues that there are many intelligible species which are signs of themselves and yet are nevertheless true. These, according to the opinion's first conclusion, must therefore presuppose themselves.

19. par. 87.

20. par. 86.

21. pars. 88-90.

22. pars. 91-93. Par. 92 seems to reason as though a were 'Antichristus non est', rather than 'Antichristus potest non esse'. It would seem that a signifies primarily Antichristum posse non esse, not, as in par. 92, Antichristum non esse. The author's point still stands, however.

23. par. 94.

24. pars. 95-96.

25. par. 97.

26. pars. 98-99.

27. pars. 100-102.

28. par. 109.

29. par. 110.

30. Ibid.

31. Weisheipl, "Ockham and Some Mertonians", 190.

32. TBI, c. 6, f. 136vb.

33. MS has remotae.

34. MS has est ut.

35. Bradwardine's treatise seems to have influenced Paul of Venice's treatment of the matter. The extent of this influence cannot be evaluated without further research. The following items, however, ought to be noted:

1). Paul of Venice explicitly denies that his solution is original, but rather refers it to his predecessors. Cf. below, point 4.

2). Both opinions conclude that insolubles are false propositions. Cf. below, n. 36, and FL, 291f.

3). Both opinions include as a supposition the principle that a part can stand for its whole. Cf. TBI, f. 137ra: "Tertia (scil. suppositio) est ista: pars potest supponere pro toto et ejus opposito et convertibilibus eorundem"; and IM, f. 195ra: "Ultimo suppositio est ista: pars propositionis potest supponere pro suo toto cujus est pars et pro quolibet pertinente ad ipsum."

4). More important, the following passage of IM, f. 194rb, closely resembles the passage of Bradwardine quoted in the text above:

Pro declaratione quintadecimae opinionis, quam scio valentium fuisse antiquorum, tres articuli inferuntur....Quantum ad primum sit haec prima divisio: Omne insolubile aut oritur ex actu nostro aut ex proprietate vocis. Actus nostri sunt duplices: quidam interiores et quidam exteriores. Interiores sunt hi qui fiunt ut imaginari, cogitare, et hujusmodi. Exteriores sunt illi qui fiunt ex parte corporis, ut dicere, loqui, et similia. Et ista sunt insolubilia orientia ex actu nostro: 'Sortes dicit falsum' 'Sortes intellegit falsum' et similia. Voces autem proprietates sunt ut subici, appellare, esse verum vel falsum, pro se esse verum, pro alio a se non esse verum, pro se et pro alio (f. 194va) a se et ita de se falsum, et non esse falsum pro se vel pro alio. Unde hujusmodi insolubilia: 'Falsum est' 'Nullum verum est' 'Propositio non verificatur pro se' et 'Aliqua



propositio non appellatur a suo subjecto vel  
praedicato' ex proprietate vocis nascuntur.

36. TBI, f. 137ra-va, the discussion of the second conclusion, which is: "Si aliqua propositio significat se esse veram vel se esse falsam, ipsa significat se esse veram, et est falsa." (f. 137ra)

37. Cf. pars. 135-138, 141, and below, Appendix C, pp. 135-138.

38. par. 119.

39. par. 186. The argument in this par. is another instance in which the author seems to use the terms 'significare' and 'supponere' interchangeably.

40. Cf., however, the "conclusion" on which the second opinion is based, par. 24.

41. par. 104.

42. Cf. par. 245, where there is an implicit reference to this division, although no explicit appeal to it. There the distinction is put in terms of "material" and "personal" suppositions.

43. TC, 24.

44. par. 104. Cf. above, p. \*6.

45. TC, 24f. Cf. also SL, I, 64-69, pp. 177-188.

46. par. 104.

47. pars. 69-82.

48. par. 104.

49. SL, II, 1, p. 217.

50. par. 111.

51. par. 237.

52. pars. 255-257. Cf. SL, II, 17, p. 268: "Circa primum sciendum est, quod istae dictiones 'tantum' et

'solus' faciunt propositiones exclusivas". Ibid., 18, p. 277: "Circa primum sciendum, quod tales syncategoremata 'praeter' 'nisi' faciunt propositiones, in quibus ponuntur, esse exceptivas."

53. Boethius, De syllogismo hypothetico, PL 64, 835. There are further subdivisions, which are not relevant here.

54. Peter Abelard, Dialectica, IV, 1, L.M. De Rijk, ed., 472. Cf. also the editor's introduction, pp. xlii-xlix.

55. Peter of Spain, Summulae logicales, tract. 1, I.M. Bocheński, ed., 7 (par. 1.22).

56. SL, III, 1, p. 217.

57. IM, II, 6, f. 124va.

58. Cf., e.g., William of Shyreswood, Syncategoremata, J. Reginald O'Donnell, ed., MS, 3 (1941), 59-70 and 82f.; and Peter of Spain, Syncategoremata, Venice, 1580, ff. 272r-283r.

59. Cf. Peter of Spain, Tractatus exponibilium, in The Summulae Logicales of Peter of Spain, Joseph P. Mullally ed., 104.

60. SL, II, 11, p. 252.

61. De inesse, as opposed to a modal proposition, de modo or modalis. Cf. SL, II, 1, p. 218.

62. par. 105.

63. par. 106.

64. par. 107.

65. par. 108.

66. TBI, f. 137ra.

67. ASI, the first two descriptiones.

68. The following remarks about affirmative propositions are construed mostly be way of contrast with what the

author explicitly says about negative proposition in pars. 107-108.

69. par. 109.

70. Cf. the discussion above, pp. #12f., #28f.

71. This is yet another case of the author's use of 'significare' and 'supponere' as nearly synonymous.

72. par. 111.

73. Ibid.

74. Cf. above, p. #12.

75. par. 112.

76. The first part of the supporting argument in par. 114 is not altogether clear.

77. par. 116.

78. par. 119.

79. The statement of this conclusion in par. 119 is problematic. There it seems to say that if a proposition or its extreme denotes that something signify, then that thing must, in fact, actually signify. The supporting argument in par. 119 and the one in par. 120 do not seem to be to the point. Perhaps there is a lacuna in the text here. The argument in par. 121, however, as well as the appeal to the conclusion in par. 186, clearly supposes that the conclusion mean that whatever a proposition or its extreme denotes, it must signify. On the reason for stating this conclusion, cf. above, p. #30.

80. par. 122.

81. pars. 122-129. The contradiction mentioned in par. 129 seems to be that, on the one hand, the significate of the term is understood before the significate of the proposition (proven in par. 128), and, on the other hand, it is not (par. 129).

82. par. 130.



83. par. 258.

84. par. 186. Cf. the discussion above, p. #30.

85. E.g., the fourth and fifth suppositions, pars. 108 and 109.

86. par. 133.

87. pars. 133-141.

88. pars. 142-163. The argument in par. 150 seems to shift the grounds of the discussion from 'reducere ad actum intellegendi' to 'reducere ad memoriam'.

The point of the argument in par. 152 is that, just as Sortes does not, in apprehending himself, thereby understand Plato (much less all men), so too Plato, in apprehending the spoken term 'falsum', does not thereby understand every falsehood. One cannot necessarily pass from the apprehension of one thing to the understanding of another thing or other things. In the case of the spoken term 'falsum', the reason for this is that it is not a natural sign--its signification is merely conventional. The inference from the apprehension of the spoken term 'falsum' to the understanding of every falsehood is thus, at least, only accidentally valid, since it depends on the contingent fact of the term's conventional imposition. Compare the reply carefully with the text of the original objection, par. 136.

89. Cf. above, p. #29 and n. 37.

90. The problem presented by the arguments against the third opinion has already been observed. Cf. above, pp. #23f.

91. pars. 164-258.

92. The progression from par. 176 to par. 183 is a good example of this.

93. pars. 164-224.

94. The second seems to begin at par. 188, with the setting up of a new casus. Par. 198 begins abruptly with "Tertio, principaliter arguitur...".

95. The argument in pars. 168-170 is structured as follows: In par. 168, the opponent states the author's position, to which the author assents in par. 169. Then the opponent argues on this basis to the opposite conclusion, in par. 170.

In par. 173, with the premiss 'a est propositio vera', understand 'per te'.

In pars. 186-187, with each occurrence of 'aliquo' or 'aliquo alio', understand 'complexo', or a similar word. The point is not that the term does not stand for anything whatsoever, but that it does not stand for any proposition.

Note the use of the word 'propositio' in par. 200.

The argument in par. 235 seems to be based on the implicit assumption that Sortes and Plato begin to speak simultaneously.

In par. 238, understand the second part of the antecedent, namely, 'et secunda pars disjunctivae a me prolatae est falsa', as an hypothesis.

96. The following summary is a distillation of the author's presentation in pars. 164-258.

97. Cf. par. 111.

98. pars. 122 and 130.

99. By an "appropriate" proposition is meant, for instance, a disjunctive proposition for which the term 'disjunctiva' in an insoluble can stand, or a proposition spoken by Sortes for which the term 'falsum' can stand in the proposition 'Aliqua propositio dicta a Sorte est falsa'. There may or may not be other propositions which are irrelevant to the insoluble at hand.

1. Cf. par. 186.

2.. Cf. the fifth supposition, par. 109.

3. Cf. par. 200.

4. Cf. par. 197.

5. Cf. par. 193.

6. Cf. par. 209.

7. Cf. par. 164.

8. Cf. par. 186.

9. Cf. par. 193.

10. pars. 194-195, 197.

11. par. 205.

12. Cf. e.g., pars. 188-190, 210-213.

13. par. 224. It is not clear how propositions such as 'Propositio est' and 'Verum est' fully satisfy the author's criteria for an insoluble. For it is not the case that from them "sequitur utraque pars contradictionis" (par. 1).

14. par. 224.

15. Cf. par. 45; and par. 46: "quamvis ista opinio sit vera...". On the latter remark, see n. 99 to p. #23.

16. Cf. par. 226.

17. par. 239. The argument in par. 239 says nothing about the supposition of the term 'falsa' in the insoluble, but only about the supposition of 'disjunctiva'. It would seem, however, that the author's argument in par. 226 would apply here as well.

18. par. 254.

19. par. 256. The casus posited in par. 255 stipulates only "Et sit ista propositio omnis propositio, quae sit a." This is clearly not sufficient, for, as is evident in the reply, the solution depends on the notion that it is Sortes who utters the proposition.

20. par. 256.

21. par. 257.

22. par. 258.

23. Cf. above, n. 58 to p. #14, n. 3 to p. #23, n. 39 to p. #30, n. 71 to p. #35, and the edition below, passim,

but especially par. 146: "iste terminus 'significare' convertitur cum isto termino 'supponere'".

24. Cf. above, pp. \*32f.
25. pars. 71-72. Cf. above, n. 17 to p. \*27.
26. Cf. above, pp. \*23f.
27. par. 164.
28. par. 225.
29. par. 226.
30. Cf. par. 186, and above, pp. \*40f.
31. par. 55; cf. par. 52.
32. Cf. pars. 89 and 98.
33. Cf. par. 205.
34. par. 98.
35. LM, II, 15, ff. 192rb-195vb.
36. On ampliation, see FL, 200-202 (secs. 28.01-28.12), and TC, 53-58.
37. LM I, 2, f. 22ra.
38. Ibid., ff. 22ra-23va.
39. Albert of Saxony also explicitly asserted the principle--without discussion. Cf. albert of Saxony, Perutilis logica, II, 10, Venice, 1518, f. 16rb:  
 "Decima regula: Quando non ponitur terminus ampliatus in aliqua propositione, tunc subjectum illius non ampliatur, sed per propositionem illam denotatur solum supponere pro eo quod est...."
40. William Heytesbury, Regulae solvendi sophismata, c. 1, Venice, 1494 (Hain #8437), ff. 4va-7rb. On Heytesbury, cf. Weisheipl, "Ockham and Some Mertonians," 195-199.



41. Cf. Weisheipl, "Roger Swyneshed, O.S.B., Logician, Natural Philosopher, and Theologian," in Oxford Studies Presented to Daniel Callus, 245.

42. Cf. Weisheipl, "Ockham and Some Mertonians," 196 and 209f.

43. Weisheipl, "Roger Swyneshed...", 244f.; and Curtis Wilson, William Heytesbury: Medieval Logic and the Rise of Mathematical Physics, 25-28.

44. Cf. above, p. #18.

45. A Catalogue of the Harleian Manuscripts in the British Museum..., III, p. 11.

46. John E. Murdoch and Edward A. Synan, "Two Questions on the Continuum: Walter Chatton (?), O.F.M. and Adam Wodeham, O.F.M.," Franciscan Studies 26 (1966), "Introduction", II, pp. 225-232. Several items in the codex have already been edited and published. Cf. the references, Ibid.

Synan argues "that the gatherings were bound together and paginated before the five scribes copied the twenty-eight pieces that constitute the collection." (Ibid., 225). This statement is based on the observation that "although the folios of this codex are paginated in succession to the number 159, the fact that eight folios (numbers 9, 10, 32, 44, <45>, 46, 65, and 66) are wanting has occasioned no gaps in the texts that bridge the missing leaves." (Ibid.) Presumably, then, the codex was first bound together and paginated, then several leaves were cut out, and finally the texts were copied.

In fact, however, there are no texts that bridge the missing leaves. The first item in the codex ends on f. 8v. Folios 9 and 10 are missing, and folios 11 and 12 are blank. The second text in the codex begins on f. 13r. Likewise, the third text in the codex ends on f. 42v. Folios 43-46 are missing. The fourth text, the treatise on insolubilia edited below, begins on f. 46r. Similarly, the eighth item in the codex ends on f. 64v. Folios 65 and 66 are lacking. The ninth text begins on f. 67r.

Thus, in no case does the text of a work pass over the missing leaves. Instead, in each case, the gaps occur after the end of one text and before the beginning of the next. From this it must be concluded, not that the leaves were cut out before the texts were copied, but rather probably just the opposite. For, had the leaves been

removed before the texts were copied, one would have expected that, in one or more of the cases, the text would have bridged the gap. It is not likely mere coincidence that, in each of three cases, the text preceeding the missing leaves happens to end in the second verso column of the last folio before the cut. It argues, on the contrary, that the cuts were made after the texts had been copied.

This conclusion is supported by the fact that on the verso sides of five folios are found "catchwords" (ff. 24, 36, 54, 136, 148). A catchword is useless if the folios are bound together before the text is copied, and even more useless if the folios are also paginated. Thus, it may be plausibly argued, not only did the scribe's work precede the cutting out of the leaves, but it preceeded even the binding together of the gatherings.

47. Cf. above, n. 19 to p. #7.

48. In this regard, cf. Walter W. Skeat, ed., The Vision of William concerning Piers the Plowman, v. 1, B. Passus xii, p. 382, line 269: "Ne of Sortes ne of Salamon no scripture can telle." I am grateful to Mr. Peter Erb for calling my attention to this line.

49. Cf. below, pp. 140f.

Notes to the Text

(to par. 1)

1. In the MS the treatise begins without title. The title "Insolubilia" is taken from the explicit, p. 124.
2. A marginal note is obscured between the folios of the codex; only a superscript 'm' is clearly visible in the microfilm.
3. Throughout the treatise, the scribe has left a blank space at the beginning of each major division of the text, so that the capital might be filled in later. In fact, however, the capitals were never supplied. Other such blank spaces are found at the beginnings of pars. 24, 45, 65, 103, 133, 162, 164, 225, 237.
4. Aristotle, Physios, II, 3, 194b32-195a2, especially: "Cum enim dicitur 'Quare ambulat Sortes?', et dicemus propter hoc, quod suum corpus sanetur. Et hoc dicto, reddimus causam. Et similiter illa quae sunt apud motum alterius inter illud et finem intentum, verbi gratia, sanitas ex diminutione et purgatione et potatione medicinae et instrumentis, quoniam omnia ista intenduntur propter finem." (Junt., v. 4, f. 60a-b).
5. The reading is highly conjectural. The abbreviation is illegible, and may have been touched up, although there is clearly a 't' written superscript on the right. 'Sit' or some similar word is demanded by the context. The sense is clear in any case.
6. Averroes, In II Physicorum, tx. c. 31 (on 195a15-26), esp.: "Doctor induxit ratiocinationes super hoc, et dixit: 'Illud enim propter quid', etc., id est, quoniam illud propter quid, quia est nobilius illis, quae quaeruntur propter illud, est bonum intentum per illas res, et ideo est causa omnium illarum. Agens enim et materia non sunt, nisi propter ultimum finem." (Junt., v. 4, f. 61g-h).
7. marg. Definitio patet <ge>neraliter juxta <o>mnes. The note is partially obscured between the folios. Cf. above, pp. #9-#11.



8. marg. Restat quattuor <opini> ones, partially obscured between the folios.

9. MS adds vel falsam, but deletes it.

10. MS has pro posito.

11. MS has falsum.

12. MS adds ad, but del.

13. The meaning of this last sentence is not altogether clear. It does not seem to conform to the exposition of the fourth opinion given in pars. 66-67.

14. marg. <Prima> opinio, partially obscured between the folios.

15. casum...negat: MS has 'simpliciter negat casum insolubilium', with a letter 'b' over 'simpliciter', a letter 'a' over 'casum' and a letter 'a' over 'insolubilium'. Throughout the MS., the scribe uses the letters 'a' and 'b' in this manner to indicate words to be inserted into the text, or to indicate a change in word order. The word or words marked with an 'a' are to be placed in the text before the letter 'b'. Other examples occur in pars. 24, 107, 112 and 155.

16. marg. <Secund>a opinio, partially obscured between the folios.

17. marg. <Tertia> opinio, partially obscured between

18. marg. <Quarta> opinio, partially obscured between the folios.

19. MS adds an illegible abbreviation, but expunctuates it.

20. i.e., the third in the list of conclusions in John Dumbleton's treatment of insolubilia, on which the present discussion is based. Cf. SLPN, f. 5ra: "Tertia conclusio: Nulla propositio in anima per intentionem (a/b) simplicem, sed per complexum, comprehenditur." For other texts of Dumbleton, cf. below, Appendix A, pp. 126-128.

21. i.e., Dumbleton's fourth. SLPN, f. 5va:  
 "Quarta conclusio sequens ex tertia est haec: Cujuscumque  
 propositionis significantis pro complexo subjectum vel  
 praedicatum est propositio, et alteri vel utrique  
 propositio correspondet."

22. MS has uterque.

23. The sentence is somewhat garbled. Cf. par. 21  
 for a more intelligible statement of this conclusion.

24. MS has aequaliter. For aliququaliter, cf. par. 21.

25. MS unclear.

26. Cf. Dumbleton's analogous argument, SLPN, f. 5va,  
 and below, Appendix A, c), pp. 127f. This opinion bears  
 some resemblance to the fourth in Paul of Venice's list  
 of fifteen solutions (LM II, 15, f. 192va). Cf. above,  
 p. #15.

27. marg. <Contra> opinionem primam, partially obscured  
between the folios.

28. in the genitive. The author frequently uses  
 letters for the oblique cases, as well as for the  
 nominative.

29. Cf. SLPN, f. 4ra, and below, Appendix A, d), p. 128.

30. corr. in MS.

31. MS adds termini 'falsum', but del.

32. MS has ea.

33. Cf., rather, Dumbleton's arguments against the  
 third opinion (Cf. above, n. 29).

34. MS adds s, but del.

35. MS adds suppositionem, but del.

36. MS has: a.

37. MS adds non, but del.

38. MS has est. Emend for the sense of the argument.
39. On the argument in this par., cf. above, n. 66 to  
p. \*16.
40. marg. Secundo arguitur.
41. MS adds a false abbrev. for aeque, but del.
42. On the argument in this par., cf. above, n. 66 to  
p. \*16.
43. On the meaning of this passage, Ibid.
44. marg. Deducitur conclusio.
45. On the argument in this par., cf. above, n. 66 to  
p. \*16.
46. corr. from stiat.
47. corr. from non.
48. The scribe had written 'affirmare', and then  
corrected it to 'affirmatur' without deleting the 're'.
49. On the argument in this par., cf. above, n. 66 to  
p. \*16.
50. marg. Tertio arguitur.
51. MS adds est, but del.
52. MS adds est, but del.
53. MS has what appears to be 'es' with a stroke over  
it ('ens'?), followed by 'et'.
54. MS adds est, but del.
55. On the argument in this par., cf. above, n. 66 to  
p. \*16.
56. On the argument in pars. 13-17, Ibid.
57. Reading uncertain.



58. MS adds suppositionem, but del.

59. MS adds est, but del.

60. MS adds 4 5, but del. Marg. Quinto (sic)  
contra quartam conclusionem.

61. MS has correspondet.

62. marg. Nota bene.

63. marg. Contra hoc arguitur.

64. MS abbrev. ydep<sup>ca</sup>.

65. Some idea of the meaning of 'praedicatio directa' can be gained from the example of a, b, c and d, at the end of the paragraph, and from the fact that it is opposed to 'praedicatio identica'. Ockham uses the expression 'praedicatio directa' at least twice, associating it with true propositions and with predicating a genus of a species: "Aliter accipitur 'subiectum' stricte et sic dicitur subiectum omne illud, quod subicitur in propositione vera, ubi est praedicatio directa, et sic est homo subiectum respectu animalis, sed non econverso" (SL, I, 30, p. 85); "Aliter accipitur 'praedicatum', quod praedicatum in propositione vera, in qua est praedicatio directa. Et sic 'animal' est praedicatum respectu 'hominis,' sed non respectu 'lapidis.'" (SL, I, 31, p. 86).

66. Posterior Analytics, I, 4, 73b16-24, James of Venice tr., PL 64, 717: "Quae ergo dicuntur in simpliciter scibilibus per se sic sunt, sicut esse praedicatis, aut inesse, propter ipsaque sunt et ex necessitate, non enim contingat non esse, aut simpliciter, aut opposita, ut lineae aut rectum; aut obliquum, et numero aut par aut impar, est enim contrariorum, aut privatio, aut contradictio in eodem genere, ut par aut impar in numeris secundum quod consequitur; quare si necesse est affirmare, aut negare, necesse est et quae sunt per se, inesse." The point of the reference seems to be that, within the sphere of predication, the disjunction "identical or direct" holds, so that the statement that every predication is either identical predication or direct predication is equivalent, within the limited sphere of predication, to the Law of Excluded Middle.

67. MS adds de, but del.
68. The description does not appear in this treatise.  
Cf. above, p. \*6.
69. MS has distincta.
70. MS has demonstrabile.
71. MS adds propositionis, but del.
72. MS adds a false abbrev. for demonstrativae, but del.
73. MS has est.
74. This seems to be a rather interpretative reference to Posterior Analytics II, 5. There Aristotle argues that essential nature cannot be inferred by the method of division. Cf. esp. 91b11-23, James of Venice tr., PL 64, 747: "At vero neque per divisionem via est syllogizare sicut in resolutione circa figuras dictum est. Nequaquam enim necesse fir rem illam esse, cum haec sint, sed sicut neque inducens demonstrat. Non enim oportet conclusionem interrogare, neque in concedendo esse, sed necesse est esse cum sint illa, et si non dicat respondens, utrum homo animal est, aut inanimatum? postea accipit animal, non syllogizat; iterum omne animal, aut gressibile, aut aquaticum, accipit gressibile, et hominem esse totum animal gressibile, non necesse erit ex dictis, sed accipit et hoc. Differt autem nihil in multis, aut in paucis sic dicere, idem enim est." A much more explicit statement occurs in the passage of the Prior Analytics ("in resolutione circa figuras") referred to in the first sentence. Cf. Prior Analytics I, 31, 46b5-13.
75. Reading uncertain.
76. MS has distincta.
77. MS has demonstrare.
78. marg. <Quinto> arguitur, partially obscured between the folios.
79. Termination unclear in MS.
80. MS adds s, but del.

81. MS adds ma, but del.

82. MS adds est, but del.

83. in ista propositione: MS has et ista propositio. The emendation is made in order to conform to the major premiss: "quia subjectum in ista propositione..."; and to the singular verb: 'supponit'.

84. MS has quam.

85. marg. Secunda opinio.

86. marg. Prima suppositio.

87. marg. Secunda suppositio.

88. marg. Conclusio.

89. et significat...falsum: MS has et se esse falsum significat, with a 'b' before the 'se' and an 'a' over 'significat'. Cf. above, n. 15 to par. 4.

90. marg. Casus pona<tur>, partially obscured between the folios.

91. Throughout this paragraph, the author seems to use 'a' and 'b' interchangeably for the proposition 'Sortes dicit falsum'.

92. marg. Cum casu <arguitur> quodlibet inso<lubile> esse falsum, partially obscured between the folios.

93. a b: MS has ab.

94. significat se non: MS has non significat se.

95. MS has cum.

96. The originator of this opinion is unknown. It agrees substantially with the solution of Albert of Saxony (Cf. ASI). The author does not seem to have had Albert in mind, however, for Albert's suppositiones and conclusiones do not include those listed in par. 24. Cf. above, n. 73 to p. #18.

97. MS adds a vertical stroke, but del.



98. Perhaps it is this variation on the second opinion that is attributed to a certain Robert Fland (i.e., of Flanders?) in MS Bruges, Bibl. publ. de la ville, 497, f. 43rb: "Insolubile est propositio signans primo et principaliter sicut est, et ex consequenti aliter quam est...." Buridan mentions what is perhaps this same position in his Sophismata c. 8, soph. 7, Eng. tr. by Theodore Kermit Scott, John Buridan: Sophisms on Meaning and Truth, 195. Cf. above, pp. \*18f.

99. In par. 26, the phrase 'istud dictum solum est sophisticum' clearly implies a pejorative use of the term 'sophisticum'. Here, however, the phrase 'sophistice arguitur sic' introduces an argument that is cogent and penetrating, one which is by no means "sophisticum" in the pejorative sense.

The term 'sophista' was used in the Middle Ages, without pejorative connotation, to denote "undergraduates" who took "an active part in the public disputations de sophismatibus, for which reason they were known as 'sophistae'" (James A. Weisheipl, O.P., "Curriculum of the Faculty of Arts at Oxford in the early Fourteenth Century," MS 26 (1964), 134. Cf. also Ibid., n. 32). The author of the present treatise twice uses the work in this sense in par. 246. In the present paragraph, then, the word 'sophistice' seems to be used in a sense derived from this usage, and may thus be glossed approximately as follows: "as one would argue in a disputation de sophismatibus". Thus used, no disparagement is intended.

1. scil.: secundario, et non principaliter, aliter quam est.

2. marg. Contra istam opinionem.

3. MS adds p, but del.

4. Cf. Lewis and Short, A Latin Dictionary, s.v. "color" IIB2b: "In a bad sense, t.t. [i.e., technical term], an artful concealment of a fault, a pretext, palliation, excuse." From a rhetorico-legal tradition. Cf., e.g., Cicero, De oratore III, 25 (Oxford, 1783, I, 303): "Ornatur igitur oratio genere primum, et quasi colore quodam; et succo suo"; Quintilian, Institutio oratoria IV.11.88 (Butler ed., II, 98): "Sunt quaedam et



falsae expositiones, quarum in foro duplex genus est: alterum...; alterum, quod est tuendum dicentis ingenio. Id interim ad solam verecundiam pertinet, unde etiam mihi videtur dici color, interim ad quaestionem." Cf. also Vocabularium iurisprudentiae romanae, s.v. 'color'. The sense here is that, if the first supposition is refuted, the deductions from it will lose even the pretext of validity.

5. MS adds falsum, but del.

6. marg. Contra primam rationem.

7. MS adds quod, but del.

8. marg. Secundo contra rationem.

9. MS adds quod, but del.

10. MS adds totius, but del.

11. marg. Tertio contra rationem.

12. Abbrev. illegible.

13. The scribe has used this word three times in this paragraph, writing it in each case 'depta', with no abbreviation mark of any kind.

14. marg. Confirmatur ista.

15. in marg.

16. Categories, 5, 4a34-b2, editio composita (vulgata), L. Minio-Paluello, ed., AL I, 2, p. 53: "oratio autem et placitum ipsa quidem immobilia omnino perseverant, cum vero res movetur contrarium circa eam fit; oratio namque permanet eadem eo quod sedeat aliquis, cum vero res mota sit, aliquando quidem vera, aliquando autem falsa fit;..."

17. marg. Quarto contra rationem.

18. interlin.

19. marg. Quinto contra rationem.

20. MS seems to have 'agat'. Yet, there is an oblique stroke over the second 'a', as if it were an 'i'.

21. De anima III, 9, 432b20, Moerbeke tr., with St. Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotelis librum De anima commentarium, Angeli M. Pirotta, O.P., ed., 259: "Si igitur natura nihil facit frustra,..." Cf. also De anima III, 12, 434a30, ed. cit., 274: "...si nihil frustra facit natura."

22. MS has propositionum.

23. marg. Confirmatur ratio.

24. MS adds pars, but del.

25. The MS seems to have read 'terminorum', but the first part of the word has been crossed out.

26. MS. has nam.

27. marg. Contra hoc, quod pars potest supponere pro toto cuius est pars.

28. corr. from quolibet.

29. marg. Sexto contra rationem.

30. Soph. el. 13, 173a34-38, James of Venice, tr., PL 64, 1022d-23a: "Duplum autem, et duplum dimidii idem est. Si igitur duplum est dimidii duplum, erit dimidii dimidii duplum, et rursus si pro duplo duplum dimidii ponatur, ter erit dictum dimidii dimidii dimidii duplum (PL has 'diplum')."

31. corr. from dubium.

32. corr. from dubium..

33. MS has sed. Emend for sense, and to parallel Aristotle's text.

34. marg. Quod nulla propositio extra animam potest supponere pro toto cuius est pars.

35. The description does not appear in this treatise. Cf. above, p. #6.

36. marg. Contra secundam suppositionem.

37. For this rule, cf. TC, pp. 87f. (rule #2.01), and references there.

38. Reading uncertain.

39. MS abbrev has been touched up, but seems to read 'quo'. MS adds conceditur, but del.

40. It is the copulative hypothetical proposition that is the basis of the argument in this paragraph. For the kinds of hypothetical propositions, cf., e.g., SL, II, 1, p. 217.

41. For this rule, cf. TC, pp. 87f. (rule #2.02), and references there.

42. marg. Tertio (sic) <opinio>, partially obscured between the folios.

43. MS adds pri, but del.

44. MS has nulla. For the emendation, cf. the parallel statements of this principle, pars. 3 and 55.

45. The opinion is that of William of Ockham. Cf. SL III, 3, 45, f. 109rb-vb. The 'tertio incidentaliter' passage arises from a confusion. Contrast it with the statement of the opinion in par. 4. On this opinion, cf. above, pp. #20-#22, and Ockham's text, below, Appendix B, b), pp. 130-134.

46. MS spelling loyca.

47. marg. Hic arguitur, proban <do> conclusiones ex principiis, partially obscured between the folios.

48. marg. Prima con<clusio>(?), partially obscured between the folios.

49. marg. Prima probatur.

50. i.e., Darii.

51. The following text expresses the same thought, although it does not use the term 'inferiora': "Termini categorematici finitam et certam habent significationem, sicut hoc nomen 'homo' significat omnes homines, et hoc



nomen 'animal' omnia animalia, et hoc nomen 'albedo' omnes albedines." SL I, 4, p. 15.

52. marg. Secundo contra <opinionem>, partially obscured between the folios.

53. There seems to be no single text where this notion is explicitly expressed. It can be gathered, however, from a combination of several of Ockham's statements, such as the following. According to the first of these texts, the signification of terms by imposition requires their subordination to concepts or intentions in the soul. The second passage argues that these universal concepts are acts of understanding by which singulars are understood in a confused manner.

a) SL, I, 1, p. 9): "Dico autem voces esse signa subordinata conceptibus seu intentionibus animae, non quia proprie accipiendo hoc vocabulum 'signa' ipsae voces semper significant ipsos conceptus animae primo et proprie, sed quia voces imponuntur ad significandum illa eadem, quae per conceptus mentis significantur, ita quod conceptus primo naturaliter aliquid significat, et secundario vox significat illud idem, in tantum quod voce instituta ad significandum aliquod significatum per conceptum mentis, si conceptus ille mutaret significatum suum, eo ipso ipsa vox sine nova institutione suum significatum permutaret.... Et sicut dictum est de vocibus respectu passionum seu intentionum conceptuum, eodem modo proportionaliter quantum ad hoc tenendum est de his quae sunt in scripto respectu vocum."

b) Commentarium in Perihermenias, c. 1, Boehner ed., in his "The Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham", Traditio 4 (1946), 323f.: "...Accipio cognitionem communem sive confusam, quae correspondet isti voci 'homo' vel isti voci 'animal', et quaero: aut aliquid intelligitur ista cognitione, aut nihil. Non potest dici, quod nihil;... Si aliquid cognoscitur ista cognitione, aut aliquid in anima aut aliquid extra animam. Si aliqua res extra animam, et non res universalis, quia nulla talis est,... ergo aliqua res singularis cognoscitur tali cognitione; sed non magis una quam alia; ergo vel quaelibet vel nulla; sed non nulla, ergo quaelibet intelligitur. Et ita, quando intellexerem omnem hominem vel formarem istam propositionem in anima: Homo est animal, ego intellexerem omnem hominem, et ita intellexerem et cognoscerem multos homines, quos numquam novi nec de quibus umquam cogitavi. Quod videtur inconveniens....

"Ad primum potest dici, quod tali intellectione confusa intelliguntur res singulares extra, sicut habere intellectionem hominis confusam non est aliud quam habere unam cognitionem, qua non magis intelligitur unus homo quam alius, et tamen quod tali cognitione magis cognoscitur sive intelligitur homo quam asinus...."

54. corr. in MS.

55. secundum quid propositio est: The phrase is rather elliplical. 'Secundum quid' does not here mean "in a certain respect", but rather "according to the nature or 'quidditas'". For 'propositio est', understand 'per quod propositio est' or a similar phrase. This interpretation is supported by the 'eadem natura in specie' of the last sentence in the paragraph.

56. The repetition seems to be likely a scribal error. The slight variation of word order does not seem to change the sense of the expression.

57. corr. from paris.

58. SL III, 3, 38, f. 107vb. Cf. below, Appendix B, a), pp. 129f.

59. marg. Nota bene.

60. MS adds supponit, but del.

61. marg. Probatur secunda conclusio.

62. MS adds iste termini, but del.

63. marg. Secundo contra opinionem.

64. Here and in par. 55, Ockham's doctrine can be gathered from the following text (SL, I, 72, pp. 194f.): "Pro quo est intellegendum, quod tunc terminus supponit personaliter, quando supponit pro suis significatis vel pro his, quae fuerunt sua significata vel erunt vel possunt esse. Et sic intelligendum est prius dictum. Quia dictum est prius, quod 'significare' uno modo sic accipitur. Hoc tamen intelligendum est, quod non respectu cuiuscumque verbi supponit pro illis, sed pro illis, quae significat stricte accipiendo 'significare', supponere potest respectu cuiuscumque

verbi, si aliqua talia significet. Sed pro illis, quae fuerunt sua significata, non potest supponere nisi respectu verbi de praeterito.

"Et ideo quaelibet talis propositio est distinguenda, eo quod talis terminus potest supponere pro his, quae sunt, vel pro his quae fuerunt. Similiter pro his, quae erunt, non potest supponere nisi respectu verbi de futuro; et ideo ista propositio est distinguenda, eo quod terminus potest supponere pro his, quae sunt, vel pro his, quae erunt. Similiter pro his, quae possunt esse significata, et non sunt, non potest supponere nisi respectu verbi de possibili vel de contingenti; et ideo omnes tales sunt distinguendae, eo quod subiectum potest supponere pro his, quae sunt, vel pro his, quae possunt esse, vel pro his, quae contingunt esse."

On this notion of "ampliation", cf. the discussion in FL 200-202 (secs. 28.01-28.12), and TC 53-58. (Both discussions follow primarily the texts of Albert of Saxony.)

The principle that the author here attributes to Ockham is of fundamental importance to the author's own solution. Cf. above, pp. #47-#49.

65. marg. Tertio contra opinionem.

66. marg. Quarto contra opinionem.

67. Cf. Perierm. 6, 17a34-36, p. 9: "Et sit hoc contradictio, affirmatio et negatio oppositae; dico autem opponi eiusdem de eodem, non autem aequivoce et quaecumque cetera talium determinamus contra sophisticas importunitates." On the historical significance of this passage in the development of theories of fallacy, cf. L.M. De Rijk, Logica Modernorum: A Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic, I: On the Twelfth Century Theories of Fallacy, passim.

68. MS adds non, but del.

69. MS del. (?)

70. MS adds ab, but del.

71. marg. Contra secundum.

72. Cf. above, n. 64 to par. 52.

73. marg. Secundo.



74. MS adds rationem, but del.
75. MS adds verum, but del.
76. MS has b, corr. interlin. to a.
77. MS adds Probo consequentiam, but del.
78. interlin.
79. MS spelling loyce. Cf. par. 46.
80. marg. Tertio.
81. MS adds f, but del.
82. MS adds Sorte, but del.
83. marg. Quarto.
84. in marg.
85. corr. from terminus.
86. This or a similar addition seems necessary in order to make the consequence work.
87. marg. Quinto.
88. si quod: in marg.
89. marg. Nota divisionem. Cf. below, n. 90.
90. marg. Contra secundam partem divisionis. There seems to be a lacuna here. The "divisio" mentioned in this and the previous marginal note does not appear to refer to anything in the text as it stands in the MS. Moreover, the present paragraph is clearly (cf. the last sentence) a reply to an argument based on the assumption that some term in the proposition which Socrates says stands "confuse tantum". But nowhere above has this been mentioned. Judging from the form of the reply, the missing argument presumably maintained that the argument in par. 60 does not hold, because some extreme in a stands confuse tantum.
91. MS has confusa.



92. marg. Sexto.
93. MS has una.
94. MS has particula.
95. MS adds aliquam aliam, but del.
96. scil. ponitur.
97. marg. Tertio dicit ista opinio.
98. See the discussion above, pp. \*21f.
99. MS adds dicta, but del.
1. MS has one extra minim.
2. marg. Quarta opinio.
3. Abbrev. unclear.
4. MS has quarto (4<sup>o</sup> for 4).
5. Abbrev. had one extra minim, but corr.
6. MS adds be, but del.
7. MS adds necessariis, but del.
8. marg. Hic ostendit definitionem primam istius opinionis.
9. marg. Secunda definitio.
10. marg. Suppositio prima.
11. marg. Suppositio secunda.
12. marg. Conclusio prima.
13. marg. Conclusio secunda.
14. marg. Tertia conclusio.
15. The scribe had written 'nullum', but deleted this and inserted 'omne' above the line.

16. marg. Haec tertia arguitur.
17. Emend from the statement of the first conclusion, par. 66.
18. MS has verum.
19. For this rule, cf. TC 88 (rule #2.05), and references there.
20. MS adds in, but del.
21. The author of this opinion is unknown. It corresponds perhaps to the sixth opinion in Paul of Venice's list of fifteen solutions. Cf. LM II, 15, f. 192va. On this opinion, cf. above, pp. #25-#27.
22. marg. Contra quartam op<ionem>, partially obscured between the folios.
23. MS adds a false start for 'rationem', but del.
24. MS leaves a blank space here, for no apparent reason, at the beginning of a line.
25. aliter quam: MS has aliququaliter. With 'aliququaliter' the conclusion would in no way follow from the premisses, nor would it prove the consequence, as the author claims. 'Aliter quam' seems demanded by both considerations.
26. marg. Confirmatur consequentia.
27. marg. Secundo contra op<inionem>, partially obscured between the folios.
28. Termination unclear in MS.
29. interlin.
30. On the arguments in pars. 71 and 72, cf. above, n. 17 to p. #27.
31. marg. Tertia contra opinionem.
32. marg. Quarto contra opinionem.

33. MS adds ista, but del.

34. Perhaps deleted in MS.

35. MS adds verae, but del.

36. marg. Quinto contra opinionem.

37. Abbrev. unclear.

38. A highly interpretative reference (ut colligi potest) to Posterior Analytics II, 5, esp. 91b11-23, James of Venice, tr., PL 64, 747. For the text, cf. above, n. 74 to par. 20. The remark there about the passage from the Prior Analytics is applicable here as well.

39. marg. Sexto contra conclusionem.

40. MS adds fass, but del.

41. De anima III, 6, 430b26f. In trans. with Averroes' commentary, F. Stuart Crawford, ed., Averrois Cordubensis commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros, 463: "Et dicere aliquid de aliquo, sicut affirmatio, et omne compositum, est verum vel falsum."

42. Averroes, In III De anima, tx. c. 26, Crawford ed., loc. cit.: "Et predicare per intellectum aliquid de aliquo, sicut affirmatio et negatio, est compositio per actionem intellectus. Et omne compositum est verum vel falsum. In intellectu igitur materiali semper inveniuntur veritas et falsitas admixte; et hoc est proprium huic intellectui."

43. MS has hoc.

44. marg. Septimo contra conclusionem.

45. Periherm. 4, 17a1-5, p. 8: "Est autem oratio omnis quidem significativa non sicut instrumentum, sed (quemadmodum dictum est) secundum placitum; enuntiativa vero non omnis, sed in qua verum vel falsum inest; non autem in omnibus, ut deprecatio oratio est, sed neque vera neque falsa."

46. Prior Analytics I, 1, 24a16f., Boethius tr., L. Minio-Paluello, ed., AL III, 1, p. 5: "Propositio igitur est oratio affirmativa vel negative alicuius de aliquo."

47. MS adds ca, but del.

48. marg.: Aristoteles, Periermenias.

49. Perierm. 10, 20a34f., p. 21: "Semper enim vel veram esse vel falsam necesse est negationem." The edition refers to MS Carnutensis, bibl. munic. 497, which has the 'esse' after 'falsam', and 'negationem' and 'necesse est' transposed, as in the present paragraph.

50. marg.: Boethius, primo Topicorum.

51. Boethius, De differentiis topicis, I, PL 64, 1174B: "Propositio est oratio verum falsumve significans."

52. marg. Anselmus (MS spelling Ancelmus).

53. MS spelling Ancelmus.

54. Anselm, De veritate, ca. 2, F.S. Schmitt ed., I, 178:

"M. Quid igitur tibi videtur ibi veritas?

"D. Nihil aliud scio nisi quia cum significat esse quod est, tunc est in ea veritas et est vera."

55. Reading uncertain.

56. Anselm, loc. cit.:

"M. Ad quid facta est affirmatio?

"D. Ad significandum esse quod est.

"M. Hoc ergo debet.

"D. Certum est.

"M. Cum ergo significat esse quod est, significat quod debet."

57. MS adds est vera, but del.

58. et...lineam: The phrase is slightly elliptical. Understand "et rectitudo sicut ad lineam", or a similar reading.



59. Anselm, op. cit., c. 11, p. 191:

"M. ...Aut si de alicuius corporis absentis linea dubitetur an recta sit, et monstrari potest quia in nullam partem flectitur: nonne ratione colligitur quia rectam illam esse necesse est?"

60. MS adds f, but del.

61. marg: Aristoteles, 6<sup>o</sup> Metaphysicae.

62. A highly interpretative reference, read presumably in the light of Averroes' commentary (cf. below, n. 63): Metaphysics E, 4, 1027b17-22, f. 151L-M: "Et loquamur de vero ente, quod non est sicut falsum. Est enim in compositione et divisione, et universaliter in divisione contradictoriorum: quia habet affirmationem, secundum quod est verum, et secundum quod est compositum habet negationem aliquam, et secundum quod est divisum habet falsitatem istius divisionis, quae est contradictio."

63. Averroes, In VI Meta., tx. c. 8 (on Meta. E, 4, 1027b17-22), Junt. v. 8, f. 152D-E: "...id est, vera enim affirmativa significat compositionem in entibus, et vera negativa divisionem. Et quia idem ens impossibile est quod sit compositum et divisum insimul, ideo, si affirmativa fuerit vera, negativa erit falsa. Et quasi dicat, affirmativa autem quia est vera, est ens in compositione, quasi haberet negationem, cuius falsitas existit in divisione. Quoniam cum affirmativa est vera per compositionem, negativa est falsa per divisionem. Et similiter, quando negativa est vera per divisionem, affirmativa est falsa per compositionem."

64. MS adds contra positio, but del.

65. MS has alia.

66. interlin.

67. The sense is: "And now let this be a!"

68. MS has omnia.

69. Posterior Analytics II, 4, 91a14-17, James of Venice tr., PL 64, 746: "Syllogismus enim aliquid de aliquo monstrat per medium, sed quid est, proprium quidem est, et in eo quod quid est praedicatur, hoc autem necesse est converti."

70. The scribe has written one minim too few. Cf. below, n. 86 to par. 88.

71. MS adds eo quod Plato non est pater, but del.

72. Not to be found in Avicenna, Metaphysica, VI, 5. Cf. perhaps, however, Metaphysica, VI, 2, Venice, 1508, f. 91vb: "...unaquaeque igitur causa est simul cum suo causato... tunc omnis causa est cum suo causato... igitur verae causae simul sunt cum suis causatis"; and Ibid., VI, 3, f. 93rb: "In quantum autem causa nondum refertur ad causatum, causatum esse non est necesse, quia non est necesse suum esse, nisi in quantum causa refertur ad illud; et tunc fit; propter has igitur tres intentiones causa est dignior esse causati; igitur causa dignior est causato."

73. MS had similitate, but corr.

74. interlin.

75. The description does not appear in this treatise. Cf. above, p. #6.

76. De anima III, 6, 430b27-29, Crawford ed., 463: "Et non omnis intellectus, sed qui dicit quiditate rei, est verus, non qui dicit aliquid de aliquo."

77. Averroes, In III De anima, tx. c. 26, Crawford ed., 464: "Idest, et non in omni actione istius intellectus inveniuntur veritas et falsitas admixte, sed actio que est informatio est semper vera, non actio que est predicare aliquid de aliquo."

78. MS has ipsa.

79. Sic, terminus in anima... vera non est: in marg.

80. marg. Tertia contra positionem rationis (sic).

81. Reading uncertain.

82. MS adds 4 tam, but del.

83. MS has quarta.

84. interlin.

85. The scribe has written one minim too many.
86. The scribe has written one minim too few. Cf. above, n. 70 to par. 84.
87. MS adds a point, but del.
88. MS has definitionis. Cf. the last sentence of the par.
89. MS adds ipse, but del.
90. MS adds consequentia patet, but del.
91. marg. Hic secundo arguitur ad idem.
92. MS adds fuit, but del.
93. corr. from determinarat, or perhaps from declarat.
94. MS adds temporis, but del.
95. marg. Ostenditur quod (interlin.) definitio secundo (sic) sit insufficiens et falsa.
96. MS has alia, written out in full. Emend for sense.
97. For this rule, cf. TQ 88 (rule #2.05) and references there.
98. MS adds alia, but del.
99. On this par., cf. above, n. 22 to p. #28.
1. marg. Commune concluditur secundam definitionem esse falsam.
2. MS adds non, but del.
3. marg. Contra primam conclusionem.
4. MS has quae.
5. MS adds partes, but del.
6. MS seems to have veritati.



7. MS adds what is perhaps the beginning of a repetition of 'ut', but del. (?)

8. MS adds veritatem (?), but del.

9. The sentence is very obscure. The force of the 'non' carries over into 'exigit': non dependet...ut exigit, i.e., it does not depend...so that it requires-- i.e., it does not require. Ut exigit ad unum esse veritatem signi: so that it does not require the truth of a sign for a thing ("unum") to be (being=veritas significati?) It is not clear which is the subject of 'sequitur', 'veritas signi' or 'veritas significati'. In either case, it seems that the reason (eo quod...) is insufficient to establish what it is supposed to support, namely that the truth of that which is signified does not depend on the truth of the sign.

10. MS adds propositione, but del.

11. MS adds Sortis, but expunc.

12. MS adds ax, but del. (False start for 'Antichristi').

13. significatum falsum: MS has significato falso.

14. MS adds sicut, but del.

15. MS adds ax, but del. Cf. above, n. 12.

16. marg. Aristoteles.

17. Metaphysics Δ, 29, 1024b16-1025a12, passim, Junt. v. 8, f. 141F-L.

18. MS adds potest, but del.

19. MS leaves a blank space, in the middle of a line.

20. corr. from possent.

21. Not to be found in Soph. el. II (i.e., chs. 16ff.). But cf. perhaps, Soph. el., 6, 169a11-21 (in book I), James of Venice, tr., PL 64, 1015 (emphasis added): "Si igitur una propositio est quae unum de uno postulat, et simpliciter erit propositio talis interrogatio. Atqui quoniam syllogismus ex propositionibus est, redargutio autem syllogismus, et

redargutio erit ex propositionibus....contradictio, quod erat proprium redargutionis,.... This is the nearest Aristotle comes in the Soph. el. to making the statement attributed to him.

22. MS adds falsum, but del.
23. marg. Prima divisio.
24. Cf. above, pp. #30f.
25. The discussion does not appear in this treatise.  
Cf. above, p. #6.
26. marg. Secunda divisio.
27. marg. Tertia divisio.
28. MS adds insos, but del.
29. Cf. above, pp. #31-#33.
30. marg. Prima suppositio.
31. marg. Secunda suppositio.
32. marg. Tertia suppositio.
33. sicut praesentialiter: MS has praesentialiter sicut, with a 'b' over 'praesentialiter' and an 'a' over the 'sicut'. Cf. above, n. 15 to par. 4.
34. MS adds primo, but del.
35. marg. Quarta suppositio.
36. MS adds res, but del.
37. On the first four suppositions, cf. above, pp. #33-#35.
38. marg. Quinta suppositio.
39. Reading very uncertain.
40. MS has dubia.
41. MS has qui.

42. MS has aliquid.
43. TBI, f. 136vb. Cf. above, pp. \*28f.
44. corr. from non.
45. TBI, loc. cit. Cf. above, p. \*29.
46. Cf. above, p. \*29.
47. MS adds re, but del.
48. marg. Prima descriptio.
49. MS has arrarante.
50. marg. Secunda descriptio.
51. MS has apparante.

52. MS has incomplexe. This must surely be a corruption. The descriptions are never elaborated any further in the treatise, despite the promise in the last sentence of the paragraph (although they are referred to briefly in par. 258). Yet, emending 'incomplexe' to 'complexa' or 'complexum' makes sense of the description, and conforms to the examples of "hypothetical" insolubles given later in the treatise (pars. 236-257).

53. MS adds divisioe, but del.
54. MS has quinto.

55. Clearly an error. There are only three divisions (par. 104). The last is between categorical and hypothetical insolubles, but it is hard to see how these two descriptions could be said to "follow" from that division. There is a fifth supposition (par. 109) and a fifth conclusion (par. 130), but neither of these seems to be relevant here. In the absence of the author's promised discussion, there is insufficient information to determine the correct reading.

56. MS adds patebit, but del.
57. marg. Prima conclusio.



58. MS adds nullam aliam rem, but del.
59. MS has illam.
60. praecise naturaliter: MS has naturaliter praecise, with a 'b' over 'naturaliter' and an 'a' over 'praecise'. Cf. above, n. 15 to par. 4.
61. MS has quilibet.
62. MS adds quodlibet, but del.
63. MS has esse.
64. interlin.
65. MS leaves a blank space, in the middle of a line.
66. marg. Secunda conclusio.
67. Perierm. 1, 16af., p. 5: "Sunt ergo ea quae sunt in voce earum quae sunt in anima passionum notae, et ea quae scribuntur eorum quae sunt in voce."
68. The description does not appear in this treatise. Cf. above, p. \*6.
69. marg. Confirmatur.
70. MS. adds vel, but del. (Probably a false abbrev. for 'nihil').
71. marg. Confirmatur.
72. MS has quale.
73. MS adds: b, but del.
74. MS has tentendum.
75. MS adds ab, but del.
76. MS adds ultra, but del.
77. MS adds et ultra: igitur, nullum extremum propositionis aliquid ex impositione significat, nisi quod naturaliter et a priori significat extremum propositionis mentalis, quod est probandum, but vacat.

78. MS has sibi.

79. MS has propositionem.

80. The emendations in this sentence are taken from the original statement of this second conclusion (par. 116) and from the passage marked vacat, above, n. 77.

81. marg. Tertia conclusio.

82. Reading uncertain.

83. Cf. above, p. \*30, and n. 79 to p. \*36.

84. MS has dicere.

85. From here to the end of the par., the author seems to have reversed the meanings stipulated for 'a' and 'b'.

86. Cf. above, pars. 116-118.

87. marg. Quarta conclusio.

88. MS adds quarto (?), but del. Likely a false start for 'conclusio'.

89. In fact, the conclusion is never discussed for negative propositions.

90. MS adds e, but del.

91. i.e., primo modo primae figurae: Barbara.

92. interlin. corr. from item.

93. MS adds item, but del.

94. Perhaps Perierm. 1, 16a13-19, pp. 5f.: "...circa compositionem enim et divisionem est falsitas veritasque. Nomina igitur ipsa et verba consimilia sunt sine compositione vel divisione intellectui, ut 'homo' vel 'album', quando non additur aliquid; neque enim adhuc verum aut falsum est. Huius autem signum: 'hircocervus' enim significat aliquid, sed nondum verum vel falsum, si non vel 'esse' vel 'non esse' addatur vel simpliciter vel secundum tempus."

95. MS adds a vertical stroke, but del.

96. Averroes, In VI Meta., tx. c. 8, Junt., v. 8, f. 152D-E: "Doctor dicit, 'Et loquamur de vero ente', ...et hoc est illud, quod est in anima. Haec enim entia facta sunt ab intellectu, quando dividit entia abinvicem aut componit ea adinvicem...vera enim affirmativa significat compositionem in entibus, et vera negativa divisionem....cum affirmativa est vera per compositionem, negativa est falsa per divisionem. Et similiter, quando negativa est vera per divisionem, affirmativa est falsa per compositionem...." (on Meta. E, 4, 1027b16-22).

97. De anima III, 6, 430a26-28, Crawford ed., 454: "Formare autem res indivisibiles erit in istis rebus, scilicet in quibus non est falsitas. Res autem in quibus est falsum et verum, illud est aliqua compositio tunc ad res intellectas secundum quod sunt entia;..."

98. Averroes, In III De anima, tc. c. 21, Crawford ed., 455: "...inceptit considerare de actionibus et proprietatibus intellectus....Idest, comprehendere autem res simplices non compositas erit per intellecta que non falsantur neque veridicantur, que dicitur informatio; comprehendere autem ab eo res compositas erit per intellecta in quibus est falsitas et veritas.... Idest, intellecta autem in quibus invenitur veritas et falsitas, est in eis aliqua compositio ab intellectu materiali...."

99. MS adds a false start for 'c', but del.

1. MS has persupponit.

2. MS adds et, but del.

3. MS abbrev. unclear, but perhaps 'nisi' or 'ubi'. The emendation seems demanded by the sense of the argument.

4. MS adds the beginning of the letter 'p', but del.

5. The word is divided in the middle of the first 'n'. The first minim of the letter is at the end of one line of writing, while the second minim begins the next line.

6. interlin.

7. MS has prius cum.



8. corr. from alia.
9. in marg. as a corr. for an illeg. abbrev. crossed out in the line of writing.
10. MS abbrev. ypo<sup>cis</sup>
11. MS has intellectum.
12. MS adds terminus, but del.
13. MS abbrev. adds an extra minim, but expunc. it.
14. Abbrev. corr.
15. On the contradiction, cf. above, n. 81 to p. #37.
16. MS adds s, but del.
17. MS has conclusionem. Cf. above, pars. 30-41.
18. marg. Quinta conclusio.
19. Termination unclear in MS.
20. Cf. above, n. 3 to p. #23.
21. marg. Ad idem.
22. MS has: d.
23. MS adds an illegible abbrev., but del.
24. MS adds arguo, but del.
25. Corr. from sic.
26. MS adds s, but del.
27. Corr. from quam.
28. Perierm. 8, 18a13-25, pp. 12f.: "Una autem est adfirmatio et negatio quae unum de uno significat, vel cum sit universale universaliter vel non similiter...Sin vero duobus unum nomen est positum ex quibus non est unum, non est una adfirmatio; ut, si quis ponat nomen 'tunica' homini et equo, 'est tunica alba' haec non est una adfirmatio nec



negatio una; nihil enim hoc differt dicere quam 'est' equus albus et homo albus', hoc autem nihil differt quam dicere 'est equus albus' et 'est homo albus'. Si ergo hae multa significant et sunt plures, manifestum est quoniam et prima multa vel nihil significat (neque enim est aliquis homo equus).

29. MS adds s, but del.

30. marg. Hic vult arguere contra duas ultimas conclusiones.

31. Termination unclear in MS.

32. marg. Primo contra conclusiones ultimas duas.

33. MS adds sa (?), but del.

34. MS has omnium.

35. MS. has propositionum.

36. marg. Secundo contra easdem.

37. TBI, f. 135ra. Cf. Appendix C, c), p. 137.

38. MS adds illam, but del.

39. MS adds Et additur quod hoc negare non est, nisi figmentum illorum qui aliter ad insolubilium nesciunt respondere. Quarto sic, but vacat.

40. For the addition, cf. above, n. 39, and below, par. 151.

41. marg. Quarto contra conclusiones.

42. TBI, loc. cit. Cf. Appendix C, d), pp. 137f.

43. marg. Quinto contra conclusiones.

44. TBI, f. 134vb. Cf. Appendix C, b), p. 137.

45. marg. Sexto contra conclusiones.

46. TBI, loc. cit. Cf. Appendix C, a), pp. 136f.

47. In fact, the reference is to the fourth book (cf. below, par. 154). The text is Metaphysics I, 8, 1012b15-18, William of Moerbeke tr., contained in Sancti Thomae Aquinatis...In metaphysicam Aristotelis commentaria, M.-R. Cathala, ed., 245: "Nam qui omnia vera dicit, orationis suae contrariam veram facit. Quare et suam non veram. Contraria enim non dicit ipsam esse veram. Qui vero omnia falsa, et ipse se ipsum."

48. MS has albus, corr. from asinus. The argument seems to demand 'asinus'.

49. MS spelling Cichero.

50. MS spelling Chicerone.

51. MS adds vera, but del.

52. Cf. TBI, f. 135ra. Cf. Appendix C, e), p. 138.

53. Prior Analytics I, 1, 24b26-30, Boethius tr., AL III, 1, p. 6: "In toto autem esse alterum altero et de omni praedicari altero alterum idem est. Dicimus autem de omni praedicari quando nihil est sumere subiecti de quo alterum non dicatur; et de nullo similiter."

54. MS has commenti. Averroes, In Priorum resolutiorum liber unus, Junt. I, 2, f. 2vb-3ra: "Verum enim vero dictum de omni, aut dictum de nullo, significat, nihil in omni reperiri subiecto, de quo non praedicetur praedicatum, hoc est, ut praedicatum insit omni subiecto, et omni etiam illi, quod per subiectum disponitur, inexistat: adeo, ut cum dicimus, omne animal est corpus, et velimus in ipso exercere intentionem dicti de omni, non tantum sit intentio nostra, unumquodque ex animalibus est corpus, sed unumquodque ex animalibus, et omne id quod per unumquodque ipsorum disponitur, est corpus. Et haec est differentia inter dictum de omni, quod principium efficitur in hoc libro, et inter propositionem universalem: et dictum de nullo consimiliter. Significat enim nihil in omni reperiri subiecto, a quo non negetur praedicatum, ita ut praedicatum negetur ab omni subiecto, et ab ijs omnibus, quibus inest subiectum, hoc est ab ijs, quae disponitur a subiecto."

55. marg. Hic respondetur.

56. Cf. above, par. 133.
57. MS adds potest aliquid significare, but del.
58. MS has ejus.
59. MS adds potest, but del. (?)
60. MS adds q, but del.
61. The scribe started to write 'terminus'. He nearly completed the abbreviation, then corrected it to 'termini'.
62. MS adds ordinare, but del.
63. marg. Hic arguitur contra istam imaginationem.
64. MS abbrev. has an extra minim, but del.
65. MS adds an illegible mark, but del.
66. MS adds quia, but del.
67. MS has quo.
68. MS has Confirmatio (?).
69. Cf. above, par. 143.
70. marg. Ad secundum.
71. Cf. above, par. 144.
72. MS abbrev. has an extra minim, but del.
73. Cf. above, par. 133.
74. Cf. above, par. 134.
75. MS has mediante, or mediate.
76. MS leaves a blank space, in the middle of a line.
77. MS has significantibus.
78. Cf. above, n. 88 to p. \*38.



79. MS adds autem, but del.
80. marg. corr. for autem.
81. MS has esse.
82. marg. Ad tertium.
83. Cf. above, par. 135.
84. MS has illam.
85. MS adds vestrum, but del.
86. MS has descutuenti.
87. The author does not seem to have had any individual passages in mind. Rather, the statement seems to mean simply that for a part to stand for its whole would be opposed to the whole thrust of Aristotelian psychology (as it is presented, e.g., in De anima II and III).
88. marg. Ad quartum.
89. Cf. above, par. 136.
90. Cf. the discussion above, n. 88 to p. #38.
91. MS has auditor.
92. Cf. above, par. 136.
93. On the argument in this par., cf. above, n. 88 to p. #38.
94. Cf. above, par. 137.
95. Cf. above, par. 116. But this is not what the second principle conclusion states. For "reducere ad actum intellegendi", cf. above, pars. 134, 149.
96. marg. Ad quartum (sic) de auctoritate.
97. Cf. above, n. 47 to par. 138.
98. MS adds b, but del.

99. MS adds a false start for the abbrev. for 'respondes', but del.

1. MS adds what seems to be a false start for 'arguebat', and does not delete it.

2. corr. from hominem.

3. Spelling here and elsewhere in the MS: Eraclitum (Eraclitus).

4. MS spelling: Anaxegaram or Anaxogaram.

5. Metaphysics  $\Gamma$ , 7, 1012a24f., Moerbeke tr., ed. cit., 240: "Videtur autem Heracliti quidem oratio dicens omnia esse et non esse, omnia vera facere. Quae vero Anaxagorae, esse aliquid medium contradictionis. Quare omnia falsa."

6. MS adds a false start for 'consequentias', but del.

7. MS has concludere satis, with a 'b' over 'concludere' and an 'a' over 'satis'. Cf. above, n. 15 to par. 4.

8. MS adds possu, but del.

9. marg. Hic arguitur Philosophus contra Heraclitum, qui posuit (?) omnia esse vera.

10. MS adds vera, but del.

11. Ibid., 1011b24f., ed. cit., 240: "Verum nec inter contradictiones quicquam medium esse contingit; sed necessarium aut dicere aut negare unum de unoquoque." According to Aristotle (cf. above, n. 5), it was Anaxagoras, and not Heraclitus, who denied the Law of Excluded Middle; Heraclitus denied rather the Law of Non-Contradiction. Yet, Aristotle seems to argue, Heraclitus' position implicitly implies a denial of the Law of Excluded Middle as well. Cf. Metaphysics  $\Gamma$ , 8, 1012a29-b15.

12. MS has aliquid.

13. Ibid., 1012b14-19, ed. cit., 245: "Contingit autem quod fatum est omnibus talibus rationibus ipsas

seipsas destruere. Nam qui omnia vera dicit, orationis suae contrariam veram facit. Quare et suam non veram. Contraria enim non dicit ipsam esse veram. Qui vero omnia falsa, et ipse seipsum."

14. MS abbrev. adds an extra minim, but del.
15. MS leaves a blank space at the end of a line.
16. MS adds a false abbrev., but del.
17. Cf. above, n. 13.
18. MS has an extra minim, but del.
19. marg. Responsio ad alium.
20. Cf. above, par. 139.
21. MS adds totum, but del.
22. marg. Ad aliam formam.
23. Cf. above, par. 140.
24. MS spelling Chicerone, in both occurrences of the word in this par.
25. marg. Simile arguitur ex isto casu.
26. marg. Primus casus declaratur.
27. Cf. above, par. 160.
28. MS has modum (?).
29. MS has modus.
30. MS has modus.
31. MS adds non sit vera illa propositio 'Solus Sortes dicit verum', but del.
32. MS abbrev. unclear.
33. MS spelling Chicero.



34. Cf. below, pars. 254f., and above, p. #6.
35. MS leaves a blank space, at the beginning of the line.
36. Cf. above, par. 141.
37. et adductas: inserted at the end of the following line.
38. marg. Hic solvuntur insolubilia jam posita.
39. MS adds pnatur, but del.
40. marg. Casus.
41. Cf. above, par. 104.
42. marg. Responsio.
43. MS has copulativa, and adds ad alteram (?), but del.
44. For this consequence, cf. TC, 85 (rule #1.08) and references there.
45. marg. Ad aliam formam.
46. marg. Responsio ad aliam formam.
47. marg. Contra responsionem.
48. MS adds praecise, but del.
49. MS adds significat, but del.
50. MS adds secunda, but del. (?)
51. Cf. above, par. 105.
52. MS adds s or f, but del.
53. Cf. above, n. 95 to p. #40.
54. marg. Responsio.
55. marg. Contra responsionem.
56. marg. Confirmatur.

57. Cf. above, n. 95 to p. #40.
58. Cf. rather suppositio prima, par. 105.
59. marg. Responsio.
60. marg. Ad secundam formam.
61. MS adds usque, but del.
62. Cf. above, par. 173.
63. marg. Contra responsionem.
64. marg. Responsio.
65. marg. Responsio.
66. marg. Responsio.
67. marg. Contra responsionem.
68. marg. Responsio.
69. marg. Contra responsionem.
70. marg. Responsio.
71. MS has tibi.
72. MS adds terminus, but del.
73. Cf. above, par. 112.
74. MS has erit.
75. Cf. above, n. 95 to p. #40.
76. MS adds an illeg. abbrev., but del.
77. Cf. above, par. 122.
78. Cf. above, par. 130.
79. Cf. above, par. 119, and the discussion above, p. #30.
80. marg. Hic arguitur ex dictis.

81. MS adds sequitur, but del.
82. marg. Et contra hoc obicitur.
83. marg. Responsio.
84. Cf. above, par. 106.
85. marg. Contra responsionem.
86. marg. Responsio.
87. MS may have arguando.
88. Cf. above, pars. 55-62.
89. Cf. above, par. 122.
90. Cf. above, par. 130.
91. Cf. above, par. 112.
92. MS has sed.
93. MS adds Sortes dicit, but del.
94. marg. Responsio.
95. MS has falsum.
96. MS adds non, but del.
97. Cf. above, par. 186.
98. corr. from latentur.
99. For the first two, cf. the discussion above, n. 94 to p. #40.
  1. MS has dicere.
  2. MS adds d, but del.
  3. MS adds illud, but del.
  4. MS leaves a blank space in the middle of a line.  
Soph. el. 25, 180bl, James of Venice tr., PL 64, 1034C:

"...nam qui jurat se perjuraturum (PL has perjeraturum), bene jurat perjurers hoc solum."

5. marg. Nota bene.
6. MS adds igitur, but del.
7. MS has consequentia.
8. marg. Nota: Sensus Aristotelis ad istas propositiones.
9. scil. conclusio. Cf. above, par. 122.
10. scil. conclusio. Cf. above, par. 130.
11. marg. Hic arguitur ex illa propositione.
12. Cf. above, par. 112.
13. Cf. above, par. 106.
14. MS has aliquid.
15. marg. Contra confirmationem.
16. MS adds sic, but del.
17. marg. Responsio.
18. MS adds est, but del.
19. Reading uncertain (probo?).
20. MS adds aliquid (?), but del.
21. Cf. above., par. 105.
22. MS has: b.
23. Cf. above, par. 122.
24. Cf. above, par. 130.
25. marg. Quarto principaliter arguitur.
26. marg. Responsio.

27. MS adds 4 (?), but del. marg. Quarto (sic)  
ad idem.

28. marg. Responsio.

29. marg. Contra rationem (Read: Contra responsionem).

30. This rule seems to be based on the "confused and distributive" supposition of general predicate terms in negative sentences. Cf., e.g., the following texts from SL: I, 70, pp. 190, 191; I, 74, p. 206. Cf. also TC pp. 18-25, 45-48, and references there.

31. The 'b' here is that of pars. 210-211, and not that mentioned previously in par. 212: 'Sortes non dicit falsum'.

32. corr. from: a.

33. MS. adds: b, but del.

34. marg. Responsio.

35. marg. Sexto principaliter ad idem arguitur.

36. marg. Responsio.

37. marg. Responsio.

38. marg. Contra responsionem.

39. MS adds dictum, but del.

40. marg. Responsio.

41. marg. Contra responsionem.

42. MS adds a false abbrev., but del.

43. marg. Septimo ad <principale> (?), partially obscured between the folios.

44. marg. Responsio <ad> septimum, partially obscured between the folios.

45. MS adds f, but del. (?)



46. marg. Hic determi<nan>da inso<lubilia> categorica et f<alsa>, partially obscured between the folios.

47. MS adds a false start for 'breviter' (?), but del.

48. marg. Primus c<asus>, partially obscured between the folios.

49. Cf. above, pars. 6-23.

50. Cf. above, par. 106.

51. interlin.

52. MS adds praecise, but del.

53. Perhaps deleted in MS.

54. Cf. above, par. 104.

55. MS adds s, but del.

56. MS adds praecise, but del.

57. Cf. above, par. 105.

58. marg. Responsio <ad> casu<m>, partially obscured between the folios.

59. The references to the argument in the previous paragraph are rather loose. The "minor" seems to be "et a praecise significat primo quod hoc est falsum" (par. 225). The subject of 'potest' is the 'hoc est falsum' of that minor. Thus, the consequence which does not hold is that from 'non est ita, quod hoc est falsum' to 'hoc est verum'. The reason is given in the text.

60. Cf. above, par. 116.

61. This is the basis for the inference above, from 'non naturaliter...' to 'nec hic ex impositione...'.

62. Incomplete abbrev. in MS.

63. The structure of the argument becomes rather complicated from here to the end of the paragraph. The



consequentia in question here is from 'in ista propositione "Hoc est falsum", nec subjectum nec praedicatum supponit pro aliqua propositione' to 'utrumque extremum in a propositione supponit eo modo quo supponeret, si neutrum extremum aliquando fuisset impositum ad significandum'. The justification for this inference is given in the passage: 'Consequentia tenet per hoc...juxta quartam et quintam conclusionem'. Only then, beginning with 'Subjectum, igitur' does the main chain of reasoning start again. Thus, the 'igitur' there connects the last sentence of the paragraph with the passage: 'utrumque extremum in a...impositum ad significandum'.

64. The casus at the beginning of par. 225.

65. This seems to refer to par. 186: "sed casus qui ponit quod Sortes non dicit aliquam aliam excludit extremum propositionis dictae a Sorte supponere pro aliquo alio; igitur, si pro aliquo supponeret, necessario pro ipsa propositione cujus est pars supponeret." The entire argument in par. 186 is parallel to the one in this par.

66. The scribe has previously used 'b' as the counterpart of 'c'.

67. Cf. above, par. 122.

68. Cf. above, par. 130.

69. marg. Contra responsionem.

70. marg. Adhuc.

71. Cf. above, par. 112.

72. MS adds sed totam propositionem, as a catchword at the bottom of f. 54v.

73. iste terminus 'hoc': MS has species ejus. The emendation given, or a similar one, is demanded by the sense of the argument.

74. marg. note illegible in the microfilm because of a fold in the folio.

75. marg. <Ad> secundum, partially obscured between the folios.

76. Perhaps the reference should be to the fifth conclusion, because of the "ex impositione". For the fourth conclusion, cf. above, pars. 122-129; for the fifth, cf. above, pars. 130-132.

77. Cf. above, pars. 142-163.

78. Cf. above, pars. 122-129.

79. MS adds 5, but del.

80. Cf. above, par. 116.

81. Cf. above, par. 130.

82. marg. Responsio.

83. MS adds totum, but del.

84. MS has termini (?).

85.<sup>a</sup> marg. note illegible. Partially obscured between the folios.

85.<sup>b</sup> marg. <Responsi>o (?), partially obscured between the folios.

86. Cf. above, n. 95 to p. #40.

87. Abbrev. corr.

88. marg. <Aliu>s casus, partially obscured between the folios.

89. MS adds dicendum est, but del.

90. This seems to be here merely a particle to divide members of a sentence, with no disjunctive sense. Equivalent to 'tunc'. Perhaps the word ought to be deleted.

91. The sentence is perhaps corrupt. As it stands, the argument is unintelligible.

92. interlin.

93. MS has vel.

94. MS adds vera, but del.

95. Cf. above, par. 106.
96. MS adds non, but del.
97. Cf. above, par. 104.
98. corr. from diusjunctivae.
99. Cf. above, n. 95 to p. #40.
1. marg. Responsio.
2. corr. from quae.
3. Abbrev. corr.
4. MS adds per, but del.
5. corr. from ista.
6. Cf. above, par. 112.
7. Cf. above, par. 130.
8. MS has igitur.
9. MS adds prina, but del.
10. Cf. above, par. 112.
11. Cf. above, n. 17 to p. #44.
12. Cf. above, par. 116.
13. MS adds propositione, but del.
14. marg. Ad secundum.
15. Cf. above, par. 237.
16. MS adds significat, but del. Also adds the vertical stroke of the letter 'p' (false start for 'pars'?), not deleted.
17. MS adds secunda, but del.
18. MS adds et, but del. (?).

19. Abbrev. corr.
20. MS started to add pp, but del.
21. marg. Exemplum. Cf. above, pp. #7f.
22. added in marg.
23. MS has intellectum. (?)
24. MS adds ad se, but del.
25. MS adds a false start for 'tamen', but del.
26. MS adds subjecti, but del.
27. MS adds a false start for 'indifferenter', but del.
28. MS has suam.
29. MS adds a false start for 'praedicatum, but del.
30. corr. from in.
31. added in marg.
32. MS has naturalem.
33. Cf. above, n. 99 to par. 26.
34. MS has intellectum (?).
35. Abbrev. corr.
36. MS perhaps has campossibilis.
37. interlin.
38. corr. in marg. from: b.

39. cum iste terminus...pro se ipso supponere: The sentence is clearly corrupt. The sense of the argument from par. 240 on, as well as the clear purpose of the argument in the present par., indicates that a reading such as the following ought to be adopted: "cum iste terminus 'falsum' et iste terminus 'disjunctiva' supponunt sicut communiter solent supponere, et casus



excludit ex hoc aliquem talem terminum supponere pro significato ab eo distincto, non excludit ex hoc aliquem terminum talem pro se ipso supponere."

40. The sentence is obscure, but the sense seems to be: "since in one instance which the case allows, it can be true."

41. MS has derelinquitur.

42. Cf. above, par. 104.

43. The sentence, governed by the 'si' above, remains incomplete. The sense is: "Si sic arguatur, ad hoc responderi possit...". The reply is given in the following pars.

44. Perierm. 4, 17a3-5, p. 8: "...enuntiativa (scil. ratio) vero non monis, sed in qua verum vel falsum inest; non autem in omnibus, ut deprecatio quidem est, sed neque vera neque falsa."

45. Reading uncertain.

46. Cf. above, par. 248.

47. marg. <Pro c>onjunctivis, partially obscured between the folios.

48. conjunctiva...falsa; MS has aliqua conjunctiva falsa est prolata a Sorte.

49. MS adds a false start for omnis, but del.

50. Reading uncertain. MS adds an 'i' before the abbrev., but perhaps expunctuates it.

51. MS has est.

52. marg. Responsio.

53. Cf. above, par. 112.

54. Cf. above, par. 122.

55. marg. Ad formam.

56. marg. De exclusivis.

57. Cf. above, n. 19 to p. #44.
58. MS adds et, but del.
59. MS adds Sortes dicit, but del.
60. MS adds primo, but del.
61. corr. from consequentia. MS adds secunda, but del.
62. Cf. above, par. 112.
63. Cf. above, par. 116.
64. Cf. above, par. 122.
65. Cf. above, par. 130.
66. marg. Responsio.
67. marg. Exemplum de exceptivis.
68. Reading uncertain. On exclusive and exceptive propositions, cf. above, n. 52 to p. #32.
69. Cf. above, par. 111.
70. MS has quae.
71. Cf. above, p. #6.
72. MS abbrev. has an extra minim.



Notes to the Appendices

(Notes to Appendix A)

1. Reading uncertain.
2. MS has illud.
3. marg. Descriptio insolubilis.
4. interlin. add. by a later hand.
5. MS has solam.
6. marg. add. by a later hand.
7. interlin. add. by a later hand.
8. Reading uncertain.
9. interlin. add. by a later hand.
10. MS adds quia, but del.
11. corr. from a by a later hand.
12. interlin. add. by a later hand.

(Note to Appendix B)

1. vel hunc...consimilem: om. Paris ed., 1488 (homoeoteleuton). Expanded according to Vat. lat. 952, f. 117ra and Cambridge, Congille & Caius, 464/571, f. 58va. The latter omits 'aliquem'.

(Notes to Appendix C)

1. f. 134va: "Restringtonum autem duae sunt sectae. Quidam enim restringunt terminum et quidam tempus. Restringtonum terminum pro tanto dicuntur, quia non permittit terminum supponere pro omnibus suis significatis vel pro omnibus suis singularibus. Et istorum autem tres [tres] sunt (f. 134vb) sectae. Quidam enim istorum solvunt insolubilia secundum quid

et simpliciter. Et ita sunt omnes communiter loquentes de insolubilibus....

2. Reading uncertain.

3. Aristotle, Metaphysics Γ, 8, 1012b13-15, Moerbeke tr., contained in Sancti Thomae Aquinatis... In metaphysicam Aristotelis commentaria, M.-R. Cathala, ed., 245: "Contingit autem quod famatum est omnibus talibus rationibus ipsas seipsas destruere."

4. MS adds duae, but del.

5. Reading uncertain.

6. MS leaves a blank space in the middle of a line.

7. Aristotle, Metaphysics Γ, 8, 1012b18, Moerbeke tr., loc. cit.

8. interlin.

9. Reading uncertain.

10. corr. from omne.

11. Prior Analytics I, 1, 24b26-30. Cf. above, n. 53 to par. 141.

12. MS adds verum, but del.

Index of Authors and WorksCited in the TextANSELMDe veritate, F.S. Schmitt, ed.

c. 2, p. 178	.	.	.	.	.	par. 80
c. 11, p. 191	.	.	.	.	.	80

ARISTOTLEPraedicamenta, editio composita (vulgata),  
L. Minio-Paluello, ed., AL, I, 2

c. 5, 4a34-b2, p. 53.	.	.	.	.	33
-----------------------	---	---	---	---	----

Periermenias, Boethius tr., L. Minio-Paluello,  
ed., AL, II, 1

c. 1, 16a4f., p. 5	.	.	.	.	116
c. 1, 16a13-19 (?), pp. 5f.	.	.	.	.	122
c. 4, 17a1-5, p. 8	.	.	.	.	77
c. 4, 17a3-5, p. 8	.	.	.	.	249
c. 8, 18a13-25, pp. 12f.	.	.	.	.	132
c. 10, 20a34f., p. 21	.	.	.	.	78

Analytica priora, Boethius tr. (recensio  
Florentina), L. Minio-Paluello, ed.,  
AL, III, 1

I, 1, 24a16f., p. 5	.	.	.	.	77
I, 1, 24b26-30, p. 6.	.	.	.	.	141

Analytica posteriora, James of Venice tr.,  
PL 64.

I, 4, 73b16-24, col. 717 . . . .	18
II, 4, 91a14-17, col. 746. . . .	83
II, 5, esp. 91b11-23 (?), col. 747 .	20,75

Sophistici elenchi, James of Venice tr.,  
PL 64.

c. 6, 169a11-21 (?), col. 1015. . .	102
c. 13, 173a34-38, cols. 1022D-23A .	40
c. 25, 180b1, col. 1034C . . . .	198

Physica, Junt., v. 4,

II, 3, 194b32-195a2, f. 60A-B . . .	1
-------------------------------------	---

De anima, Moerbeke tr., published with Thomas  
Aquinas' In Aristotelis librum De anima  
commentarium, Pirotti ed.

III, 9, 432b20, p. 259 . . . .	35
Crawford ed. (with Averroes' commentary)	
II and III, <u>passim</u> . . . .	151
III, 6, 430a26-28, p. 454. . . .	122
III, 6, 430b26f., p. 463 . . . .	76
III, 6, 430b27-29, p. 463. . . .	85

Metaphysica, Moerbeke tr., published with  
 Thomas Aquinas' In metaphysicam Aristotelis  
commentaria, Cathala ed.

□, 8, 1012b15-18, p. 245 . . . .	138, 154
----------------------------------	----------

Junt, v. 8

Δ, 29, 1024b16-25a13, f. 141F-L . . . 99

E, 4, 1027b17-22, f. 151L-M . . . 82

### AVERROES

In Priorum resolutiorum, Junt. v. 1, 2

c. 1, f. 2vb-3ra . . . . . 141

In Physicam, Junt, v. 4.

II, tx. c. 31, f. 61G-H . . . . . 1

In De anima, Crawford ed.

III, tx. c. 21, p. 455 . . . . . 122

III, tx. c. 26, p. 463 . . . . . 76

In Metaphysicam, Junt., v. 8.

VI, tx. c. 8, f. 152D-E . . . . . 82, 122

### AVICENNA

Metaphysica, Venice ed., 1508

VI, 2, f. 91vb (?) . . . . . 84

VI, 3, f. 93rb (?) . . . . . 84

### BOETHIUS

De differentiis topicis, PL 64

I, col. 1174B . . . . . 79

JOHN DUMBLETON

Summa logicae et philosophiae naturalis,  
MS Vat. lat. 6750

f. 4ra	.	.	.	.	.	.	.6, 7
f. 5ra	.	.	.	.	.	.	5
f. 5va	.	.	.	.	.	.	5

ROBERT FLAND (?)

Insolubilia, MS Bruges 497

f. 43rb . . . . . 26

THOMAS BRADWARDINE

Insolubilia, MS Bruges 500

f. 134vb	.	.	.	.	.	137-138
f. 135ra	.	.	.	.	.	135-136, 141
f. 136vb	.	.	.	.	.	110

WILLIAM OF OCKHAM

Summa logicae, Paris ed., 1488 (Hain #11948)

III, 3, 38, f. 107vb.	.	.	.	.	50
III, 3, 45, f. 109rb-vb	.	.	.	45, 63	



Index of Propositions Discussed  
in the Text

Adam fuit . . . . .	89
<u>a</u> est <u>b</u> . . . . .	123, 124, 128, 129, 131, 132
<u>a</u> est propositio vera . . . . .	167
Album possibile est esse nigrum. . . . .	90
Aliquid est . . . . .	135
Antichristus erit . . . . .	88
Antichristus est . . . . .	97, 98, 100
Antichristus non est. . . . .	97, 100
Antichristus potest non esse . . . . .	91
<u>b</u> significat primo et principaliter aliter quam est . . . . .	27
<u>c</u> est <u>d</u> . . . . .	131, 132
' <u>c</u> est <u>d</u> ' est <u>d</u> . . . . .	132
Deus est . . . . .	18, 37, 39, 139, 160, 258
Deus non est vel disjunctiva a me prolata est falsa . . . . .	246, 248
Deus non est vel disjunctiva prolata a me est falsa . . . . .	237
Dies crastina erit . . . . .	89
Ens est . . . . .	135
Equus est albus. . . . .	132
Falsum dicitur a Sorte . . . . .	136
Falsum est. . . . .	5, 6, 21, 22, 23, 30, 33 34, 40, 55, 56, 135

Falsum est hoc . . . . .	234
Hoc est falsum . . . . .	.6, 12, 18, 225, 226
Homo est albus . . . . .	6, 132
Homo est animal. . . . .	141, 160
Homo est asinus. . . . .	.18, 33, 58, 63, 139, 199, 258
Iste terminus 'disjunctiva' est falsa . . . . .	239
Nulla propositio est. . . . .	54
Nulla propositio est negativa . . . . .	161
Nullum <u>a</u> est propositio vera . . . . .	168
Nullus praeter Sortem dicit verum . . . . .	257
Omne dictum a Sorte est falsum. . . . .	141
Omne verum est . . . . .	63, 67, 69
Omne verum est verum. . . . .	83
Omnia sunt falsa . . . . .	138
Omnia sunt vera. . . . .	156
Omnis propositio est vera. . . . .	50, 52
Per Deum, ego sum perjurus . . . . .	200
Plato non dicit verum . . . . .	162
Possibile est Sortem esse. . . . .	94
Propositio est . . . . .	48, 53, 54, 135, 224
Quodlibet istorum est verum . . . . .	37
Quodlibet verum est aliquod istorum. . . . .	161
Rex sedet . . . . .	.9, 10, 11
'Rex sedet' est propositio falsa . . . . .	9, 11

'Rex sedet' est propositio vera . . . .	9, 10
Rex sedet vel disjunctiva prolata a te est tibi dubia . . . . .	252
Solus Sortes currit . . . . .	162
Solus Sortes dicit falsum. . . . .	139
Solus Sortes dicit talem vocem 'falsum' . . . .	256
Solus Sortes dicit verum . . . . .	140, 162, 258
Sortes audit falsum . . . . .	110, 224
Sortes dicit falsum . . . . .	3, 25, 28, 29, 45, 58, 61, 63 109, 110, 135, 137, 164, 172 173, 183, 187, 192, 205, 210, 246
Sortes dicit istam 'Homo est asinus' non significantem sicut est . . . . .	58
Sortes dicit propositionem falsam . . . . .	172
Sortes dicit talem vocem 'falsum' . . . . .	194
Sortes dicit verum . . . . .	162
Sortes est. . . . .	73
Sortes est perjurus . . . . .	201
Sortes intellegit Antichristum. . . . .	105
Sortes intellegit falsum . . . . .	109, 224
Sortes non dicit falsum . . . . .	212
Sortes scribit falsum . . . . .	110, 224
Tantum Sortes dicit falsum . . . . .	225
Tu es homo. . . . .	12, 16, 17
'Tu es homo' est 'Tu es homo' . . . . .	12
Tu es homo et aliqua conjunctiva prolata a Sorte est falsa . . . . .	253

Tunica est alba. . . . . 132  
Verum est hoc . . . . . 236



## casus

casus insolubilium . . . .110 and passim

## causa

causa est prius naturaliter se ipsa. . . .84  
 causa falsitatis signi . . . .66  
 causa finalis insolubilium . . . .1  
 causa prima . . . .94  
 causa totalis insolubilium . . .109-110  
 causa veritatis signi . . .66, 83  
 Plato est causa Sortis . . .84  
 praesupponit tamquam prius veram causam .66-67

## circulatio

circulatio in causis essentialiter ordinatis .53

## color

nullum omnino habent colorem . . .28

## complexum

propositio per complexum comprehenditur .5

## compossibilis

ad invicem compossibilis . . .246

## confuse

stare confuse tantum. . .61  
 Cf. also 'praecognitio'.

## consequentia

potest dici valere dupliciter: vel in se  
 vel ad hominem . . .154

## consignificare

consignificare tempus . . .89

## contradictio

contradictio formalis . . .102, 129  
 contradictio solum est inter propositiones .102

## contradictoria

in contradictoriis oportet terminis stare  
 pro eisdem . . .54, 233

## debere

significare quod debet . . .80



decipere		
non potest decipi . . . . .		59
definitio		
definitio est convertibilis cum definito. . . . .		83
definitio praedicatur de opposito definiti . . . . .		93
denotare		
eo quod aliqua propositio aliquid denotat, ipsum significat . . . . .		186
quidquid aliqua propositio vel ejus extremum denotat significare . . . . .		119
descriptio		
descriptio insolubilis hypothetica . . . . .		111
descriptio insolubilis simplicis . . . . .		111
dictum		
dictum autem propositionis non est propositio. . . . .		249
difficilis		
de difficili solubilia . . . . .		1
disjunctiva		
'disjunctiva' praecise ex impositione significat duas categoricas vel plures, mediante inter illas ista conjunctione 'vel' . . . . .		239
esse		
in esse subjectivo vel objectivo . . . . .		97
exclusiva		
dictio exclusiva addita subjecto attribuit praedicatum subjecto et excludit tantum praedicatum illius propositionis ab opposito subjecti. . . . .		162
vis exclusivae . . . . .		200
experimentalis		
haec conclusio experimentalis est . . . . .		149
minor videtur experimentalis . . . . .		134
fallacia		
fallacia aequivocationis . . . . .	86, 222-223, 254	
fallacia consequentia . . . . .	242-243	
fallacia non causa ut causa . . . . .	86	

falsum					
	falsum solum est privatio veri in propositione.	73			
fictio					
	fictio est ponere quod propositio dicta a				
	Sorte significat Sortem dicere aliam				
	propositionem ab illa quam dicit.		.	.	59
figmentum					
	figmentum illorum qui aliter nesciunt				
	respondere ad insolubilia	.	.	.	151
figura					
	tertio modo primae figurae	.	.	.	48
filius					
	sit Sortes filius Platonis	.	.	.	84
finis					
	finis est causa propter quam causata omnia ab				
	aliis causis concausantur, et etiam ad quam				
	omnes aliae causae ordinantur	.	.	.	1
	finis hujus scientiae	.	.	.	1
	finis illius materiae	.	.	.	2
firmitas					
	firmitas talis intellectus	.	.	.	59
formalis					
	formalis contradictio	.	.	.	102, 129
formaliter					
	formaliter arguitur	.	.	.	187
	formaliter inter se contradicentibus	.	.	.	54
	formaliter sequitur	.	.	.	23, 126
	potest formaliter concludi	.	.	.	8
frater					
	frater studiosus	.	.	.	243
Heraclitus					
	Heraclitus dicebat omnia esse vera	.	.	.	155-156
incidentaliter					
	incidentaliter dicit quod propositio dicta				
	a Sorte nec est vera nec falsa	.	.	.	45

impossibile	
impossibile quod aliquod aliud a se hoc extremum 'falsum' dat intellegere	. 187
impossibilitas	
impossibilitas earum simul in falsitate	. 59
inductive	
inductive probatur	. . . . . 71-72
inferiora	
de aliquibus sibi inferioribus praedicatur	. 19
omnia (termino communi) inferiora	. . . 48
ininitus	
ininitae propositiones	. : : 60
procedere in ininitum	. : : 85, 124, 127
infirmitas	
infirmitas talium objectorum	. . . . . 59
intellectus	
intellectus simplex semper est vera.	. . . 85
intuitive	
intuitive cognitum	. . . . . 123
Cf. also 'notitia'.	
jurare	
qui jurat se esse perjurum bene jurat jurans hoc solum	. . . . . 198
juvenes	
tractabo hujusmodi sophismata propter juvenes minus	. . . . . 162
lapis	
species lapidis existens in anima Sortis.	. . . 85
libertas	
hoc sophisma de libertate.	. . . 147
tota libertate non potest ( <u>scil.</u> voluntas)	
habere velle respectu mali quatenus malum	. 147

linea					
	absolute impossibile est quod aliqua linea sit				
	quae nec sit recta nec curva	.	.	.	80
	rectitudo ad lineam	.	.	.	80
medium					
	videre per medium vel media	.	.	.	59
	videre sine omni medio	.	.	.	59
memoria					
	memoria intellectiva.	.	.	.	149
	reducere ad memoriam.	.	.	.	150
modus					
	modus significandi	.	.	.	13, 17
natura					
	convenire in eadem natura in specie.	.	.	.	49
	natura nihil agit frustra, nec agere potest	.	.	.	127
necesse					
	'necesse' prout determinaret inhaerentiam				
	praedicati ad subjectum	.	.	.	119
negatio					
	quidquid negatio negat, negat universaliter				
	et distributive	.	.	.	212
neutrum					
	verum vel falsum vel neutrum	.	.	.	81
notitia					
	notitia complexa	.	.	.	124-126
	notitia incomplexa	.	.	.	124-126
	notitia intuitiva	.	.	.	128
obligatio					
	convenienter in obligationibus.	.	.	.	258
	materia obligationum.	.	.	.	50
oppositum					
	ex opposito consequentis sequitur oppositum				
	antecedentis.	.	.	.	67
	ex opposito sequitur oppositum.	.	.	.	91
passio					
	passio disjuncta	.	.	.	20, 75

penna						
	"Quod habeo pennam."	.	.	.	.	110
petitio						
	petitio principii	.	.	.	.	163
pejerare						
	bene pejerare est male vel false jurare	.				201
praecognitio						
	praecognitio confusa et universalis.	.				49
praedicatio						
	praedicatio directa	.	.	.	.	18
	praedicatio indirecta	.	.	.	.	18
praesentialiter						
	sicut praesentialiter est.	.	.	.		107
qualitas						
	qualitas propositionis	.	.	.	.	204-205
qualitercumque						
	'qualitercumque' prout distribuit modos significandi.	.	.	.	.	17
reflexio						
	reflexio actuum supra se	.	.	.	.	53
relatio						
	actus ( <u>scil.</u> uniendi in propositione) vel est relatio vel necessario relationem includens	.	.	.	.	145
	eadem relatio specifica	.	.	.	.	146
	eadem relatio in numero	.	.	.	.	146
	impossibile est aliquam relationem manere deducto altero ejus extremo.	.	.	.	.	145
res						
	nihil...est, nisi res	.	.	.	.	107
sicut						
	'sicut' prout habitudinem denotat et proportionem inter rem significatam et terminum significantem.	.	.	.	.	108



significare	
descriptio illius termini 'significare'	85
iste terminus 'significare' convertitur cum	
isto termino 'supponere'	146
significare primo	105
significare principaliter.	105
significare recte	80
significare secundario, ut partialiter	105
significatio	
totalis significatio propositionis	105
simultas	
simultas requisita ad relativa.	84
sophista	
maxime (est admittendus) a sophistis	246
species	
species sensibilis	113
species termini in voce vel in scripto	112-115
supponere	
supponere materialiter	243
supponere significative	243
Cf. also 'significare'.	
suppositio	
materia suppositionum	104
suppositio materialis	104, 245
suppositio ordinata ad tale insolubile	110
suppositio personalis	245
suppositio significativa	104
syllogistice	
syllogistice sequitur	7
syncategorema	
syncategorema habens vim faciendi terminum	
sequentem sic supponere	61
tempus	
tempus alterius dicere	89
tempus ejusdem dicere	89
tempus praesens.	89
tempus praeteritum vel futurum.	89
verbum unius temporis	89



terminus						
concludit sic in terminis.	.	.	.	.	.	78
major in terminis	.	.	.	.	.	76
minor in terminis	.	.	.	.	.	97
opinio in terminis	.	.	.	.	.	66
tunica						
tunica est alba.	.	.	.	.	.	132
unitas						
unitas termini infertur ex unitate						
significatione	.	.	.	.	.	131
variatio						
variatio medi	.	.	.	.	.	208, 251
molitum						
non est possibile aliquid esse volitum quod						
prius non fuit cognitum	.	.	.	.	.	147
voluntas						
voluntas est agens liberum	.	.	.	.	.	144
vox						
proprietas vocis	.	.	.	.	.	110

# BIBLIOGRAPHY

## Primary Sources

Albert the Great. Libri duo elenchorum. In Opera omnia, II, Paris: Vives, 1890, pp. 525-713.

Albert of Saxony. Insolubilia. Published with his Sophismata, Paris: Félix Baligault, 1495 (Hain #582).

\_\_\_\_\_. Perutilis logica. Venice: Petrus Aurelius Sanutus Venetus, 1518.

Anonymous. De insolubilibus. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS lat. 16617, ff. 46v-54r.  
(f. 46v only has been seen in microfilm.)

Anselm.  
\_\_\_\_\_. De veritate. In Opera omnia, Franciscus Salesius Schmitt, ed., I, Seckau (Austria), 1938, pp. 169-199.

Aristotle. Analytica priora. Boethius, tr. (recensio Florentina), L. Minio-Paluello, ed., Aristoteles latinus III, 1, 1962.

\_\_\_\_\_. De anima. In Averrois Cordubensis commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros, F. Stuart Crawford, ed., "Corpus philosophorum medi aevi: Corpus commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem: Versionum latinarum", VI, 1; Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953.

\_\_\_\_\_. De anima. William of Moerbeke, tr., published with St. Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotelis librum De anima commentarium, Angelo M. Pirotta, O.P., ed., Turin: Marietti, 1925.

\_\_\_\_\_. Aristoteles latinus. "Union académique internationale: Corpus philosophorum medi aevi academiarum consociatarum auspiciis et consilio editum"; Bruges-Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1939- .

- \_\_\_\_\_. Aristotelis metaphysicam libri XIII cum Averrois Cordubensis in eosdem commentariis.... Junt., VIII, 1574.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Aristotelis de Physico auditu libri octo cum Averrois Cordubensis variis in eosdem commentariis. Junt., IV, 1562.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Elenchorum sophisticorum Aristotelis libri duo. James of Venice, tr., PL 64, 1007-1040.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Metaphysica. William of Moerbeke, tr., published with St. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis doctoris angelici ordinis praedicatorum In metaphysicam Aristotelis commentaria, M.-R. Cathala, ed., Turin: Merietti, 1926.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Periermenias. Boethius, tr., L. Minio-Paluello, ed., Aristoteles latinus II, 1, 1965.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Posteriorum analyticorum Aristotelis libri duo. James of Venice, tr., PL 64, 711B-762B.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Praedicamenta. Editio composita (vulgata), L. Minio-Paluello, ed., Aristoteles latinus I, 2, 1961.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Works of Aristotle Translated into English. W.D. Ross, ed., 12vols.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928-1952.
- Averroes. Aristotelis De interpretatione... Severino Boetho interprete: cum Averrois Cordubensis expositione.... Jacob Mantinus, tr., Junt. I, 1, 1574.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Aristotelis metaphysicorum libri XIII cum Averrois Cordubensis in eosdem commentariis.... Junt. VIII, 1574.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Aristotelis de Physico auditu libri octo cum Averrois Cordubensis variis in eosdem commentariis. Junt. IV, 1562.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Aristotelis Priorum resolutiorum... cum Averrois Cordubensis media expositione, Ioanne Francisco Burana Veronensi interprete. Junt., I, 2, 1574.

- \_\_\_\_\_. Averrois commentaria et introductiones in omnes libros Aristotelis cum eorum versione. 12 vols.; Venice: Juntas, 1562-1574.  
(Abbreviated: Junt.)
- \_\_\_\_\_. Averrois Cordubensis commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros. F. Stuart Crawford, ed., "Corpus philosophorum medi aevi: Corpus commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem: Versionum latinarum", VI, 1; Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953.
- Avicenna. Metaphysica. In Opera philosophica, Venice, 1508.
- Boethius. De differentiis topicis. PL 64, 1173B-1216D.
- \_\_\_\_\_. De syllogismo hypothetico libri duo. PL 64, 831-876.
- Cicero. De oratore libri tres. In M. Tullii Ciceronis opera, cum indicibus et variis lectionibus, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1783, I, pp. 131-336.
- Henri d'Andeli. La bataille des .vii. arts. Louis John Paetow, ed.: The Battle of the Seven Arts: A French Poem by Henri d'Andeli, Trouvère of the Thirteenth Century. "Memoirs of the University of California", IV, 1: History, I, 1; Berkely, California: University of California Press, 1914.
- John Buridan. Sophismata. Theodore Kermit Scott, tr.: John Buridan: Sophisms on Meaning and Truth, "Century Philosophy Sourcebooks"; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966.
- John Dumbleton. Summa logicae et philosophiae naturalis. Vatican, MS Vat. lat. 6750.
- Lambert of Auxerre. Summulae logicales. The ETS codex (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Episcopal Theological School, No. 22,025 in the ETS Accession Book, I, p. 277).



- Martin of Dacia. Modi significandi. Published in  
Martini de Dacia opera, Henricus Roos, ed.,  
 "Corpus philosophorum Danicorum medii aevi", II;  
 Hauniae: G.E.C. Gad, 1961, pp. 3-118.
- Migne, J.P. Patrologiae cursus completus...series latina.  
 221 vols.; Paris: apud Garnier fratres, 1844-1864.  
 (Abbreviated: PL)
- Paul of Venice. Logica magna. Venice: Albertinus  
 (Rubeus) Vercellensis, for Octavianus Scotus,  
 1499 (Hain #12505).
- Peter Abaelard. Dialectica. L.M. DeRijk, ed.,  
 "Wijsgerige Teksten en Studies"; Assen, Netherlands:  
 Van Gorcum & Co. N.V., 1956.
- Peter of Spain. Tractatus Syncategorematum and Selected  
 Anonymous Treatises. Joseph P. Mullally, tr.,  
 "Mediaeval Philosophical Texts: Translation", no.  
 13; Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University  
 Press, 1964.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Summulae logicales. I.M. Bochenski, O.P., ed.,  
 [Turin]: Domus editorialis Marietti, [1947].
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Summulae Logicales of Peter of Spain.  
 Joseph P. Mullally, ed. & tr., "Publications in  
 Mediaeval Studies, The University of Notre Dame",  
 VIII; Notre Dame, Indiana: [The University of  
 Notre Dame Press], 1945.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Syncategoremata. Published with his Summulae  
 logicales, Venice: apud Haeredes Melchioris  
 Sessae, 1580, ff. 264r-311v.
- Quintillian. The Institutio oratoria of Quintillian,  
 with an English Translation. H.E. Butler, ed. &  
 tr., 4 vols., "Loeb Classical Library"; London:  
 William Heinemann, Ltd., 1921-1922.
- Roger Nottingham. "The 'Insolubilia' of Roger Nottingham,  
 O.F.M.," Edward A. Synan, ed., Mediaeval Studies  
 26 (1964), 257-70.

- Siger of Courtrai. Summa modorum significandi. In Oeuvres de Siger de Courtrai: Etude critique et textes inédits, G. Wallerand, ed., "Les Philosophes Belges", VIII; Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie de l'Université, 1913, pp. 93-125.
- Thomas Bradwardine. Insolubilia. Bruges, Bibliothèque publique de la ville, MS 500, ff. 134rb-143va.
- Thomas of Erfurt. De modis significandi sive grammatica speculativa. In John Duns Scotus, Opera omnia, I, Paris: Vives, 1891, pp. 1-50.
- William Heytesbury. Regulae solvendi sophismata. Published in Tractatus guilielmi Hentisberi de sensu composito et diviso, Regulae eiusdem cum sophismatibus, declaratio gaetani supra easdem.... Venice: Bonetus Locatellus, for Octavianus Scotus, 1494, ff. 4va-7rb. (Hain #8437)
- William Langland. The Vision of William concerning Piers the Plowman in Three Parallel Texts together with Richard the Redeless by William Langland (about 1362-1399 a.d.). Walter W. Skeat, ed., 2 vols; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1886.
- William of Ockham. Summa logicae. Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., ed., "Franciscan Institute Publications, Text Series", no. 2; St. Bonaventure's, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1951.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Tractatus logicae [= Summa logicae]. Paris: [Johannes Higman], 1488 (Hain #11948).
- William of Sherwood. "The Syncategoremata of William of Sherwood," J. Reginald O'Donnell, C.S.B., ed., Mediaeval Studies 3 (1941), 46-93.

#### Studies and Modern Sources

- Bocheński, I.M. Ancient Formal Logic. "Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics"; Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1951.



- \_\_\_\_\_. Formale Logik. "Orbis Academicus: Problem-  
geschichten der Wissenschaft in Dokumenten und  
Darstellungen"; Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber,  
1956.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Formalization of a Scholastic Solution of  
the Paradox of the 'Liar'," In Logico-philosophical  
Studies, Albert Menne, ed., Dordrecht, Holland:  
D. Reidel Publishing Company, n.d., pp. 64-66.
- \_\_\_\_\_. A History of Formal Logic. Ivo Thomas, ed.  
& tr., Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre  
Dame Press, 1961.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Sancti Thomae Aquinatis de modalibus  
opusculum et doctrina," Angelicum 17 (1940),  
180-218.
- Boehner, Philotheus, O.F.M. Medieval Logic: An  
Outline of Its Development from 1250 to c. 1400.  
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Ockham's Theory of Supposition and the  
Notion of Truth." Franciscan Studies 6 (1946),  
261-292.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Realistic Conceptualism of William  
Ockham." Traditio 4 (1946), 307-335.
- Faral, E. "Jean Buridan: Maître ès arts de l'  
université de Paris." Histoire littéraire de  
la France, XXXVIII, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale,  
1949, pp. 462-605.
- Grabmann, Martin. Die Introductiones in logicam des  
Wilhelm von Shyreswood († nach 1267). "Sitzungs-  
berichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften,"  
Philosophisch-historische Abteilung, Jahrgang 1937,  
Heft 10; Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie  
der Wissenschaften, 1937.
- Heijenoort, John van. "Logical Paradoxes." The  
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, V, 1967, pp. 45-51.
- Kneale, William, and Kneale, Martha. The Development  
of Logic. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962.

- Mates, Benson. Stoic Logic. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1961.
- Moody, Ernest A. Truth and Consequence in Mediaeval Logic. "Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics"; Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1953.
- Murdoch, John E., and Synan, Edward A. "Two Questions on the Continuum: Walter Chatton (?), O.F.M. and Adam Wodeham, O.F.M." Franciscan Studies 26 (Annual IV, 1966), 212-288.
- Prantl, Carl. Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande. 4 vols., Leipzig: Buchhandlung Gustav Fock, G.M.B.H., 1927 (Manuldruck der Originalausgabe).
- Quine, W.V. "The Ways of Paradox." In his The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, New York: Random House, 1966, pp. 3-20.
- Ramsey, Frank Plumpton. The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays, R.B. Braithwaite, ed., "International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method"; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1931.
- Rijk, L.M. De. Logica Modernorum: A Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic, I: On the Twelfth Century Theories of Fallacy. "Wijzgerige Teksten en Studies"; Assen: Van Gorcum & Comp. N.V., 1962.
- Rivetti Barbo, Francesca. L'antinomia del mentitore nel pensiero contemporaneo da Peirce a Tarski: Studi-Testi-Bibliographia. "Pubblicazione dell'Universita Cattolica del Sacro Cuore", Serie terza: Scienze filosofiche, V; Milan: Societa editrice "Vita e pensiero", 1961.
- Russell, Bertrand. "Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types." The American Journal of Mathematics 30 (1908), 222-262.

- Spade, Paul Vincent. "Aristotle's Sophistici Elenchi and the Mediaeval Development of the Problem of Semantic Antinomies to the End of the Thirteenth Century." Unpublished paper.
- Synan, Edward A. "The 'Introitus ad sententias' of Roger Nottingham, O.F.M." Mediaeval Studies 25 (1963), 259-279.
- Tarski, Alfred. "Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen." Studia Philosophica I (1935), 261-405.
- Weisheipl, James A., O.P. "Curriculum of the Faculty of Arts at Oxford in the Early Fourteenth Century." Mediaeval Studies 26 (1964), 143-185.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Developments in the Arts Curriculum at Oxford in the Early Fourteenth Century." Mediaeval Studies 28 (1966), 151-175.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Ockham and Some Mertonians." Mediaeval Studies 30 (1968), 163-213.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Repertorium Mertonense." Typescript of an article to appear in a future volume of Mediaeval Studies.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Roger Swyneshed, O.S.B., Logician, Natural Philosopher, and Theologian." In Oxford Studies Presented to Daniel Callus, "Oxford Historical Society," New Series, vol. XVI; Oxford: Clarendon Press for the Oxford Historical Society, 1964 (for 1959-60), pp. 231-252.
- Whitehead, Alfred North, and Russell, Bertrand. Principia Mathematica. 2nd ed., 3 vols.; Cambridge: University Press, 1925.
- Wilson, Curtis. William Heytesbury: Medieval Logic and the Rise of Mathematical Physics. "The University of Wisconsin, Publications in Medieval Science," no. 3; Madison, (Wisconsin): The University of Wisconsin Press, 1956.



Catalogues, Dictionaries, Reference Works

- A Catalogue of the Harleian Manuscripts in the British Museum: with Indices of Persons, Places, and Matters.  
4 vols.; London: [G. Eyre and H. Strahan], 1808-1812.
- Emden, A.B. A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to a.d. 1500. 3 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957-59.
- Hain, Ludwig. Repertorium Bibliographicum in quo Libri Omnes ab Arte Typographica Inventi usque ad Annum MD. 4 vols.; Milan: G.G. Görlich, 1948.
- Hauréau, B. Notices et extraits de quelques manuscrits latins de la Bibliothèque Nationale. 6 vols.; Paris: Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1890-93.
- Incunabula in American Libraries: A Third Census of Fifteenth-Century Books Recorded in North-American Collections. Frederick R. Goff, ed., New York: The Bibliographical Society of America, 1964.
- Mohan, Gaudens E., O.F.M. "Incipits of Logical Writings of the XIIIth-XVth Centuries." Franciscan Studies 12 (1952), 349-489.
- Poorter, A. de. Catalogue des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque publique de la ville de Bruges. "Catalogue général des manuscrits des bibliothèques de Belgique," II; Gembloux (Belgium): J. Duculot, 1934.
- Vocabularium iurisprudentiae romanae iussu Instituti savigniani compositum.... Berolini: Typis et impensis G. Reimeri, 1903- .